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Executive Summary
Several domestic and international developments increased interest among the US dairy 
industry in world markets during the 1990s.  One development was the passage of the 
NAFTA and Uruguay Round (URA) trade agreements in the mid-decade, and their 
successors, the current “Doha Round” of international trade negotiations now
underway. Another development during the 1990s was additional (positive) experience 
gained by the US dairy industry in export markets.  Much of this experience came about 
because increases in world market prices for butter and powder in 1995-96 made US 
exports more competitive. The Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP) is also credited 
with improving the ability of US exporters to move powders, butter and cheese into 
international markets. 
At the same time, there has been an increased level of concern about possible negative
impacts of past and potential liberalization of dairy product trade.  Rapid growth in 
imports of products designed to circumvent US tariffs on dairy products, such as milk 
protein concentrates (MPCs) have caused a great deal of concern about their impacts 
on US farm milk prices.  Viewed in larger perspective, this issue demonstrates how 
much the US dairy trade policy environment had changed since the early 1990s.  The 
NAFTA had placed the US on the road to something close to free trade in dairy products 
with Mexico, and the URA had committed the US to reductions in domestic support and 
export subsidies and increases in market access for dairy products.   
Importantly in light of the rapid pace of technological developments in dairy processing, 
these trade agreements also placed limits on the US’ ability to modify tariff schedules to 
address new product formulations.  As a result of these diverse developments, there is 
continued interest in understanding the world market for dairy products, the impacts of
imports on the US dairy industry and the potential for growth in US exports.  The 
overall objectives of this report are: 
1) To review recent patterns of US dairy trade and changes in trade policies 

affecting US trade in dairy products; 

2) To develop improved analytical frameworks for empirical economic analysis of the 
impacts of dairy product trade and trade liberalization on the US dairy industry; 
and 
3) To implement an empirical model formulation to assess the impacts of imports of 
dairy product formulations that circumvent existing trade barriers, using milk
protein concentrates (MPCs) as an example. 
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The key findings of this study are: 
•	 A number of new technologies for separating the components of milk (e.g., fat, 
protein, lactose) have become commercially viable and other similar technologies will 
become viable in the near future.  This will increase the economic viability of 
transporting dairy components long distances, and will promote the formulation of
new products to better meet the demands of both dairy processing companies and 
final consumers. This will place tremendous pressure on policies aimed at pricing 
milk and protecting domestic producers.  (Chapter 1) 
•	 Much of the analytical research to date fails to account for many of the important 
facets that determine prices, trade patterns, and competitiveness in the dairy 
industry today. In general, the existing models are too highly aggregated with 
respect to regional and product specificity, overly simplistic with respect to policy 
detail, and naive with respect to the technical relationships and marketing 
arrangements peculiar to the dairy sector.  (Chapter 1) 
•	 US dairy trade policy has undergone great change in the past decade.  US 
participation in the NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreement (URA) has allowed 
relatively modest increases in dairy product imports, and laid the groundwork for 
current efforts to further liberalize agricultural trade.  (Chapter 2) 
•	 The US is a relatively small player in world dairy markets.  It exported less than 4% 
of the volume of major commodities (butter, cheese, and milk powders) in 1999 and 
2000. The European Union, New Zealand, and Australia are the world’s major dairy 
product exporters.  (Chapter 2)
•	 Despite its small share of world dairy trade, the US exported nearly $900 million 
worth of dairy products in 2001.  The value of dairy product exports has grown more
rapidly than imports since 1990, with whey and whey products an important and 
fast-growing export. (Chapter 2) 
•	 The value of US imports ($1.5 billion), however, was larger than the value of exports 
in 2000, and imports have also grown some 80% since 1990.  The most important 
US imports are specialty cheeses and casein products.  Imports of milk protein 
concentrates grew rapidly from 1995 to 2000.  (Chapter 2) 
•	 Despite the growth in the value of imports, imports still account for less than 3% of 
commercial disappearance, measured as either fat or nonfat solids.  This percentage 
was roughly constant from 1990 to 1997, then increased in 1998 due to butter and 
MPC imports. (Chapter 2) 
•	 The URA commits the US to a broader range of trade-related policies, including 
reductions in the overall value of “domestic support” programs—which may include 
the Dairy Price Support Program.  However, the impacts of the URA on the US dairy 
industry to date are modest. (Chapter 2) 
ii 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
•	 A number of studies have examined the potential impacts of trade liberalization on 
the US dairy industry.  These studies indicate that past and future reductions in 
tariffs and increases in import quotas are unlikely to result in either dramatic benefits 
for the US dairy industry, or dramatic negative effects.  Most studies predict small 
reductions (1-2%) in US dairy farm income when various trade barriers are reduced, 
as long as all major dairy exporters participate in the reductions. However, most of 
these studies address only short-term effects and may not capture long-term 
opportunities to export certain products. (Chapter 2) 
•	 Key dairy trade issues in recent years include the increase in MPC imports, ongoing 
disputes with Canada about its export subsidies, the role of what are called “state 
trading enterprises” in dairy trade, and the impacts of provisions other than tariffs 
and quotas (e.g., sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) provisions) on the prospects for 
dairy trade.  (Chapter 2) 
•	 The prospects for future dairy trade liberalization are uncertain.  The US is keen to 
see further agricultural trade liberalization, but the EU and Canada are reluctant 
because of the potential negative impacts on their dairy farms.  The US should focus 
attention not just on the reduction of export subsidies, but also on provisions that 
may be used as trade barriers, such as import licensing, SPS, and other technical 
barriers to trade. (Chapter 2) 
•	 The use of tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) is widespread, especially in agricultural and 
other primary-sector trade policy settings. Many of the extant trade models can be
reformulated as mixed complementarity problems (MCPs). They are then capable of 
being used to analyze complex of TRQ instruments.  (Chapter 3)
•	 The use of a mixed complementarity problem framework has great potential to 
incorporate characteristics of dairy trade not yet adequately addressed by existing 
empirical models. These characteristics include direct modeling of ad valorem tariffs, 
imperfectly competitive international markets (including state trading enterprises 
such as the former New Zealand Dairy Board, now reincarnated as Fonterra), 
nonlinearities in component balance equations due to variations in raw milk 
component content by region, and development of new intermediate products that 
circumvent existing trade barriers.  (Chapter 4) 
•	 Imports of milk protein concentrates (MPC) classified under Chapter 4 of the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule have modest impacts on US milk and product prices.  
The impact depends on the substitutability between MPC and nonfat dry milk (NDM) 
and between MPC and non-milk proteins in the manufacture of other dairy products 
and in final demand.  If MPC are imperfectly substitutable with NDM, the US all-milk 
price is estimated to have been decreased $0.06/cwt by MPC imports in 2001.  If all 
MPC imports are perfectly substitutable with NDM, there are no impacts on milk 
prices, but government purchases of NDM were increased by about 100 million lbs in 
2001. (Chapter 5) 
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•	 If MPCs are an imperfect substitute for NDM in final demand, cheese prices would 
have been about 1.5 cents/lb higher in the absence of MPC imports, due to the 
additional demand for domestically-produced milk proteins.  Class III prices would 
increase by about $0.10/cwt if MPC imports were not available in 2001.  (Chapter 5) 
•	 However, the increase in domestic demand for milk proteins would bring about an 
increase in milk and butter production, so butter prices would fall.  Thus, there would 
be an offsetting effect in butter markets that lowers the Class IV price.  In California, 
the effects of the decrease in the Class 4a price would more than offset the effects 
on the Class 4b price due to high Class 4a utilization.  If Chapter 4 MPC imports were 
not allowed, the all milk price in California would be an estimated $0.03/cwt lower. 
(Chapter 5) 
•	 The magnitude of the effects of MPC imports on milk prices also depends on whether 
the Class III or Class IV price is the “higher of” price used to determine Class I prices 
in Federal Milk Marketing Orders.  If Class IV is the “higher of,” the negative impacts 
of MPC imports on farm milk prices are smaller, because prohibiting MPC imports 
would reduce Class IV prices (and thus Class I and II prices as well).  (Chapter 5) 
•	 Chapter 4 MPCs accounted for less than one-fifth of milk protein imports in 2001; 
casein and caseinates accounted for the majority.  Restrictions on casein imports 
(such as those currently under consideration by Congress) can be expected to have 
larger effects on product prices and class prices (cheese prices and Class III prices 
increase, butter and Class IV prices decrease).  Because these effects are offsetting, 
additional analysis is needed to estimate impacts on all milk prices. (Chapter 5) 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The US dairy industry accounts for about 12 percent of total farm cash receipts, and is 
the second largest agricultural sector. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s, the US became the world’s largest producer of cow’s milk.  Consumer 
expenditures on all dairy products exceeded $70 billion during the 1990s, approximately 
11 percent of all food expenditures.  Furthermore, significant quantities of intermediate 
dairy products are used as inputs in non–dairy food manufacturing. Clearly, the dairy 
industry is an important sector of the US economy.  Yet, for the past decade, the US 
share of world dairy exports has averaged much less than 10 percent and exports 
account for just 2 percent of domestic milk production.  Moreover a large percentage of 
US dairy exports require subsidies to be viable.   
Dairy has long been a highly regulated industry in the United States.  Since the 1930s, 
a complex system of federal, state, and local laws and regulations have, to varying 
degrees, supported prices and regulated how milk and dairy products are sold and 
distributed. Because domestic prices typically have been set above international price 
levels, border measures such as quotas and prohibitive tariffs have been necessary to 
control the flow of imports and protect the integrity of the economic regulations.  At the 
same time, international markets often have been used by the US and other countries 
to dispose of surplus products—frequently with the assistance of generous export 
subsidies. This has created the environment in which international dairy prices are 
volatile and US involvement in world dairy markets has been minimal.  The current 
situation provides a stark contrast to the expressed interest of recent federal 
administrations and the US Congress for a freer and more open system of international 
trade. 
In recent years, however, the tide has been turning.  The dairy industry recently 
entered a period of domestic and trade policy reform.  In particular, three major policy 
events—the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 1995 Uruguay 
Round Agreement (URA),1 and the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform 
Act (FAIR)2—represent a significant reversal of protectionist policies by opening up 
1 The major thrust of the URA was to liberalize international markets.  Key provisions for dairy include: (i) 
replacement of non-tariff barriers to trade with tariff equivalents and/or Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs), (ii)
reduction of expenditures on export subsidies and the volume of subsidized exports, and (iii) 
strengthening the minimum access provisions to progressively open protected markets to imports. 
While the URA permits greater competition from imports, it may also provide significant opportunities
for increasing exports of US dairy products and ingredients because of the commitments for trade 
liberalization made by other countries (particularly the EU) on tariffs, minimum access, and export 
subsidies. 
2 Under the FAIR Act, several policy changes were aimed at reducing government involvement in
production and marketing decisions.  Key among such provisions are: (i) the phase–out of price 
supports through government purchases of dairy products by the end of the decade and their
replacement with a recourse loan program, (ii) a reduction to 10-14 in the number of marketing orders 
and reform of the milk pricing system for Grade A milk, and (iii) elimination of marketing assessments 
(that penalize producers for increasing marketings).
1
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
markets and limiting government price support.  Although the subsequent legislation 
provided for large direct payments to dairy farmers and the 2002 Farm Bill formalized 
these over the next few years, the process of trade liberalization is likely to continue 
and intensify.   
In addition, a number of new technologies for separating the components of milk (e.g., 
fat, protein, lactose) have become commercially viable and other similar technologies 
will become viable in the near future.  This will increase the economic viability of 
transporting dairy components long distances, and will promote the formulation of new 
products to better meet the demands of both dairy processing companies and final
consumers. Such events will place tremendous pressure on policies aimed at pricing 
milk and protecting domestic producers.  These changes will provide new opportunities 
for US food companies, both buyers and sellers, to enter international dairy markets 
and to respond efficiently to world price signals.  Much of the analytical research to 
date fails to account for many of the important facets that determine prices, trade 
patterns, and competitiveness in the dairy industry today. In general, the existing 
models are too highly aggregated with respect to regional and product specificity, 
overly simplistic with respect to policy detail, and naive with respect to the technical 
relationships and marketing arrangements peculiar to the dairy sector.  The overall
purpose of this project is to clearly elucidate the issues and areas where analyses are 
needed, to develop analytical frameworks that allow these important issues to be
addressed, and implement an empirical model for the important issue of how imports of 
product formulations designed to circumvent existing trade barriers can influence 
outcomes in the US dairy industry.   
Recent Trade Policy Changes
The NAFTA and the URA are the two key trade policy reforms for which implementation 
is essentially complete.  US dairy import quotas have increased by roughly 50 percent 
over 1995 levels by the year 2000 due to the URA.  The NAFTA allows Mexico to 
increase its exports to the US although the volumes involved are relatively small.  The 
market access target set by the URA is 5% of the domestic market although the specific 
commitments were left to each country’s own discretion and the US, like many other 
countries, adopted commitments that fall short of the 5% goal.  More important is the 
fact that the strict import quotas of the past have been replaced with tariff rate quotas.  
Thus, imports are permitted above the quota but at a higher rate of tariff.  The URA 
required that over-quota tariffs be reduced, and these rates are now in the range of 70 
to 120 percent for many dairy products.  Whether or not imports occur at this rate of 
tariff depends on the relative difference between internal US prices and world prices.  
Over-quota dairy imports already occur; high domestic prices have resulted in 
substantial butter imports during 1997, 1998, and 2001.  Also significant is the fact that 
some products are not subject to quotas or significant tariffs.  Imports of these product 
types (e.g., milk protein concentrates and casein) are increasing, especially for those 
products that are close substitutes to the more highly protected products.  Finally, the 
2
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
  
 
 
  
 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
URA places limits on certain types of domestic support and the extent to which 
subsidies may be used to assist exporting activity.   
The NAFTA and the URA have fundamentally changed dairy trade policy options for the
US As a result, there is a need to better understand the impacts of these agreements 
before further modifications are made to dairy provisions in the next round of trade
negotiations.  In particular, one should understand whether current provisions have
been beneficial or detrimental, for whom, and by what criteria such determinations are 
to be made. 
Technological Developments in the Dairy and Food Processing Industries 
In addition to trade and domestic policy reform, technological developments in the dairy 
and food processing industries are going to take on a greater importance in the next 
few years. Current microfiltration technologies permit the fractionation of milk into its 
basic nutritive components: proteins, fats, lactose and minerals (Rizvi, 1987; Rizvi and 
Bhasker, 1995). These basic building blocks of milk are already being used to build 
customized products for industries as diverse as medicine and pharmaceuticals, health 
foods, and specialized food preparations and ingredients.  Component separation and 
the use of intermediate products3 are ubiquitous in the world dairy industry.  Separation 
allows dairy processing companies to formulate products that can be transported more 
cheaply, stored for longer periods, and reformulated into a variety of customized food 
ingredients and value-added products.  Already much dairy trade comprises products 
that can be used by dairy manufacturers in other locations.  The implications of future 
component separation technologies and product formulations for world and US dairy
markets has not previously been studied, so the potential impacts currently are 
unknown. 
As new uses are being developed for the components of milk, new dairy products— 
often intermediate products used to manufacture other dairy or dairy-based products— 
are being formulated.  This creates complications and opportunities in a world where 
barriers to trade are designed for specific products.  A 40-year old example of this in
the US dairy sector is casein, a milk protein which can be used as a substitute for dry 
milk powders in a number of food and non-food products.  At the time quotas were 
established for dairy products, casein was no longer produced in the US nor imported.4 
Subsequent to the adoption of section 22 import quotas, food processors discovered 
that imported casein, for which there was no quota, could be used as a cheaper source 
3 ‘Intermediate products’ refer to dairy products used in the manufacture of other dairy products; an
example would be whole milk powder manufactured in New Zealand used for reconstituting fluid milk in 
Indonesia or Mexico.  Manufactured products used in other food industries (such as skim milk powder 
used in the manufacture of chocolate) can be considered ‘final products’ because their use is ‘outside’
the dairy manufacturing sector.
4 Casein production rapidly declined after the federal Dairy Price Support Program became permanent in
1949 and rendered casein less profitable to make than nonfat dry milk.
3
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
of milk protein than powders produced in the US  The US now imports annually more 
than $500 million worth of casein and casein derivatives, much of it free of tariffs.  As 
new product types and uses are developed, the ability of product-specific tariffs and 
quotas to protect domestic producers and processors can be undermined.  Due to 
recent trade agreements, the imposition of new prohibitive tariffs is no longer an 
option. 
Developments in the storage and packaging arena are also contributing to the changing 
nature of trade patterns.  Improved barrier materials and modified atmosphere
packaging techniques permit much longer shelf life and therefore the ability to transport 
perishable products greater distances (Hotchkiss; 1995a, 1995b).  Modern warehousing 
methods and practices along the entire marketing channel are driving changes in dairy 
product trade, and new technologies allow new marketing practices to be used for dairy
products. 
In order to analyze these complex and interrelated issues, a suitable modeling 
framework is required. The next section briefly discusses some of the previously 
developed models and points out their limitations to address the issues described 
above. 
Review of Analytical Literature 
Many interregional models of agriculture and dairy in particular, have been constructed 
over the past three or four decades (e.g., see Snodgrass and French, 1958; Louwes et 
al., 1963; McDowell, 1982). Although earlier studies focused on country-level issues, 
the increased interest in trade over time has seen the development of more 
international trade applications.  Most recently, the Uruguay Round focused attention 
on agricultural trade and domestic policy reform, and researchers responded with a 
large number of analyses. 
A common aspect of almost all the agricultural trade studies is their derivation from the 
well-known Samuelson-Takayama-Judge (STJ) modeling framework (Samuelson, 1952; 
Takayama and Judge, 1964, 1971).  Even those models adopting a statistically oriented 
formulation (as opposed to the linear or quadratic programming approach of STJ) can 
trace a direct lineage back to the pioneering work of STJ.  Given the methodological
and algorithmic development spawned by the work of these and other early pioneers, it 
is quite remarkable that so many contemporary agricultural trade models tend to look 
just like those of thirty years ago.  Many dairy-related analyses employ a standard 
quadratic programming (QP) model in the quantity domain with linear supply and 
demand functions, a set of linear conservation-of-flow constraints, and a few fixed per
unit transfer costs such as transportation, import tariffs, or subsidies (Lattimore and 
Weedle, 1981; Baker, 1991; Chavas, Cox, and Jesse, 1993; Cox and Zhu, 1997). 
Of the more recent studies undertaken in support of the Uruguay Round, some of most 
widely referenced include: the Ministerial Trade Mandate (MTM) model by the OECD
(1991); the SWOPSIM modeling framework developed at the USDA (see Roningen et 
al., 1991); the various works of Tyers and Anderson (e.g. 1992); the ongoing efforts of 
4
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
FAPRI (e.g. 1993); and the work by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the
United Nations with their World Food Model (FAO, 1995).  These models all treat dairy 
as one of many sectors under study; the commodity detail with respect to dairy is
therefore negligible. The range of products is aggregated to just fluid milk and 
manufacturing milk (e.g. OECD/MTM) or, at most, three or four of the major dairy 
product categories such as fluid milk, cheese, butter, and powder (e.g. SWOPSIM). 
Although this high degree of product aggregation is required from a practical standpoint 
in multi-sector, multi-region models, the result is that these models have limited ability 
to analyze complex interactions among the multitude of products comprising the dairy 
sector. 
Policy instruments in these types of models tend to be very aggregate and non-specific.
For instance, the OECD/MTM and SWOPSIM models collapse policy detail to a single
measurement of subsidy-equivalents.  Although useful, such an approach precludes 
analyzing the direct impacts of individual policy instruments.  These models also tend to 
ignore bilateral marketing arrangements and agreements.  In addition to high degrees 
of product and geographic aggregation, most previous trade models that include a dairy 
sector implicitly assume that producers trade directly with consumers.  This ignores the 
crucial role of intermediate dairy products and the processing sector in mediating farm 
supplies of raw milk and consumer demands for final products.
International trade models generally make the simple assumption that goods moving by 
ocean freight in international markets will encounter a flat transportation rate per unit 
of distance. However, this is far from the case.  Although there are no publicly 
available ocean transportation rates for dairy products, we were able to obtain actual
ocean freight rates for shipments of dairy products from Oceania ports to global
destinations during a recent year. The shipment cost per unit distance for butter and 
whole milk powder shipped from Oceania to worldwide ports varies substantially.  
Although the rates per unit distance for butter decline at longer distances, they are also 
determined by many other important factors.  Rates per unit distance are related to the
commodity being transferred, wharf charges specific to the origin and destination ports,
insurance rates, fuel surcharges and general state of the transportation economy.  Also 
important is whether the shipper participates in a conference scheme5. The rates vary 
by about 300% from low to high for butter and by about 200% for whole milk powder, 
even for countries within 500 miles of one another.  The variations in the actual rates 
are large enough to alter the results of any study that makes a naive, flat rate 
assumption. 
Perhaps most important for analyses of product-specific trade policies, most models 
have not included explicit representation of discriminatory ad valorem tariffs (i.e., tariffs
that differ by country of origin).  This is a remarkable omission in models designed to
explore the impacts of trade liberalization, given the important recent role of 
tariffication in that process.  One reason for the omission is the additional difficulty in 
formulating and solving models with discriminatory ad valorem tariffs.  Takayama and 
5 A ‘conference scheme’ is an agreement among shipping companies about rates to be charged.
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Judge (1971) noted that optimization methods such as QP could not be used to solve 
models with discriminatory ad valorem tariffs, but demonstrated that complementarity 
techniques could be employed to solve linear models including them. 
Recently constructed models that focus on the global dairy sector are those of Cox and 
Zhu (1997), Bishop et al. (1993, 1994). The Cox and Zhu model is a conventional QP 
formulation in the vein of STJ with a quantity domain formulation, linear supply and 
demand functions, and fixed per-unit transfer costs.  The Bishop et al. model adopts a 
more flexible framework making use of the complementarity approach to equilibrium 
modeling.  Both models use a similar level of disaggregation with respect to regional
and product specificity, but Bishop et al. explicitly consider intermediate products.  
Despite the advances they represent, the regional and product specificity of both these 
models does not allow analyses of the full range of issues discussed above.  Both 
studies are constrained as to their choice of products by the availability of free or 
inexpensive public domain data.  The only complete and consistently compiled source of 
global production and trade data is that put together by the FAO.  Unfortunately, it is 
quite highly aggregated and focuses more on quantity than on prices. 
Most previous modeling efforts offer few specific and detailed analyses of the impacts 
of proposed policy options on either the US or the international dairy sectors, although 
refinements continue on some of these models6. There is a strong need to have useful 
models ‘on-the-shelf’ and ready to perform timely and relevant analyses.  The linkages 
that the URA has created between trade and domestic support policies imply that 
increased specificity in empirical models is required to adequately analyze policy 
options.  We believe a useful dairy sector model must at a minimum be able to account 
for a number of important characteristics of international dairy markets.  These are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
Research Objectives 
The overall objective of this project is to develop improved analytical frameworks that 
can be used to examine the impacts of various trade policy options on the US dairy 
sector, in light of continuing multilateral trade and domestic policy liberalization.  These 
frameworks should contain a high degree of policy specificity, focuses on intermediate 
and final product disaggregation, and recognize the complexities of dairy marketing 
channels. Specific objectives are as follows, and the portions of this report addressing 
them are indicated in parentheses: 
1) Describe the recent history of US dairy imports and exports, i.e., volume, value,
level of export subsidies and import protection, by product types.  Place the US in a 
global context with respect to trade and identify the product groups for which trade 
is contracting, stagnant, and growing.  (Chapter 2) 
6 For example, the MTM model has evolved to the AGLINK model that includes greater product 
disaggregation and policy specificity. Because it does not have partner to partner flows, however, it 
cannot easily deal with TRQs and targeted export subsidies. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
2) Describe the current nature of production and trade in the international dairy sector 
on a disaggregated product basis.  Document the current policy regimes and explain 
the nature of proposed and potential reforms.  Explain and quantify the institutional 
structures which influence trade and production patterns. (Chapter 2) 
3) Review the literature pertaining to modeling international dairy trade and other 
trade literature with an emphasis on how trade liberalization has or will influence the 
US dairy industry. (Chapters 1 and 2) 
4) Formulate mixed complementarity models of the US and world dairy industries.  The 
models describe a farm milk production sector, processing and marketing 
intermediaries, and final consumption for a wide range of product types and regions.
They incorporate all significant policy instruments and contain endogenous prices 
and quantities. (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) 
5) Implement an empirical model of the US dairy industry to estimate the impacts of 
(new) products formulated to circumvent US trade barriers, using milk protein 
concentrates (MPC) as an important current example.  Estimate the effect of MPC 
imports on US farm milk production and producer milk prices.  (Chapter 5) 
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry1 
Introduction 
As the world’s largest milk producer2, the US dairy industry has often expressed interest 
in enlarging export markets for US dairy products.  Yet as one of the world’s largest 
consumers of dairy products, the US is also a lucrative export market for the other 
major dairy countries.  Several domestic and international developments have increased 
interest among the US dairy industry in world markets during the 1990s.  One 
development was the passage of the NAFTA and Uruguay Round (URA) trade
agreements in the mid-decade, and their successors, the current “Doha Round” of 
international trade negotiations now underway.  Another development during the 1990s 
was additional (positive) experience gained by the US dairy industry in export markets.  
Much of this experience came about because of increases in world market prices for 
butter and powder in 1995-96 made US exports more competitive.  The Dairy Export 
Incentive Program (DEIP) is also credited with improving the ability of US exporters to 
move powders, butter and cheese into international markets.  Finally, major US
companies such as McDonald’s and Pizza Hut have expanded their activities in foreign 
markets, and have maintained their supply relationships with US dairy companies. As a 
result of these developments, there is continued interest in understanding the world 
market for dairy products, and the potential for growth in US exports.  At the same 
time, there has been an increased level of concern about possible negative impacts of
past and potential liberalization of dairy product trade.  This chapter reviews recent 
patterns in world dairy product trade and discusses changes in US dairy trade policy 
during the 1990s. With that background, current and potential trade policy issues can 
be better understood.  To help provide a perspective on future negotiations about dairy
trade policy, the available evidence about how trade (and trade liberalization) affects 
the US dairy industry also is summarized.
World Trade in Dairy Products
One of the curiosities of dairy trade patterns in the 1990s is that being a large producer 
doesn’t mean that a country will be a large exporter, and being a major exporter 
doesn’t necessarily imply that a country will be a large producer.  The US is a good 
example of a large producer whose role in international dairy markets is smaller than its 
share of milk production would suggest.  New Zealand, which produces about as much
milk as Wisconsin, is a major player in world markets for many dairy products.  
Following the dissolution of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the US became the world’s 
largest milk producer.  India, Russia, Germany, and France round out the top five milk
1 This document draws on Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry available at 
www.cpdmp.cornell.edu under “Weblets”. 
2 The US is the world’s largest producer of cow’s milk.  India is the world’s largest producer if buffalo milk 
is included, which may be appropriate given that milk from the two species is mixed in dairy processing 
in that country.
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
producing countries (Figure 2.1).  Of these five, Germany and France are members of 
the European Union, which is a large net exporter of dairy products.  Our neighbors, 
Canada and Mexico are well down on the list. 
Compared to the grain trade, world trade in dairy products is a rather small share of the 
total volume of milk production, about 8% in 2000 (Figure 2.2).  The largest exporters 
of dairy products are the European Union3, New Zealand, and Australia (Figure 2.3)4. 
The EU has been a major player in world dairy markets largely because its domestic 
dairy policies have resulted in surplus production that cannot be consumed
domestically, and it relies heavily on export subsidies to sell dairy products in world 
markets. In contrast, New Zealand and Australia are major exporters because their 
populations are small relative to their milk production, they have low-cost milk 
production systems, and they have undertaken aggressive international marketing 
efforts (assisted by government organizations).  The US’ share in world butter, powder 
and cheese markets is relatively small (Table 2.1), but US exports still totaled nearly $1 
billion in 2001. 
The world’s largest dairy importers (net of intra-EU trade) in 2000 were the EU, Mexico, 
China and the US (Figure 2.4).  China, Mexico, and Brazil are countries with large 
populations, relatively low milk production per capita, and moderate levels of per capita
income. Algeria, the Philippines, and Indonesia share these characteristics.  Russia, a 
large milk producer, is a major butter importer because of the significant decreases in 
milk production resulting from its transition to a market-oriented economy.  The EU and 
US are major importers because of their large populations and high incomes, which 
increase the demand for specialty dairy products from other countries.  The US in 
particular is a major importer of cheese, purchasing primarily specialty cheeses from the
EU. 
US Dairy Product Imports and Exports, 1990-2001 
Despite its relatively minor role in most international dairy product markets, the US 
does export important quantities of dairy products.  In 2001, US dairy exports totaled 
$960 million, an amount nearly three times the value of exports in 1990 (Table 2.2).  
The major products exported by the US in 2000 include whey and modified whey ($136 
million), NDM ($190 million), cheese ($162 million), other products derived from dried 
milk, buttermilk, or whey ($161 million), and ice cream ($86 million).  The value of 
exports in each of these categories has grown rapidly since 1990, assisted by the DEIP
3 The EU currently consists of 15 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Portugal, and the UK), but Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and Hungary will soon join. 
4 Note that use of milk equivalents on a butterfat basis will overstate the importance of exports from 
countries selling more fat-intensive products (e.g., the EU and New Zealand) and understate the 
importance of exports from countries selling more solids-not-fat intensive products (e.g., the US).
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Figure 2.1.  Major Milk Producing Countries, 2001 
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Figure 2.2.  Dairy Tade and Cow's Milk Production, 1999 and 2000 
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Figure 2.3. Dairy Product Exports by Major Region, 2000 
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Figure 2.4. Dairy Product Imports by Major Region, 2000 
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Table 2.1. Share of Dairy Exports by Exporting Region and Product, 2000,  

Quantity Basis 

Region Butter Cheese NDM Whole Milk Powder 
USA 1.1% 3.9% 7.9% 1.9% 
European Union 21.3% 33.9% 27.6% 37.8% 
New Zealand and Australia 57.9% 36.7% 29.8% 41.4% 
Eastern Europe 3.8% 7.4% 9.9% 1.7% 
Other 17.0% 22.0% 32.7% 19.1% 
Source: FAO Statistical Databases.
for NDM and cheese. The importance of the US as an exporter of butter has declined 
since 1990, reflecting in large measure the decrease in Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC) butter stocks during the decade.  A growing proportion of US dairy exports went 
to Mexico and Canada (Figure 2.5), but a majority of sales were made to countries 
other than the major dairy traders or our neighbors.   
As noted earlier, the US is also an important importer of dairy products given its 
population and high per capita income.  The value of dairy product imports in 2001 
totaled nearly $1.6 billion (Table 2.3).  Over 40% of this was for imports of cheese 
($746 million). Casein and caseinates accounted for an additional one-third of the 
value of imports, and imports of milk protein concentrates (MPC) grew rapidly in the 
late 1990s to account for about 10% of imports.  The vast majority of dairy product 
imports originated in the EU or New Zealand (Figure 2.6.)  The total value of dairy 
imports grew more slowly than the value of dairy exports during the 1990s, increasing 
about 90% during the decade.  In value terms, the US was a net exporter of NDM, 
whey products, certain cheeses, ice cream, and certain dried milk products in 2001 
(Table 2.4).  The US was a net importer in value terms of most cheese, casein 
products, and butterfat in 2001.  The composition of US imports provides a starting 
point to understand why we still buy foreign dairy products in years when milk 
production has increased and farm milk prices are low.  In general, we import primarily 
dairy products that aren’t produced in large quantities in the US. 
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Table 2.2 Value of US Dairy Product Exports, 1990-2002 
Product HTS 1990 1995 2000 2001 YTD 
20021 
% change, 
1990-20012
 (Million $) 
Fluid milk, <1.0% fat 040110 3.9 2.2 1.3 1.0 0.8 -70.3% 
Fluid Milk, 1-6% fat 040120 11.8 14.8 14.1 12.3 9.1 0.1% 
Fluid Milk and Cream, >6% fat 040130 1.6 4.1 5.0 8.5 5.1 278.3% 
Powdered milk, fat <1.5% 040210 11.7 115.2 157.4 189.5 68.3 348.3% 
Powdered milk, fat >1.5% 040221 3.6 25.3 30.6 38.7 14.7 638.1% 
Sweetened powdered milk, <1.5% fat 040229 8.2 76.6 7.3 17.3 6.1 105.9% 
Concentrated milk or cream, not sweetened 040291 1.5 1.1 1.0 3.5 1.5 72.9% 
Sweetened milk or cream 040299 2.1 20.7 3.2 6.3 5.1 183.4% 
Yogurt 040310 6.9 6.9 4.1 3.9 2.5 -49.3% 
Buttermilk and other acidified milks 040390 3.6 7.8 4.1 6.3 7.9 -5.1% 
Whey and modified whey 040410 35.3 93.7 158.6 135.9 106.9 212.2% 
Milk protein concentrates 040490 3.9 3.9 12.2 8.3 3.7 69.8% 
Butter and butterfat 040500 111.2 62.6 7.4 5.3 4.3 -91.9% 
Fresh cheese 040610 1.2 5.1 11.5 20.4 12.5 1445.3% 
Grated or powdered Cheese 040620 9.5 26.8 45.9 62.8 55.0 368.8% 
Processed cheese 040630 5.8 20.4 24.5 27.6 22.5 317.7% 
Blue-veined cheese 040640 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.2 669.9% 
Cheddar, Colby and other cheese 040690 22.2 36.6 56.3 50.8 32.1 186.9% 
Lactose and lactose syrup 170210 16.8 32.8 56.9 74.0 53.8 234.8% 
Ice Cream and other edible ice 210500 30.0 87.1 91.3 86.4 64.4 121.3% 
Other products derived from dried milk, buttermilk, or whey 210610 45.6 71.6 135.2 160.7 112.0 159.7% 
Casein 350110 2.7 5.1 12.7 7.0 1.5 124.1% 
Caseinates and other casein derivatives 350190 6.1 13.4 36.0 12.1 6.2 305.7% 
Milk albumin, concentrates of two or more whey proteins 350220 0.0 0.0 7.6 20.4 19.5 NA 
Total 
345.3 
734.3 884.5 959.6 615.7 142.2% 
1 January through September 2002. 

2 Percentage change from average of 1990 and 1991 to average of 2000 and 2001. 

Source: US International Trade Commission.  Data are for domestic exports, which includes exports of products produced entirely in the US and 

exports of foreign products which have been further manufactured in the US. 

Note: Product categories are not official designations, rather shortened and aggregated names for diverse product categories.
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Table 2.3. Value of US Dairy Product Imports, 1990-2002 
Product HTS 1990 1995 2000 2001 YTD 
20021 
% change, 
1990-20012
 (Million $) 
Fluid milk, <1.0% fat 040110 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 NA 
Fluid Milk, 1-6% fat 040120 3.3 0.1 2.5 2.2 1.7 -20.0% 
Fluid Milk and Cream, >6% fat 040130 7.4 3.8 6.1 11.3 5.3 63.4% 
Powdered milk, fat <1.5% 040210 0.5 0.5 5.2 7.0 8.0 645.6% 
Powdered milk, fat >1.5% 040221 1.0 0.9 7.8 10.0 6.7 924.2% 
Sweetened powdered milk, <1.5% fat 040229 0.0 0.4 1.8 0.1 0.1 NA 
Concentrated milk or cream, not sweetened 040291 1.0 1.0 1.5 2.8 1.3 67.9% 
Sweetened milk or cream 040299 3.0 2.3 9.6 10.1 10.1 400.0% 
Yogurt 040310 0.3 0.0 2.6 3.9 3.1 2097.9% 
Buttermilk and other acidified milks 040390 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.7 0.6 914.8% 
Whey and modified whey 040410 0.6 2.9 13.3 11.9 6.6 3453.3% 
Milk protein concentrates 040490 3.3 23.5 155.4 104.5 94.6 3273.6% 
Butter and butterfat 040500 3.8 1.4 30.0 85.1 38.0 2000.5% 
Fresh cheese 040610 0.4 8.2 3.5 4.8 5.0 897.3% 
Grated or powdered Cheese 040620 5.2 4.7 8.8 9.1 5.1 67.3% 
Processed cheese 040630 18.9 20.4 20.9 25.6 21.4 20.3% 
Blue-veined cheese 040640 13.0 17.9 22.6 23.6 16.2 74.8% 
Cheddar, Colby and other cheese 040690 401.7 498.0 629.7 682.7 518.1 67.8% 
Lactose and lactose syrup 170210 0.7 0.8 3.3 4.1 2.6 410.8% 
Ice Cream and other edible ice 210500 0.1 2.4 17.6 16.8 15.8 11520.6% 
Other products derived from dried milk, buttermilk, or whey 210610 3.9 11.2 10.2 8.1 6.0 94.7% 
Casein 350110 305.5 318.6 346.6 328.3 199.6 21.3% 
Caseinates and other casein derivatives 350190 75.9 117.8 153.8 196.8 126.2 154.2% 
Milk albumin, concentrates of two or more whey proteins 350220 0.0 0.0 34.0 36.4 32.1 NA 
Total 849.5 1036.7 1487.6 1586.2 1123.9 91.5% 
1 January through September 2002. 

2 Percentage change from average of 1990 and 1991 to average of 2000 and 2001. 

Source: US International Trade Commission.  Data are imports for consumption, which includes which have physically cleared US Customs and 

entered consumption channels immediately, from bonded warehouses, or from Foreign Trade Zones. 

Note: Product categories are not official designations, rather shortened and aggregated names for diverse product categories.

 
16
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Table 2.4. Value of US Net Exports of Dairy Products, 1990-2002 
Product HTS 1990 1995 2000 2001 YTD 
20021 
% change, 
1990-20012
 (Million $) 
Fluid milk, <1.0% fat 040110 3.9 2.2 1.1 0.7 0.7 -76.1% 
Fluid Milk, 1-6% fat 040120 8.5 14.8 11.6 10.1 7.4 5.9% 
Fluid Milk and Cream, >6% fat 040130 -5.8 0.3 -1.1 -2.8 -0.2 -45.4% 
Powdered milk, fat <1.5% 040210 11.2 114.7 152.3 182.5 60.3 341.8% 
Powdered milk, fat >1.5% 040221 2.7 24.4 22.9 28.7 8.0 573.4% 
Sweetened powdered milk, <1.5% fat 040229 8.2 76.3 5.5 17.3 6.0 90.3% 
Concentrated milk or cream, not sweetened 040291 0.5 0.1 -0.5 0.7 0.3 341.9% 
Sweetened milk or cream 040299 -0.9 18.4 -6.4 -3.8 -5.0 1642.6% 
Yogurt 040310 6.7 6.8 1.4 0.0 -0.5 -90.7% 
Buttermilk and other acidified milks 040390 3.6 7.8 3.5 5.6 7.3 -16.5% 
Whey and modified whey 040410 34.7 90.8 145.3 124.0 100.4 187.6% 
Milk protein concentrates 040490 0.7 -19.6 -143.2 -96.1 -90.9 -5554.4% 
Butter and butterfat 040500 107.5 61.2 -22.6 -79.8 -33.7 -167.7% 
Fresh cheese 040610 0.8 -3.0 7.9 15.6 7.5 1817.7% 
Grated or powdered Cheese 040620 4.3 22.1 37.1 53.7 49.8 627.7% 
Processed cheese 040630 -13.2 0.0 3.6 2.0 1.1 -121.1% 
Blue-veined cheese 040640 -13.0 -17.4 -22.3 -23.2 -16.0 72.5% 
Cheddar, Colby and other cheese 040690 -379.4 -461.4 -573.5 -632.0 -486.0 61.8% 
Lactose and lactose syrup 170210 16.0 32.0 53.6 69.9 51.2 228.0% 
Ice Cream and other edible ice 210500 29.9 84.7 73.7 69.6 48.6 79.1% 
Other products derived from dried milk, buttermilk, or whey 210610 41.7 60.4 124.9 152.6 106.1 165.5% 
Casein 350110 -302.8 -313.5 -334.0 -321.2 -198.1 19.7% 
Caseinates and other casein derivatives 350190 -69.9 -104.5 -117.7 -184.7 -119.9 139.9% 
Milk albumin, concentrates of two or more whey proteins 350220 0.0 0.0 -26.5 -16.0 -12.6 NA 
Total 
-504.3 
-302.4 -603.2 -626.6 -508.2 45.8% 
1 January through September 2002. 
2 Percentage change from average of 1990 and 1991 to average of 2000 and 2001.Source:  US International Trade Commission.  Net Exports equal
domestic exports less imports for consumption. 
Note: Product categories are not official designations, rather shortened and aggregated names for diverse product categories.
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Figure 2.5. Value of US Dairy Exports by Region, 1990-2002
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Figure 2.6. Value of US Dairy Imports by Region, 1990-2002
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Although the dollar value of dairy imports provides relevant information, it is also useful 
to consider dairy product imports as a percentage of total domestic dairy component 
use. Butterfat and skim solids equivalents of US dairy imports were roughly constant
from 1990 to 1997 (Figure 2.7). Imports accounted for a relatively small share of US 
commercial disappearance in those years, around 2%.  In 1998, imports of both butter 
fat and skim solids jumped due to high domestic butter prices (and therefore increased 
butter imports) and increases in MPC imports.  Despite this increase, dairy imports 
accounted for less than 3% of commercial disappearance in 1999, and this amount fell 
somewhat in 2000. Although the total amount of components imported is small relative 
to domestic consumption, imports can have important impacts on US milk and dairy
product prices. 
Although the dollar value of dairy imports provides relevant information, it is also useful 
to consider dairy product imports as a percentage of total domestic dairy component 
use. Butterfat and skim solids equivalents of US dairy imports were roughly constant
from 1990 to 1997 (Figure 2.7). Imports accounted for a relatively small share of US 
commercial disappearance in those years, around 2%.  In 1998, imports of both butter 
fat and skim solids jumped due to high domestic butter prices (and therefore increased 
butter imports) and increases in MPC imports.  Despite this increase, dairy imports 
accounted for less than 3% of commercial disappearance in 1999, and this amount fell 
somewhat in 2000. Although the total amount of components imported is small relative 
to domestic consumption, imports can have important impacts on US milk and dairy
product prices. 
Given the proximity of Canada and Mexico, it is also of interest to examine patterns of
dairy trade with those two countries.  The value of US dairy product exports to Canada
has nearly tripled since 1990, and has generally grown faster than Canada’s exports to 
the US (Figure 2.8). Mexico is the US’ most important export market, but sales have 
been affected by that country’s economic performance over time.  Exports to Mexico 
peaked in 1993, then declined rapidly due to the devaluation of the peso and 
subsequent economic recession.  US exports to Mexico rebounded in 1997, and grew 
relatively slowly through 2000.  In 2001, exports to Mexico surpassed their previous
peak in 1993.  US imports from Mexico have been a fraction of the value of imports,
and have not grown substantially since 1995 (Figure 2.8). 
Why do we observe the patterns of dairy trade described in the previous sections?  Key 
economic factors influencing the ability of countries to export dairy products include 
costs of milk production and dairy product processing, strategic market planning and 
organizations to facilitate a consistent market presence, and the relationship between 
milk production potential and population.  As noted above, though, trade policies 
adopted by major producing and importing countries have a great deal of influence on
existing patterns of trade. It is often said that international dairy markets are “highly 
distorted”, that is, that outcomes do not really reflect the basic underlying economic 
factors mentioned above.  The relatively small volume of trade in dairy products means  
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Figure 2.7. US Dairy Product Imports, Fat and Skim Basis, 1990-2000
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Figure 2.8. Value of US Dairy Trade with Canada and Mexico, 1990-2002
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
that these policies can have a relatively large impact on world market prices.  The US 
has not been a consistent major player in the “commodity” dairy product markets 
(butter, NDM, WMP, and cheese) because the Dairy Price Support Program (DPSP) and 
import restrictions maintain domestic prices higher than world prices (Figures 2.9, 2.10, 
2.11, and 2.12). The level of world prices, in turn, is largely a reflection of the policies 
of key dairy exporters such as the EU (although US policies play a role as well).  When 
world prices approach US prices, interest in exporting grows.  When world prices fall, 
however, interest in exporting these commodities wanes, and as a result US exporters 
do not acquire as many long-term supply relationships with foreign buyers.  The need 
to maintain a consistent market presence is one of the benefits of the continuation of 
DEIP. 
Trade Liberalization and US Dairy Trade Policy, 1990-2001 
As early as the mid-1980s, there was a growing recognition of the potential benefits to 
be gained by liberalization of agricultural trade.  Thus, the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations that began in 1986 explicitly included agricultural trade as a main agenda 
item. The relatively slow progress of these negotiations on agriculture and the 
successes of the Canada-US Trade Agreement (CUSTA) in the late 1980s encouraged 
the US, Canada, and Mexico to undertake separate negotiations to liberalize trade, 
including agricultural products.  These negotiations culminated with the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into force in 1994. The Uruguay Round 
Agreement (URA) became effective in 1995, and represented a significant step in 
opening up trade in agricultural products.  In addition, the URA created a broader set of 
trade commitments and the World Trade Organization (WTO) to monitor compliance 
and arbitrate disputes. 
To understand the implications of these agreements, it is useful to make a distinction 
between “trade liberalization” and “free trade”.  These two terms sometimes are used 
as if they meant the same thing, but in practice they often imply very different 
outcomes. Free trade can be viewed as what results when all barriers to trade (quotas, 
tariffs, licensing arrangements, administrative requirements, government trading 
organizations, etc.) are removed, and products can move freely between countries.  In 
contrast, trade liberalization is the process by which some or all of these barriers are 
reduced but not eliminated.  Under trade liberalization, there may be increased 
opportunities for trade, but substantial barriers to trade may remain.  As discussed 
subsequently, the two trade agreements represent the range of outcomes from 
essentially free trade in dairy products (with Mexico under NAFTA) to limited increases 
in opportunities for dairy trade (under the URA).  For both agreements, it is important 
to note that although benefits from liberalizing agricultural trade are likely when 
producers, processors and consumers are considered together, there is no guarantee 
that any one of these groups (or producers of a particular commodity like milk) will 
benefit from the reduction of trade barriers.  The main changes under NAFTA and the 
URA are summarized in Table 2.5.
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Figure 2.9.  U.S. and International Cheddar Cheese Prices, 1990-2002 
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Figure 2.10.  U.S. and International Butter Prices, 1990-2002 
0 
1000 
2000 
3000 
4000 
5000 
6000 
7000 
Jan 90 Jan 91 Jan 92 Jan 93 Jan 94 Jan 95 Jan 96 Jan 97 Jan 98 Jan. 99 Jan. 00 Jan. 01 Jan. 02 
Year and Month 
N. Europe High N. Europe Low U.S. Market Support 
22
 
     
 
  
Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Figure 2.11. U.S. and International NDM Prices, 1990-2002 
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Figure 2.12.  U.S. and International WMP Prices, 1990-2002 
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Table 2.5. Main Changes in US Dairy Trade Policy Under the NAFTA and URA 
Policy NAFTA URA 
Market Access Converted Section 22 import quotas for Mexico to
TRQs. TRQ amount increase each year, and “over 
quota” tariff rates decrease until TRQs are phased out 
in 2003 for most products. 
Converted Section 22 import quotas to TRQs.  TRQ 
amounts to increase to 5% of domestic consumption 
by 2001. “Over quota” tariff rate reductions for all 
agricultural products must average 36%, with
minimum reduction of 15% from 1986-88 base 
period. 
Domestic Support Included language encouraging limits on domestic 
support, but no binding commitments. 
Classified domestic policies on the basis of their 
impact on trade. For “distorting” policies, required a
20% reduction in the value of support by 2001 
compared to the 1986-88 base period.  Countries 
could not introduce new programs with significant 
trade impacts.  Non-distorting support programs not 
limited. 
Export Subsidies Included language affirming that, in principle, the two 
countries should not use export subsidies to sell in
each other’s markets, but no binding commitments. 
Must reduce value of export subsidies by 36%, and 
the volume of subsidized exports by 21% compared 
to one of two base periods.  US can maintain DEIP 
subject to these limits. Export credit and promotion 
programs unaffected. 
Rules of Origin Included specific rules of origin to limit re-exports of
dairy products originating in other countries, unless 
there was substantial transformation of the product 
Less relevant due to broad geographic coverage of 
the URA. 
Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary 
Allowed US to maintain current safety standards, as 
long as these were “scientifically justifiable.” 
Separate agreement dealing with food safety, giving 
additional importance to international standards 
under the Codex Alimentarius.  US standards can be 
stricter than international standards only if 
scientifically justified or based on documented risk 
assessment. 
Technical Barriers 
to Trade 
Allowed the US to maintain its product identity 
standards. 
Separate agreement giving additional importance to 
international standards under Codex Alimentarius, 
covering packaging, composition, and labeling. 
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Prior to the implementation of NAFTA in 1994, US dairy trade policy consisted of 
significant quantitative restrictions on many dairy product imports, and subsidized or
concessional exports of dairy products, particularly when CCC stocks of powder, butter, 
and cheese became large. Import restrictions, the Section 22 import quotas, were 
implemented in the early 1950s when they became necessary to ensure the proper 
functioning of the Dairy Price Support Program (DPSP)5. These quotas not only limited 
the total amount of dairy product imports to about 2% of US consumption, but often 
were both product- and country-specific.  That is, even if total imports in a given year 
were below the overall quota amount, individual countries or regions could only export 
up to their allotted amount.  The quotas were quite effective at limiting imports for 
major commodities, and allowed the DPSP to maintain US dairy product prices above 
prices in international markets (and producer milk prices higher than they would be 
otherwise). However, some products were not included in the quotas and had relatively
low tariff rates, notably casein (considered an “industrial product”) and MPC (little 
imported into the US before 1995). The DEIP was announced by USDA on May 15, 
1985 to facilitate exports of surplus dairy products from CCC stocks, and has been a
feature of US dairy trade policy since that time.  Most subsidized exports have been 
NDM, but in some years butter and cheese have been an important part of DEIP-
supported exports (Figure 2.13).  The US also funded programs for food aid shipments
of dairy products (mostly NDM) to low-income countries and provided export credit 
guarantees to facilitate dairy product exports. 
Under NAFTA, the US agreed to eliminate Section 22 import quotas for Mexico as a part 
of an agreement that will ultimately result in something close to free trade in dairy 
products6. To allow each country’s producers and processors time to adjust, the 
agreement provided for the phasing in of greater access to each other’s markets.  
Under the agreement, a number of Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) were established for both
the US and Mexico to provide what is termed “market access” for each country’s dairy 
products into the other’s market.  TRQs are quantities of dairy products that can enter 
the country without tariffs or with low tariff rates.  They are presumed to be preferable 
to quotas that set an absolute limit on imports, because they allow for “over quota” 
imports, although at higher tariff rates.  Each year, the amount of the TRQ is increased 
to provide greater market access.  Imports in excess of these amounts are still subject 
to tariffs, but these tariffs are to be phased out by 2003 for most products and 2009 for 
products like NDM. At that point, the TRQs will be effectively eliminated, and there will 
be no quantitative import restrictions or tariffs on dairy products traded between the US
and Mexico.   
5 In the absence of these import restrictions, US purchases of supported products (cheese, butter, and 
NDM) would have grown unmanageable and would have been supporting dairy producers in exporting 
countries. 
6 For additional information, see Dairy Markets and Policy Issues and Options Leaflet P-14 entitled 
“NAFTA and the US Dairy Industry” by Outlaw, Knutson, Nicholson and Novakovic, April 1994, at 
www.cpdmp.cornell.edu.
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Figure 2.13.  DEIP Bid Acceptances, 1992-2002 
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In order to ensure that Mexico did not re-export dairy products from other countries,
the NAFTA included “Rules of Origin,” which prohibit such re-exports without substantial 
transformation of the product.  NAFTA allowed both the US and Mexico to maintain 
product standards of identity (which may in fact limit trade, particularly US imports from 
Mexico), as long as these are deemed scientifically valid.  Although it used language 
discouraging the use of domestic production and export subsidies, NAFTA did not
require their elimination.  Nor did NAFTA explicitly address a number of important 
administrative issues, such as the ability of US agencies to provide Grade A certification 
to Mexican farms, or the ability of Federal Milk Marketing Orders to regulate Mexican 
plants selling fluid milk into US marketing areas.  Despite intense pressure from the US, 
Canada chose not to include its dairy industry in the NAFTA agreement, so NAFTA by 
itself had little impact on US-Canada trade in dairy products. 
The URA involved a broader set of commitments on the part of the US, both because of 
the number of countries involved and the extent to which the agreement dealt with 
issues other than tariffs and quotas.  Like NAFTA, the URA resulted in the establishment 
of TRQs for dairy products (in place of the Section 22 import quotas), and provided a
schedule for increases in TRQ quantities and decreases in tariff rates for quantities in 
excess of the TRQs. For developed countries, tariff reductions were to average 36% 
over the period 1995-2001 for all agricultural products relative to a base period (1986­
88). Although the minimum allowable reduction was 15% for each product, each 
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
country could choose how to reduce tariffs among its agricultural products to achieve 
the 36% average reduction.  The amount of the TRQs were to be set initially at a total 
of 3% of domestic consumption, to increase to 5% of domestic consumption by 2001.   
The quantitative restrictions agreed to by the US illustrate the basic approach to 
tariffication undertaken in implementing its URA commitments (Table 2.6).  Fluid milk 
imports are limited to about 26 million pounds, but face low “in-quota” and “over­
quota” tariff rates.  Other products, for example fluid milk and cream with a fat content 
greater than 6% but less than 45%, face tougher import restrictions.  Of the TRQ for 
this and related products, 85% is allocated to one country—New Zealand.  Although 
“in-quota” duties are low, “over-quota” duties are $0.77 per liter, sufficient to be 
prohibitive under most market conditions.  Note that various product categories, 
sometimes similar and sometimes not, are included in the overall TRQ amount.  Also,
products containing milk solids—but not typically thought of as “dairy products”—are 
included in the quantitative restrictions.  Thus, there is a TRQ for mixes and doughs for 
baker’s wares containing more than 25% butterfat by weight.  Finally, note that for 
butter, milk powders, and cheeses, the US still requires import licenses in addition to 
the other restrictions under the URA.  Applicable only to amounts imported under the 
TRQ, these licenses are typically allocated by country, and their continuation was 
allowed under the URA despite their potential to limit trade.  Note that products not 
included in the table often face tariffs, but are not subject to quantitative restrictions.  
The most important of these products are casein and caseinates, milk protein 
concentrates, and lactose products. 
Also included in the URA were “special safeguard provisions” that allow the imposition 
of additional tariffs if the quantity of imports exceeds a trigger level (e.g., greater than 
25% of the average of the previous three years), or the c.i.f. price of a product falls 
below a trigger level (e.g., less than 90% of the average price of the import during 
1986-88). For example, if butter from New Zealand were landed in the US at a price of 
60 cents/lb, the US could impose an additional tariff of about 17 cents/lb in addition to
other tariffs allowed under the TRQ.  For volume-based safeguards, the imposition of 
these tariffs is not automatic, however.  The provisions must be approved by the
President, and apply only until the end of the calendar year in which they are imposed.  
In November 2002, USDA announced additional volume-based safeguard tariffs on 
imports of American cheese, the first such use of safeguards for dairy products. 
US trade policy for dairy product imports from Mexico follows similar principles, 
although the product groupings differ, the TRQs will be phased out and no import 
licenses are required (Table 2.6).  Another notable difference under NAFTA at present is 
that “over-quota” tariff rates differ depending on the value of the product.  For lower-
value products, a certain dollar amount (a “specific tariff”) is charged, and for higher-
value products, a percentage of the value (an “ad valorem tariff”) is assessed.  Again, 
these tariffs will be completely phased out under NAFTA. 
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Table 2.6. Quantitative Restrictions (TRQs) for US Dairy Product Imports, 2000
Product TRQ Units Main Country 
Allocations 
Under Quota Tariff Rates Import
License 
Required? 
Imports,
2000 
Quota Fill 
Rate
Over-Quota Tariff Rates 
General Special1 
General Special2 
(Low Value) (High Value) 
TRQsand Tari ff RatesUnder the URA 
Fluid milk, 1-6% fat 11,356,236 Liters None $0.004 Free No 3,547,925 31.2% $0.015 Free -­
Fluid milk and cream 6-45% fat, sour 
cream <45% fat 
6,694,840 Liters New Zealand (5,678,117) $0.032 Free No 3,479,823 52.0% $0.772 Free -­
Fluid milk and cream, >45% fat; sour 
cream, >45% fat; butter 
6,977,000 Kg None $0.123 Free Yes 6,990,039 100.2% $1.541 to
$1.646 
-- --
Milk powder, <3.0% fat 5,261,000 Kg None $0.033 Free Yes 3,283,784 62.4% $0.865 -­ -­
Milk powder, 3-35% fat; Dried sour 
cream 6-35% fat 
3,321,300 Kg None $0.068 Free Yes 1,994,675 60.1% $1.092 
--
WMP; dried buttermilk 99,500 Kg None $0.137 Free No 0 0.0% $1.556 -­ -­
Sweetened or concentrated milk; dry 4,105,000 Kg Australia (1,016,046) 3.5 to 20%; Free No 2,176,689 53.0% Varies, but -- --
yogurt; modified whey other than WPC; Belgium and Denmark $0.029 to usually 
other dairy spreads; other edible fats; (154,221) $0.11 includes both 
chocolate preparations containing specific and 
butterfat; edible ice; food preparations ad valorem 
containing milk solids; milk-based tariff 
drinks
Evaporated and condensed milk 6,857,300 Kg Canada (1,028,292); 
Denmark (610,081); 
Netherlands (701,707) 
$0.022 to
$0.039 
Free No 5,778,247 84.3% $0.313 to
$0.496 
-- --
Dried buttermilk and dried whey 296,000 Kg None $0.033 Free Yes 102,983 34.8% $0.876 -­ -­
AMF and butter substitutes 6,080,500 Kg None $0.154 Free Yes 6,127,634 100.8% $1.996 -­ -­
Fresh cheeses 48,979,859 Kg EU (25,810,000) ; New 
Zealand (11,322,000) 
10% Free Yes 41,478,029 84.7% $1.509 -­ -­
Blue-mold cheese (other than Stilton) 2,911,001 Kg EU (2,779,000) 10 to 20% Free Yes 2,822,170 96.9% $2.269 -­ -­
Cheddar cheese 13,256,306 Kg New Zealand 
(8,200,000); Australia 
(2,450,000) 
10 to 16% Free Yes 12,716,598 95.9% $1.227 -­ -­
28 

 
  
 
  
 
   
    
    
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
     
    
Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Product TRQ Units Main Country 
Allocations 
Under Quota Tariff Rates Import
License 
Required? 
Imports,
2000 
Quota Fill 
Rate
Over-Quota Tariff Rates 
General Special1 
General Special2 
(Low Value) (High Value) 
American-type cheese 3,522,556 Kg New Zealand 
(2,000,000); Australia 
(1,000,000) 
10 to 20% Free Yes 3,142,708 89.2% $1.055 -­ -­
Edam or Gouda cheese 6,816,402 Kg EU (6,289,000) 10 to 15% Free Yes 6,719,346 98.6% $1.803 -­ -­
Italian-type cheeses 13,481,064 Kg Argentina (6,383,000); 
EU (4,082,000) 
7.5 to 25% Free Yes 12,618,655 93.6% $2.146 -­ -­
Swiss, Emmantaler, or Gruyere cheeses 7,854,833 Kg EU (5,925,000); 
Switzerland (1,850,000) 
6.4 to 10% Free Yes 5,975,078 76.1% $1.386 -­ -­
Other cheese, including margarine 
cheese and cheeses containing <0.5% 
butterfat 
1,649,908 Kg New Zealand 
(1,000,000); EU 
(425,000) 
10% Free Yes 2,640,678 160.1% $1.128 -­ -­
Chocolate preparations, >5.5% 
butterfat 
26,167,000 Kg Ireland (4,286,491); UK 
(3,379,297); Australia 
(2,000,000) 
3.5 to 5% Free No 21,483,704 82.1% $.372 to
$.582 and 
4.3% 
-- --
Chocolate preparations, <5.5% 
butterfat 
2,122,834 Kg Ireland (1,700,988); UK 
(421,845) 
3.5 to 10% Free No 0 0.0% $.372 to
$.582 and 
4.3% 
-- --
Mixes and doughs for baker's wares,
>25% butterfat
5,398 MT None 10% Free No 4,177 77.4% $0.423 and 
8.5% 
-- --
Ice cream 5,667,846 Liters Belgium (922,315) and 
New Zealand (589,312) 
10% Free No 1,560,716 27.5% $.502 and 
17.0% 
-- --
TRQsand Tari ff RatesUnder NAFTA 
Fluid milk and cream, 6-45%, sour 
cream <45% fat, ice cream
437,000 Liters Mexico (437,000) -­ Free No 
Not calculated 
-­ $0.094 to
$0.123 
18.4 to
18.8% 
Fluid milk and cream, >45% fat; WMP, 51,000 Kg Mexico (51,000) -­ Free No -­ $0.239 to 18.8 to
sour cream; Butter, AMF, Butter $0.301 19.1% 
substitutes 
Milk powders; dried buttermilk; dried 
whey 
504,000 Kg Mexico (504,000) -­ Free No -­
$0.189 
to
$$0.212 
15.6 to
16.8% 
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
Product TRQ Units Main Country  Under Quota Tariff Rates Import Imports, Quota Fill 
Over-Quota Tariff Rates 
Allocations License 
Required? 
2000 Rate
General Special2 
General Special1 
(Low Value) (High Value) 
Sweetened milk powders; evaporated 979,000 Kg Mexico (979,000) -­ Free No -­ $0.06 to 15.6 to
and condensed milk; dired yogurt; $.223 18.9% 
other dried whey products; margarine; Not calculated 
chocolate containing butterfat
Cheeses 6,626,000 Kg Mexico (6,626,000) -­ Free No -­ $0.24 to
$0.436 
13.9% 
1  Within-quota special tariff rates apply primarily to developing countries, and few dairy product imports are received from these countries. 
2  Over-quota Special tariff rates for Mexico depend on the value of the product imported, and the designation of low and high value varies for each product 
category.
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Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the US Dairy Industry 
In addition, the URA called for two other key components:  reductions in export 
subsidies and reductions in domestic support.  Because a key cause of international 
trade in agricultural products is domestic support policies (and often, the product 
surpluses they create), the URA included language to classify and limit certain types of 
domestic support.  To classify different domestic support policies, the URA employed a
system of “boxes” with the names of different colors indicating their relative 
acceptability under the agreement.  In the “blue box” are policies that provide support 
to agricultural producers by limiting the amount they can produce (e.g., supply
controls).  This type of support did not have to be reduced, but could not be increased 
above its 1992 level.  “Green box” policies are measures that are deemed to have 
minimal trade-distorting effects on agricultural production, including government 
research programs, domestic food aid, direct payments to producers (not tied to level of 
production) and payments for environmental protection.  Green box measures can be 
used without restriction. Finally, “amber box” measures are those that are deemed to 
distort market prices, including price supports, direct payments tied to production, and 
other non-exempt subsidies. The degree of “amber box” intervention is summarized by 
the “Aggregate Measure of Support” (AMS).  Under the URA, the US must reduce its 
AMS by 20% from the base period (1986-88) by 20017. Countries could maintain their 
individual support programs subject to the reductions, but they could not implement 
new support programs that did not exist in the base period.  This calls into question 
whether current policies, such as regional or national dairy compacts would be in 
compliance with these provisions. 
The third major component of the URA was reductions in export subsidies.  Under the 
agreement, countries committed themselves to a 36% reduction in the value of export 
subsidies and a 21% reduction in the volume of subsidized exports by 2001, relative to 
either a 1986-90 or 1991-92 base period.  Countries can maintain their individual export 
subsidy programs subject to these limits, but may not introduce new export subsidy 
programs. Export credit guarantees and export promotion programs were exempted 
from these reductions. 
In addition to the provisions on market access, domestic support, and export subsidies, 
the URA brought into existence the WTO as the successor to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  The WTO differs from GATT in that it is a permanent 
institutional commitment on the part of signatory countries, deals with services and 
intellectual property rights as well as goods, and perhaps most importantly, has a more 
transparent (and presumably binding) dispute settlement mechanism.   
Two other agreements that are part of the URA are important for dairy trade.  The first, 
dealing with Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) defines rules to assess the 
reasonableness of domestic regulatory measures that affect trade.  For dairy products, 
7 Under what are termed “de minimus” rules, countries are exempted from reductions in product-specific 
support that does not exceed 5% of the total value of the product and non-product specific support 
that does not exceed 5% of the total value of agricultural production. 
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this agreement covers packaging, composition and labeling, and processing techniques.  
The agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures covers health risks (food 
safety) arising from additives, contaminants, toxins and pathogens in food products.
The SPS measures acknowledge the rights of governments to restrict trade in certain 
products from certain countries in order to protect human, animal, or plant health, but 
requires that these restrictions be transparent and consistent.  Transparency and 
consistency imply that equal standards are applied to all other countries, and that 
domestic and foreign products are treated equally.   
Under the SPS measures, the principle of “equivalence” is given an important role.  The 
equivalence principle states that the US must accept other countries’ SPS measures as 
“equivalent”, even if they are different than domestic measures, if the foreign SPS 
measures achieve a level of protection specified as appropriate by the US.  Moreover, 
measures based on international standards are accepted as complying with the SPS 
agreement. This has given an increasingly important role to the Codex Alimentarius, an
international code of standards for human health protection administered by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, and the Codex
Alimentarius Commission. Countries can adopt standards stricter than those accepted 
by Codex, but these must be scientifically justified or be based on standards deemed 
appropriate after an appropriately documented risk assessment. 
Thus, as of 2001, the US dairy trade policy environment had changed dramatically since 
the early 1990s. The NAFTA had placed the US on the road to something close to free 
trade in dairy products with Mexico, and the URA had committed the US to reductions 
in domestic support and export subsidies and increases in market access for dairy 
products. Moreover, the URA made US product standards and health measures more 
subject to international scrutiny, and in principle made US trade policy changes subject 
to dispute settlement rulings by the WTO.  Despite (and sometimes because of) these 
changes, there has been much criticism of trade liberalization, particularly of the 
perceived imperfections of the URA. 
One of the main criticisms of the URA has to do with the fact that it does not result in
completely free trade. This leads to perceptions that the market access, domestic 
support and export subsidy provisions have provided greater benefits to countries other 
than the US.  Regarding market access, it is often observed that although TRQs have 
been established for dairy products, that these quotas may not be filled due to import
licenses and other administrative restrictions that prevent quotas from being filled (see 
Table 2.6 for US TRQ fill rates).  In some cases, the tariffs on the TRQ amounts are 
high enough to discourage imports, and this is often the case for quantities in excess of 
the TRQ amounts. Reductions in these high “over quota” tariff rates during 1995 to 
2001 may not be sufficient to bring about meaningful increases in market access for 
some countries. Some observers have concluded that the degree of “liberalization” in 
dairy trade policy actually has been minimal under the URA, but the agreement still 
serves as an important first step for further reductions in trade barriers. 
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Impacts of Trade Liberalization on the US Dairy Industry 
There are a wide variety of impacts that can be examined related to dairy trade 
liberalization.  Some impacts, such as those on the evolution of domestic farm policy, 
changes in health risks due to imported dairy products, or the extent to which US dairy 
product standards have been challenged by international scrutiny, are difficult to
quantify. Certainly, the limits imposed by the URA on domestic support policies have 
influenced the evolution of debates on the 2002 Farm Bill, and limits on export 
subsidies have played a role in the level of DEIP bonus payments since 1995 (Figure 
2.14). Reducing barriers to trade can influence opportunities for growth in milk
production and dairy processing, and therefore have potentially important impacts on 
farm structure, industry concentration, and rural communities.  Because the scope for 
impacts is broad, it is challenging to examine each of them in detail.  A starting point
for consideration of these broader impacts, however, is an analysis of the basic 
economic incentives for trade in various types of dairy products, and how these 
incentives influence milk production, farm milk prices, dairy processing activity, and 
product prices.  This information provides us with greater intuition about the likely 
longer-term and structural impacts, although detailed studies of these questions would 
also be beneficial. 
This section summarizes studies of the economic impacts on the US of liberalization of 
dairy trade. A variety of studies have been published since the mid-1990s, each with its
own objectives and methods (Table 2.7).  With one exception, all of the studies listed in 
the table are ex ante, that is, they attempt to predict future outcomes of ongoing or
possible changes in trade policies by the US and(or) other major dairy-producing 
countries. Most of the studies cited assess the impacts of trade liberalization with a 
quantitative model that examines outcomes under various trade liberalization scenarios 
compared to a baseline scenario using the same model.  One of the main assumptions
about dairy trade liberalization is that it will result in increases in world market prices 
for dairy, because reductions in domestic support and export subsidies will decrease the 
amount of subsidized dairy products in international markets.  A key question for the
US, then, is whether this expected increase in world prices will allow the US to expand 
its exports, or at least maintain farm milk prices close to current levels.  Although many 
of the studies include a wide variety of variables (milk production, farm prices, product
prices, trade patterns), the emphasis here is on changes in farm-level milk prices and 
dairy farm income given the importance of these two outcomes.   
One study released in 2001 by the Foreign Agricultural Service of USDA discussed the 
impacts of the URA on world dairy markets since 1995.  Although assessment of the 
impacts is complicated by developments in foreign markets (such as economic crises in 
Mexico, Russia, and southeast Asia), FAS concludes that in the absence of the URA’s 
limitations on export subsidies, more NDM would have been traded on world markets,
and NDM prices would have been substantially lower.  It attributes the strengthening of 
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Figure 2.14.  Amount of Bonus Payments Under DEIP, 1992-2002 
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NDM and WMP prices between January 1999 and mid-2001 (Figures 2.11 and 2.12) 
primarily to the provisions of the URA.  Although it does not estimate impacts on US 
dairy farm income, this report has a generally favorable view of the developments in 
international dairy markets due to trade liberalization. 
A number of studies have assessed the impacts of various combinations of past and 
future trade policy changes related to the URA.  These “general dairy trade liberalization 
studies” were conducted using data from 1992 to 1999.  In general, the results of these 
studies suggest that US dairy producers have little to lose—but importantly, also little to 
gain—from current or future trade liberalization.  A 1996 study (Nicholson) of the 
impacts of trade liberalization indicated that reductions in tariff rates under NAFTA 
would provide opportunities for increases in US milk powder exports to Mexico.  This 
study did not examine broader impacts of trade liberalization, and did not fully account 
for the impacts of peso devaluation on Mexican dairy product imports.  A second study 
(Cox et al.) did examine the impacts of multilateral dairy policy changes under the URA.
The results suggested that US farm milk prices would be 0.5% lower in 2000 with the 
URA than they would have been in its absence.  Another study (Larivière and Meilke) 
predicted that free trade in dairy would have essentially no impact on US milk prices, 
but that increases in market access to 7% of consumption from the current 5% under 
URA would result in US milk prices 2% lower than otherwise.   
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Table 2.7. Summary of Studies of the Impacts of Dairy Trade Liberalization on the US Dairy Industry , 1996-2001 
Author (Year) Focus of Analysis Base Year 
for Data 
Methods Key Findings 
Descriptive, Historical Studies of the Impacts of the URA 
USDA/FAS (2001) Impacts of the URA on 
Global Trade in NDM 
1995­
2000 
Descriptive analysis of 
world prices and trade 
In the absence of limitations on export subsidies specified by 
the URA, volume of NDM on world markets would have been 
“far greater” and prices lower.  Export subsidy limits are 
having a “profound impact” on global NDM markets. 
Studies Using a Quantitative Trade Model to Examine URA Impacts on Dairy Markets 
Nicholson (1996) Impacts of NAFTA and 
GATT on Mexico’s Dairy 
Sector 
1992 Multi-product spatially 
disaggregated model of 
Mexico’s dairy sector 
with imports from 4 
regions including the 
US 
Relative to previous trade policy, under NAFTA and GATT, the 
US would see increases in US exports to Mexico for many 
dairy products, especially milk powders. 
Cox et al. (1999) Impacts on World Dairy 
Sector of Extending the 
URA to 2005 
1995 Multi-product, multi-
region spatial price 
equilibrium model 
Under URA provisions for 2000 or global free trade in dairy 
products, US milk prices fall less than 0.5%  Producer surplus 
falls $74-91 million, with the smaller decrease for free trade. 
Larivière and Meilke (1999) Impacts of Partial Dairy 
Trade Liberalization on the 
US, EU, and Canada 
1995 Multi-product, 3-region 
model with exogenous 
net trade 
Impacts on US milk prices or production of multilateral trade 
liberalization are minimal.  Free trade has no impact on prices 
in the US, but increasing minimum access to 7% of domestic 
consumption results in a 2% price reduction. 
Shaw and Love (2001) Impacts of Multilateral 
Increases in Market Access 
and Reductions in Export 
Subsidies 
1999 Multi-product, multi-
regional price 
equilibrium model 
Doubling of TRQ amounts and 50% reductions in over-quota 
tariff rates would reduce US producer revenues by 1.3%.  A 
50% reduction in the volume of export subsidies would have 
little impact on US milk prices or dairy producer incomes. 
von Schagen (2000) Impacts of Global Dairy 
Trade Liberalization 
1998 Multi-product, multi-
region spatial price 
equilibrium model 
Additional trade liberalization similar to the URA changes 
would reduce US dairy producer income 2%. Global free 
trade in dairy products would result in a 10% decrease in US 
producer revenues. 
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Author (Year) Focus of Analysis Base Year 
for Data 
Methods Key Findings 
de Gorter and Boughner 
(1999) 
Impacts of (Unilateral)
Liberalization of US Dairy 
Tariff Rates 
1997 Multi-product stylized 
model of US dairy 
trade policies 
15% reductions in over-quota tariff rates for butter, NDM and 
cheese reduced national average blend price 0 to 6%, and 
producer revenue 0 to 9%.  Effects were largest for 
reductions in tariffs on cheese and least for reductions in 
tariffs on NDM.  Increases in TRQ amounts to levels for 2000 
specified by the URA result in no impacts on producer prices. 
Studies of the Impacts of Trade Liberalization on Federal Milk Marketing Orders 
Bishop et al. (1996) Impacts of Trade 
Liberalization on US 
Federal Milk Marketing 
Orders 
1993 Multi-product, spatially 
disaggregated model 
for US, Canada, and 
Mexico
Incentives to circumvent FMMO regulations by processors in 
Canada and Mexico are substantial.  With free trade, the 
average US blend price in all orders decreases about 
$0.14/cwt, but effects on pooling in FMMO outside border 
regions are minimal.  Effects are similar even if Class I 
differentials are lowered by substantial amounts.  Regulation 
of foreign plants would mitigate many but not all of these 
effects. Providing Class I credits to plants in border areas 
would largely eliminate pooling effects, but blend price in all 
orders would still decrease by $0.09/cwt.  
Studies of Impacts of Trade Liberalization on the Northeast Dairy Industry 
Doyon (1996) Impacts of Liberalized 
Trade between Canada 
and the US 
1989 Multi-product spatially 
disaggregated model 
for Northeastern US 
and Eastern Canada 
Under free trade between the US and Canada, the farm value 
of milk in the Northeast would increase by more than 20%.  
The spatial distribution of fluid milk processing and distribution 
are relatively unaffected affected by free trade. 
Blandford (1999) Impacts of Global Trade 
Liberalization on the 
Northeastern US 
1999 Assumptions about 
world price increases 
with free trade, 
proportion of milk in 
fluid uses and Class I 
premiums 
No major decline in Northeast US milk prices under free trade 
“providing that other countries lower their tariffs and subsidies 
as we reduce ours.” 
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The most recent of the studies (Shaw and Love) also suggested that further trade 
liberalization would have relatively little impact on US farm milk prices.  They find that 
multilateral doubling of TRQ amounts (i.e., to 10% of consumption) and 50% 
reductions in “over-quota” tariff rates would reduce US dairy farm incomes by about
1%. Perhaps more importantly, their results suggest that further reductions in export 
subsidies will have little impact on US milk prices or dairy producer incomes.  The most
pessimistic of the studies—and a bit of an outlier in terms of its overall results—(von 
Schagen) suggested that further dairy trade liberalization similar to that under the URA
would reduce US dairy farm incomes by 2%; free trade is predicted to lower dairy farm 
revenues by about 10%.  A final study (de Gorter and Boughner) indicates the 
importance of multilateral dairy trade policy changes to the predicted outcomes.  
Unilateral reductions in “over quota” tariff rates for NDM, butter, and cheese by the US 
are predicted to reduce dairy producer revenues by as much as 9% depending on 
which product’s tariff rate is reduced.  Although the specific results of these studies do 
not always agree, their common basic conclusion is that dairy trade liberalization is 
neither a panacea nor a disaster for US dairy farmers. 
Other studies have examined specific types of impacts (or impacts on regions within the 
US). In the mid-1990s, USDA supported a study to examine how trade liberalization 
would affect the functioning of Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs).  At the time,
there was concern that a high degree of trade liberalization, particularly with Mexico, 
would provide fluid milk processors on both sides of the border with incentives to avoid
pooling Class I milk on the orders.  A model of Canada, the US, and Mexico with a high 
degree of spatial and product disaggregation (Bishop et al.) was used to examine 
whether the size of Class I differentials were high enough to justify the transportation 
and processing costs necessary to avoid pooling.  The study made the important 
assumption that that sanitary and product identity standards could be met, which 
means that it provides the highest possible access for fluid milk products, particularly
those from Mexico.   
For its basic scenarios, it assumed that foreign dairy processing plants would not be 
regulated. The study found that incentives to circumvent FMMO regulations by 
processors in Canada and Mexico are substantial.  Under free trade, nearly 18% less 
milk would be shipped to fluid plants in the US, and the average blend price across all 
orders would decrease about $0.14/cwt.  Effects were largest for FMMOs bordering
Canada and Mexico, and de-pooling outside border regions would be minimal.  The 
study also examined whether reductions in Class I differentials could moderate the 
effects of trade liberalization, and found outcomes similar to those above even if Class I 
differentials are lowered by as much as 75%.  Using the same model, it was found that
Order regulation of foreign plants would mitigate many but not all of these effects.  An 
alternative policy of providing Class I credits (reductions in differentials) to plants in 
border areas would largely eliminate de-pooling, but the average blend price across 
orders would still decrease by $0.09/cwt.  
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The studies that have been conducted to date suggest that current and future dairy
trade liberalization is unlikely to have markedly positive or negative impacts on US dairy
farms, at least if the liberalization is undertaken by all the key players in international 
dairy markets. This may incline some to suggest that further efforts at liberalizing dairy 
trade are at best not merited, and at worst potentially damaging.  However, it is useful
to examine the limitations of these analyses before drawing general conclusions about
the desirability of dairy trade liberalization.  First, most of the models used have 
relatively short time horizons, that is, they represent better the effects during the first 
few years after a new policy.  This means that they capture less well the potential 
longer-term adjustments to new trade policies.  Thus, they may understate the 
potential benefits to be gained through trade over the long haul.  Second, the number 
and types of products differs in these models, but in each case product categories are 
aggregated based on convenience and data availability.  This aggregation may mean 
that the analyses miss growth opportunities for certain products in which the US has a 
relatively more important share of work markets (e.g., whey products).   
Third, these models don’t capture the impacts of trade liberalization in other markets 
(e.g., agriculture more generally, manufacturing, or services).  Their analyses are 
restricted impacts on dairy markets, so they are “partial equilibrium,” not “general 
equilibrium” models.  Thus, they don’t directly explore the broader impacts such as the 
price of feed grains (which affects milk production costs) and world economic growth 
(which affects the demand for dairy products).  These effects are likely to be important 
to evaluating the desirability of trade liberalization for the US dairy industry.  Fourth, 
most of the studies focus on the impacts at the farm level, at least for their reported 
results. Despite the predicted lack of benefits at the farm level, certain groups of US 
processors and consumers may in fact benefit from dairy trade liberalization.  Finally, 
each of the models explores a limited number of possible policy options.  Although in
general the ones explored are reasonable, they tend to assume that similar policy 
changes are required of each trading region.  It may be the case the US trade 
negotiators can achieve concessions for dairy that would be more advantageous than
the “one size fits all” types of analyses discussed in the studies8. As a result, these 
studies provide an important starting point for evaluating dairy trade liberalization, but
do not provide definitive answers to the question “Is dairy trade liberalization good for 
the US dairy industry?”
Recent Dairy Trade Issues 
A number of dairy trade issues have received attention in the US recently, and some of 
them have implications for the ongoing round of agricultural trade negotiations.  
Between 1995 and 2000 imports of milk protein concentrates (MPC) grew rapidly.  The
term MPC is often used, but it is appropriate to distinguish between products produced 
by ultra-filtration  and “dry blends” of powdered milk products made without ultra­
filtration. Ultra-filtration is used in processing typical MPC, but there has been a high 
8 Of course, it is also possible that the converse occurs.
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degree of concern the use of dry blends to circumvent US tariffs on NDM.  In the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), the key US trade policy document, two types of
MPCs are identified. The first includes any complete milk protein that is more than 40% 
milk protein by weight. The second includes concentrates consisting of greater than 
90% casein. The HTS does not distinguish between products made with or without 
ultra-filtration.  The most rapid growth has occurred for MPCs with the lower protein 
content. One study found that, combined, imports of both types of MPCs equaled 
about 1.6% of the total protein in US milk production in 2000, or about 1.8% of the 
casein in US milk production.  There were also concerns that they were being illegally 
used to make “standardized cheeses9,” excessively (but legally) used in cheese starter 
vats, or at a minimum that they were lowering US prices for NDM and increasing CCC 
purchases of that product (Harris, 2003). 
The MPC issue arises because, as noted earlier, MPC are subject to low tariff barriers 
and no quantitative import restrictions.  As a result of the growth in MPC imports, dairy
farmer organizations have issued calls for implementation of quantitative and tariff 
restrictions on MPC, including distinguishing products made with and without ultra­
filtration. The General Accounting Office of the US Congress was called in to assess the 
degree to which MPC might be improperly used in cheesemaking.  GAO found relatively 
little evidence of improper use, noting that MPC have uses in a wide variety of food 
products. With the change in the butter-powder tilt in 2001 and the general rise in 
world powder prices over time, incentives for MPC imports have decreased.  The 
volume of MPC imports declined markedly from 2000 to 2001.  However, MPC imports 
remain important because the issue illustrates the dynamic consequences of US 
commitments to no new trade barriers under the URA.  In the past, when new products 
were developed the US could relatively quickly and easily modify tariff schedules to 
prevent a surge of imports.  This is no longer the case.  The impact of MPC imports on 
US milk prices also has not been fully evaluated to date, and is a focal point for this 
report (Chapter 5). 
Another issue that has attracted attention recently is the long-running dispute between 
the US (joined by New Zealand) and Canada regarding the latter’s dairy export pricing 
scheme. To comply with its URA obligations, Canada eliminated its previous program of 
“export levies” (taxes on producers) to pay for subsidized exports of dairy products 
arising from milk production over the quota amounts specified by its supply 
management programs.  In its place, it implemented a program under which “over 
production” is paid for and exported at world prices, combined with national pooling of
the returns from the domestic and international markets.  The US and New Zealand 
contended this program was an export subsidy that violated Canada’s commitments 
under the URA. It was important to the US to have a favorable ruling on the case, 
9 Use of liquid ultra-filtered milk products within a cheese plant or under special arrangements is
permitted but is under review by FDA.  The use of dried ultra-filtered milk products, or fluid ones from 
other plants is illegal for standardized cheeses such as cheddar and mozzarella.  The use of any ultra-
filtered products in non-standardized cheese (e.g., pizza cheese) is legal.
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because the EU had begun discussions about implementing a similar program, which 
would have had more important implications for international dairy markets.  In October 
1999, a Dispute Settlement Board of the WTO agreed with the US/New Zealand 
position, and ordered Canada to bring its program into compliance with its obligations.  
Canada responded by implementing a program similar to the previous one, except that 
it involved provincial, rather than national, administration and pooling.  The US and
New Zealand again challenged this program, and in July 2001 another DSB ruled in 
favor of US/New Zealand, but in late 2001, a WTO appeal board determined that 
additional information was necessary to reach a decision. This dispute illustrates that 
despite the lofty goals and apparent transparency of trade liberalization policy under the 
URA, it often will be necessary for countries to enter into lawsuit-type wrangling over 
details to obtain an interpretation of what exactly the provisions of the URA imply in 
particular cases. 
The Canadian case also reflects issues about the role of what are called State Trading 
Enterprises (STEs) in international dairy markets.  A precise definition of a state trading 
enterprise is difficult, but includes government or non-government organizations that 
have been granted exclusive or special rights through which can they influence imports 
or exports.  For dairy products, New Zealand, Canada, and Mexico operated the most 
important STEs during the 1990s. New Zealand maintained the New Zealand Dairy 
Board (NZDB), a government-authorized but producer-funded agency that administered 
all of the country’s dairy product exports.  Mexico operated CONASUPO, which 
controlled and allocated all imports of NDM and WMP.  Recent changes have reduced 
the prominence and potential impacts of these STEs, however.  Early in 2001, the NZDB 
was eliminated in favor of Fonterra. Fonterra is also a producer-owned entity, and will 
continue to have a large degree of control of dairy exports. However, it does not have 
the authority to be the sole exporter of dairy products (referred to as the “single desk
seller”). Mexico ended the operations of CONASUPO in 1999, and had previously made 
imported NDM quotas available to a private company.  These changes will reduce the 
impact of STEs on dairy market outcomes, but STEs will still be a likely focal point for 
the next round of negotiations due to their importance for other commodities, such as 
wheat. Moreover, there is the issue of whether private organizations with export 
marketing powers similar to those previously exercised by the government should be 
considered in the negotiation process.  Certainly, the impacts of such private entities 
may be similar to their government counterparts. 
A final issue that merits discussion is the role of the application of the SPS agreement to 
key issues in dairy trade:  the use of bST and trade in cheeses made from 
unpastuerized milk. Despite its approval in the US and some 20 other countries, bST 
use is not approved in Canada or the EU.  As a result, these countries have blocked the
approval of maximum residue standards for bST under the Codex Alimentarius, in 
essence arguing that other factors (such as the health of cows and the potential of 
increased antibiotic residues in milk) should be considered, not just whether bST 
residues were present in milk.  Approval of a maximum standard for bST would have 
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implied that bST was safe, and made countries who refused to import dairy products 
from countries using it subject to WTO scrutiny.  The EU and Canada continue to
maintain that the impacts of bST use deserve further study, and a previous ruling on
the use of hormones in beef production suggests that some trade barriers may be 
justified when there is “scientific controversy” about health impacts and “serious” risk 
analysis has been performed.  Although neither the EU nor Canada has banned imports 
of products from countries using bST, this issue is not yet resolved.   
France, Italy, and Switzerland produce a variety of cheeses from unpasteurized milk.  
Each year the EU reports what it considers “unjustified” trade restrictions for these 
cheeses, including those imposed by the US.  Previously, the US had proposed that
international standards for cheese under Codex require pasteurization.  However, the 
Codex Committee on Food Hygiene agreed only to mention that pasteurization was one 
among many methods to ensure the safety of dairy products.  Under the “equivalence” 
principle, countries should be required by WTO to allow imports of unpasteurized 
cheeses for which risk has been controlled by other means, unless they can provide a 
scientifically justified risk assessment.  If there were a WTO challenge to restrictions on 
unpasteurized cheese, the outcome is uncertain.  Because a number of US states allow 
the production and sale of unpasteurized cheeses, the US position can be viewed as 
lacking consistency. On the other hand, the EU would be required to demonstrate that 
unpasteurized cheeses meet risk standards deemed appropriate by the US.  Thus, the
interpretation of provisions in the SPS agreement may have important implications for
future dairy trade, particularly between the US and the EU. 
The Future of Dairy Trade Liberalization 
What are the prospects for further dairy trade liberalization, and what are the 
negotiating interests of the US?  The possibilities for further dairy trade liberalization 
depend on a variety of factors, including unilateral agricultural policy reform in the EU,
the provisions of the 2002 Farm Bill (and any future modifications due to the current 
budget outlook), world market developments (which influence dairy trade during the 
negotiating round) and success in negotiating other elements of the agreement.  In 
1999, EU heads of state reached agreement on reforms to the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), termed “Agenda 2000”.  If the Agenda 2000 policies are implemented as 
agreed to, intervention (support) prices for dairy products will be reduced by 15% in 
three equal steps starting in 2005, milk production quotas will be increased by 2.4%, 
and there will be an increase in direct payments per MT of milk quota.  The likely 
impacts of these policies are to decrease farm milk prices in the EU by about 10%, with 
similar decreases in dairy product prices, according to a 1999 study.  The same study 
predicted decreases in EU exports of NDM and butter, with increases in EU exports of 
cheese and WMP. The reforms for dairy are less dramatic than for other agricultural
commodities, but their ultimate outcomes will depend on and influence the EU’s position 
on further dairy trade liberalization.   
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The US is keen to achieve further agricultural trade liberalization, not so much because 
of potential gains to the dairy industry, but because it is a major grain exporter.  New 
Zealand and Australia, for whom dairy products are key agricultural exports, will also be 
in favor of further reductions in dairy-related trade barriers.  In contrast, the EU and 
Canada will be more lukewarm about trade policy reform for agriculture in general, and 
perhaps hostile to reforms for dairy specifically, because most studies indicate that 
reductions in the traditional trade restrictions (tariffs and quotas) would have the 
largest negative impact on their dairy sectors.  In fact, there has been growing interest 
in “alternative” trade restrictions, including administrative procedures (such as import 
licensing), and expansion of export credit guarantees. Another potential barrier is 
modifications of SPS provisions to allow restrictions based on consumer, cultural, and 
environmental factors, rather than on scientific assessments of risk.  Technical barriers 
to trade (such as requirements on refrigeration, labeling, packaging, and shelf-life) have 
also been identified by the US International Trade Commission as barriers that prevent 
US dairy product exports.  Finally, the provisions on safeguards (whose use was 
proposed to address US imports of MPC) may be invoked more in the future as barriers 
to dairy trade.  Various US dairy interests have expressed a strong interest in the 
reduction or elimination of export subsides, probably because this would force the EU to 
limit both export subsidies and domestic support, and will be beneficial to US dairy 
exports. However, each of these “alternative” barriers should be a focus for the current 
negotiations, in addition to efforts extend the URA provisions with regard to expansion
of market access, reduction of domestic support, and decreases in export subsidies.  
Only one thing is certain:  the process of negotiation will be long, and the outcome is 
uncertain given the both the magnitude of the losses, and highly visible (and sometimes 
violent) opposition to further trade talks in some countries. 
Concluding Comments 
The world’s major economies and trading partners continue to pursue trade 
liberalization, believing that it will result in greater worldwide economic growth and 
democratization. The path to greater liberalization of trade contains many obstacles, 
including those opposed to globalization in general and industry groups that might face 
losses in sales or income were trade barriers to be reduced in their countries.  The 
prospects for progress on agricultural trade liberalization in the next round are 
uncertain, despite strong support from the US and others.  If trade liberalization does 
occur, and if it includes dairy trade to a significant degree, the available evidence 
suggests that the US will not suffer catastrophe, nor will it benefit greatly—at least in 
the short term. Most studies indicate small decreases in US milk prices under a variety 
of trade liberalization scenarios (including free trade).  This in and of itself may be
sufficient to dampen enthusiasm in some segments of the US dairy industry, even as 
others see themselves as potential winners from greater opportunities for trade.  
However, it is likely that if there is progress on agricultural trade in general, a future 
agreement will include dairy.  Thus, the US industry should be preparing to provide 
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input to US trade negotiators to achieve the best possible terms for the industry, but
also prepare themselves to face greater competition from abroad. 
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Chapter 3: Modeling Tariff-Rate Quotas as a Mixed Complementarity Problem 
Introduction 
The use of tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) is widespread, especially in agricultural and other
primary sector trade policy settings. Thus, understanding the nuances of TRQs as a
trade policy instrument is of critical importance. For example, one question of interest is
how further liberalization of trade affect both importing and exporting countries when 
the volume of that trade is constrained by TRQs. For a net exporting country, analyzing 
the trade-off between diminished quota rents and increased trade volumes is, 
potentially, a non-trivial undertaking. What’s more, the problem is made even more 
difficult because the design and operation of most TRQs is not as straightforward as 
simple textbook illustrations would imply. Fortunately, many of the extant trade models 
can be reformulated as mixed complementarity problems (MCPs). They are then 
capable of being used to analyze even the most complex of TRQ instruments.
It is the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate how complex TRQs can be analyzed 
within the context of a model formulated as an MCP. This chapter draws upon a 
number of sources, in particular Ferris and Munson (2000) and Rutherford (1995). 
Although the primary objective of the paper is to show how TRQs can be analyzed, it 
also has a secondary objective. That is, to explain some of the jargon associated with 
optimization models, mathematical programming, and complementarity, and to reveal
the role in the economist’s analytical toolbox of models that employ such concepts. 
The chapter is organized as follows. We begin with what we call a 10-minute tour 
through optimization theory. This section culminates with a brief discussion of the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions, which enables us to then motivate the complementarity 
problem. We then change tack and present a series of small models. We start with a 
simple transportation problem and work up to a spatial price equilibrium model 
formulated as a mixed complementarity problem, which is coded using the GAMS 
software. The next section discusses the tariff-rate quota as a policy instrument. We 
conclude the chapter by bringing it all together, incorporating tariff-rate quotas into a 
simple 3-region, single commodity trade model.  We make extensive use of snippets of 
GAMS code to demonstrate the models presented in this chapter (Brooke et al., 1998). 
The models presented herein are well within the dimension limitations of the free 
version of the GAMS software that can be downloaded from www.gams.com. 
The Basics of Optimization 
Fundamental to most economic analysis is the notion of optimization; consumers make 
choices so as to maximize utility, firms seek to maximize profits, nations search for
ways to maximize GDP growth, and so on. Moreover, such optimization problems 
usually have constraints associated with them. For example, consumers maximize utility
subject to a budget constraint. In this chapter we focus on models that find optimal 
solutions to economic problems. The key tools employed to do this fall under the rubric
of mathematical programming. To be quite clear at the outset, we are not talking about 
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statistical, or econometric, models, and nor are we talking about a set of simple 
accounting or arithmetic relationships that might be found in a spreadsheet application. 
The purpose of this section is to very quickly introduce a few of the key concepts found 
in mathematical programming.1 Later in the chapter, we will use examples of simple but
realistic models to further scrutinize these concepts. For now we are simply interested 
in establishing a convenient starting point, and in introducing some of the jargon. 
Unconstrained Optimization 
The simplest type of optimization problem is one where we wish to find the extreme 
value (either a minimum or a maximum) of some function. In actual fact, a problem this
simple does not even require the tools of mathematical programming; the classical 
techniques of differential calculus are all that is required. 
Consider the following long-run average cost function: 
AC = f ( Q ) = Q2 − 5Q + 8	 (3.1) 
Here we have a quadratic function, which when plotted will reveal a U-shaped curve 
with its lowest point occurring when Q = 2.5. In other words, when Q = 2.5, AC will 
equal 1.75, representing the lowest value that this long-run average cost function can 
obtain. In this particular problem, we say that AC = f(Q) is the objective function and Q 
is the choice variable, or decision variable. There are no constraints to this problem, 
which implies we have an unconstrained optimization problem. If our interest is in 
minimizing the long-run average cost, then our task is to choose the appropriate level 
of the decision variable, Q, that is consistent with the objective function yielding its 
lowest possible value. We would follow the same procedure if there were more than 
one decision variable or if the problem was one to be maximized. 
As an aside, one may restrict the domain of Q to be non-negative as it would make no 
sense to contemplate producing a negative amount of Q. However, we don’t have to 
think of such a restriction as a constraint. 
The standard approach to solving an unconstrained optimization problem is to use the 
tools of differential calculus. In the case of our long-run average cost function, it will be
recalled from high school calculus that we simply take the first derivative, set it equal to
zero, and solve for the level of Q. For example, letting f′(Q) denote the first derivative 
of f, we have:2 
f ′( Q ) = 2Q − 5	 (3.2) 
1	 There are many good textbooks offering a comprehensive treatment of mathematical programming and 
its underlying theory. A gentle introduction is: Chiang, A. (1984). Fundamental methods of 
mathematical economics (3rd edition), McGraw-Hill. Indeed, much of the material in this section on 
optimisation theory is drawn directly from Chiang.
2	 Whereas f′ is termed the derivative function, the original function, f, is sometimes referred to as the 
primitive function.
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which, when set equal to zero, yields Q = 2.5. 
This problem is easy because the function is quadratic, which means that it only has 
one turning point. A slightly more complicated problem is a cubic function, which has 
two turning points. For example, 
y = f ( x ) = x3 −12x2 + 36x − 8 (3.3) 
Taking the first derivative and setting it equal to zero yields two “roots”, or levels at 
which f′(x) = 0; namely x = 2 and x = 6. But now we need to determine which of these 
roots is associated with the maximum point and which is the minimum – we know that 
a cubic function will have one of each. We do this by taking the second derivatives, i.e. 
the first derivative of the first derivative. Armed with this information, we can then 
determine which way the function, f(x), is turning as x approaches 2 and 6. In other 
words, is the function concave or convex at these points? We will cease this exposition 
at this point as it can be reviewed in any elementary calculus textbook. Suffice it to say 
that the theory of unconstrained optimization generalizes to nth-degree polynomial 
functions.
Before turning to constrained optimization though, it is worth noting a couple of final 
points. First, one needs to be careful about referring to extreme points as maximum or 
minimum points of the primitive function. They should more properly be referred to as 
relative (or local) extrema, as a function may have several extreme points, some of 
which may be maxima while others are minima. Only one of each can be the global (in 
contrast to the local) maximum or minimum. And some points at which the first 
derivative equals zero may fall into a third category, points of inflection. 
Second, differential calculus has been used to derive a universal set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. These conditions, or rules, can easily be applied to any function to
determine the status of all stationary points. That is, all points where the first derivative 
or the slope of the function is zero. The necessary conditions are based on the first
derivatives and are therefore referred to as the first-order conditions. Likewise, the 
sufficient conditions are based on the second derivatives, and are referred to as 
second-order conditions. 
Optimization With Equality Constraints 
It is nearly always the case in economics that some limiting factor(s) impinges upon the 
choices we are able to make when trying to solve any given optimization problem. An
obvious example is when firms set out to maximize profits; they are constrained by the 
need to employ the available technology. Hence it is necessary to have a technique 
available for solving constrained optimization problems. The standard method is that of 
Lagrange multipliers. The essence of the Lagrange multiplier method is to convert the 
constrained optimization problem into a form where the first-order conditions of the
unconstrained problem can still be applied. 
By way of example, consider the utility function 
U = x1x2 + 2x1 (3.4) 
47
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
  
 
  
 
Chapter 3: Modeling TRQs as a MCP
and the budget constraint given by 
4x1 + 2x2 = 60 (3.5) 
The first step in employing the method of Lagrange multipliers is to write down what is 
termed the Lagrangian function: 
Z = x x + 2x + λ( 60 − 4x − 2x )	 (3.6)1	 2 1 1 2 
This is nothing more than a modified version of the primitive objective function that 
incorporates the constraint (or constraints if there is more than one).3 Z is now the 
objective function value, i.e. the value we are trying to optimize (maximize in this case). 
The symbol λ is called the Lagrange multiplier and represents an as yet undetermined 
number. Notice how the constraint was rearranged when we wrote out the Lagrangian 
function. If we can be assured that the constraint will be satisfied, then the expression 
inside the brackets in our Lagrangian function goes to zero, and the entire last term of 
equation (3.6) vanishes, regardless of the value of λ. With the constraint thus 
dispensed with, we could then seek the free (unconstrained) value of Z in lieu of the 
constrained value of U. The question, then, is how do we make the term in parentheses 
in equation (6) vanish? 
The tactic employed by the method of Lagrange multipliers is to treat λ as an additional 
variable in (3.6). That is, consider Z to be a function not only of x1 and x2, but also of λ, 
e.g. Z = Z(λ, x1, x2). The first-order conditions for the free extremum (i.e. maximum in 
this case) will now consist of a set of simultaneous equations: 
Zλ ≡ ∂Z ∂λ = 60 − 4x1 − 2x2 = 0
 
Z1 ≡ ∂Z
 ∂x1 = x2 + 2 − 4λ = 0  (FOC 3.1)
Z2 ≡ ∂Z ∂x2 = x1 − 2λ = 0 
So, by taking the first derivative of Z with respect to each of the three variables, and by 
setting each derivative to be equal to zero, we have generated the first-order 
conditions. They are nothing more than a set of 3 unknowns and 3 equations. But
significantly, the first of the three equations in (FOC 1), i.e. Zλ, gives us the assurance 
that the last term in equation (6) will vanish. It is a simple matter to solve this system 
and find that λ = 4, x1 = 8, and x2 = 14.4 Putting these values into equations (3.6) and 
(3.4) yields, respectively, Z = 128 and U = 128. 
For our present purposes, we need not take this discussion any further; we are now 
ready to consider problems with inequality constraints. Chapter 12 of Chiang (1984) 
3	 When there is more than one constraint, the Lagrangian function would have a distinct λ associated 
with each one.
4  For example, rearrange Z2 to yield λ = 0.5x1. Then substitute this expression for λ into Z1 yielding x2 + 
2 - 4(0.5x1) = 0. Rearranging this gives x2 = 2x1 – 2, which we can then substitute into Zλ. Rearranging 
the result of that gives us x1 = 8. If x1 = 8, then Z2 must imply that λ = 4, and finally, putting λ = 4 
into Z1 reveals that x2 = 14.
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covers optimization with equality constraints in much greater detail and is worth 
reviewing. For example, it covers such topics as the interpretation of the Lagrange 
multiplier, the n-variable and m-constraint case, second-order conditions, and the 
significance of testing for concavity and convexity. 
Optimization with Inequality Constraints 
Thus far in our quick tour through optimization theory we have been able to confine 
ourselves to using the methods of classical optimization, i.e. techniques based on 
differential calculus. In order to tackle problems with inequality constraints, and for 
some other reasons that will become obvious shortly, we now need to move into the 
realm of nonclassical methods. Mathematical programming, which includes (among 
other topics) linear programming, nonlinear programming, and complementarity 
methods, is the name given to this collection of nonclassical solution techniques. Clearly 
the introduction of inequality constraints enables more interesting and realistic 
problems to be contemplated. 
The specific models we get to later in the chapter deal with problems containing 
inequality constraints. Hence we will not belabor their presentation at this juncture. 
What we wish to do in this section is introduce the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, and then 
provide a brief introduction to the mixed complementarity problem.
The types of problems encountered in classical optimization have three key 
characteristics: 
•	 They contain no explicit restrictions on the sign of the choice variables; 
•	 They contain no inequality constraints; and 
•	 The first-order conditions for a relative or local extremum is simply that the first 
partial derivatives of the Lagrangian function with respect to all choice variables and 
the Lagrange multipliers be zero. In other words, we are restricted to situations 
where there are no boundary or corner solutions. Stated differently, we have only
interior solutions. 
Mathematical programming methods enable us to find solutions to problems where one 
or all of these characteristics are not present. 
The Kuhn-Tucker Conditions 
The single most important result in nonlinear programming is the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions (Kuhn and Tucker, 1951). These conditions can be thought of as the 
nonlinear programming equivalent of the classical first-order conditions. As we shall 
see, the Kuhn-Tucker method generalises the first-order conditions for an equilibrium to 
a set of boundary conditions for finding an equilibrium. But unlike those classical 
conditions, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions cannot be accorded the status of necessary 
conditions, unless a certain proviso is satisfied.5 However, in specific circumstances, the 
5	 That proviso is called the constraint qualification. It imposes a certain restriction on the constraint 
functions of a nonlinear program so that irregularities on the boundary of the feasible set don’t 
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Chapter 3: Modeling TRQs as a MCP
Kuhn-Tucker conditions turn out to be sufficient conditions, or even necessary and 
sufficient conditions as well. 
At this point we are going to do little more than present the derivation of the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions. Their relevance will become clearer later in the chapter. Our primary 
reason for presenting them at all is because they provide a bridge from the theory of
constrained optimization to the mixed complementarity problem. 
Consider the following generic optimization problem, which incorporates two constraint 
functions and explicit nonnegativity conditions: 
Maximise π = f (x ,x ,x )1 2 3 
1subject to g (x1 , x2 , x3 ) ≤ r1  (NLP 3.1) 
2g (x ,x ,x ) ≤ r1 2 3 2 
x ,x ,x ≥ 01 2 3 
We can imagine that f and g1, say, are nonlinear functions. Hence we call this problem 
(NLP 3.1) for NonLinear Program. As before, we can write the Lagrangian function for 
this problem: 
1 1 2 2Z = f (x1 ,x2 ,x3 )+ λ (r1 − g (x1 ,x2 ,x3 ))+ λ (r2 − g (x1 ,x2 ,x3 )) (3.7) 
The resulting Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be stated compactly as follows (or more 
accurately, one version of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, expressed in terms of the 
Lagrangian function Z, can be stated this way): 
∂Z ∂Z≤ 0, x j ≥ 0, and x j = 0 ∀ j = 1, 2, 3∂x ∂xj j  (KT 3.1) ∂Z i i ∂Z 
i ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, and λ i = 0 ∀ i = 1, 2 ∂λ ∂λ 
What do these six expressions comprising the Kuhn-Tucker conditions tell us?
First of all, two of the six expressions are nothing more than a restatement of parts of 
the original problem, i.e. xj ≥ 0 simply restates the nonnegativity conditions for the
three primal variables. Similarly, ∂Z/∂λi ≥ 0 reiterates the constraints, i.e. one such 
condition for each of the two constraints. But notice that associated with each variable 
type, i.e. the choice variables (xj) and the Lagrange multipliers (λi), there is a 
corresponding marginal condition that must be satisfied by the optimal solution.6 
invalidate the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, should the optimal solution occur at that boundary. While the 
constraint qualification is important to the theory of nonlinear programming, and to the Kuhn-Tucker 
sufficiency theorem, we are not going to discuss it in this paper. A nonlinear programming text should 
be consulted for further information.
6  In case it is not yet apparent, it is worth noting at this point that the first-order conditions, of both 
constrained and unconstrained optimisation problems, describe a set of equations that must hold true 
at the equilibrium or optimal solution. They are sometimes thus referred to as the first-order 
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Finally, there is what is known as the complementary slackness conditions, i.e. the last 
two expressions on each line of (KT 3.1), which simply state that the product of two 
terms must equate to zero. In other words, each variable is characterised by 
complementary slackness in relation to a particular partial derivative of the Lagrangian 
function Z. And what does this mean? It means that for each xj, we must find in the 
optimal solution that either: 
• The marginal condition holds with a strict equality (as in the classical context); or 
• The choice variable in question must take on a zero value; or 
• Both of the above. 
Analogously, for each λi, we must find in the optimal solution that either the associated 
marginal condition holds as an equality – meaning that the ith constraint is satisfied 
exactly – or the Lagrange multiplier vanishes, i.e. becomes zero, or both. 
It is by exploiting the complementary slackness conditions that it becomes possible to 
find corner or boundary solutions. Of significance in the case of models that explicitly 
incorporate tariff-rate quotas, it is the property that enables endogenous regime 
switching to occur. In fact, short of exploiting complementary slackness, there exists no 
other way to explicitly model such behavior.7 We will return to this point later. 
Before we turn to the mixed complementarity problem, we would point out that the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions give rise to a natural economic interpretation. The Lagrange
multipliers can be regarded as shadow prices. Thus, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions tell us 
that, in an optimal solution, when a constraint holds with a strict inequality, then by
complementary slackness, the associated shadow price must be zero. Similarly, if an 
activity level (e.g. a primal variable) is strictly greater than zero, then the associated 
marginal condition must hold with a strict equality. We will return to this in some detail 
shortly. 
The Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) 
Now that we have understood the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we are ready to examine 
complementarity. A nonlinear complementarity problem consists of a system of
simultaneous (linear or nonlinear) equations that are written as inequalities and are
linked to bounded variables in a manner that encapsulates complementary slackness 
relationships. In a mixed complementarity problem (MCP), the equations may be a
mixture of inequalities and strict equalities. For more rigorous details and a
mathematical definition, see Rutherford (1995). 
equilibrium conditions. So, we have two ways to describe the problem; the underlying optimisation 
problem, and a set of conditions that characterise (i.e. must hold true) a solution to the underlying 
optimisation problem. 
7  There are, of course, techniques for approximating regime switching that don’t require 
complementarity.
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It is possible to rewrite (KT 3.1) in accordance with this definition, and thereby 
transform (NLP 3.1) into an equivalent MCP. However, the generic nature of the 
problem specified in NLP 3.1 means that the expression for the equivalent MCP may 
well be confusing for the novice. To avoid this possibility, we would prefer to derive an
MCP using a specific example, and shall do so shortly. 
Before leaving this section, however, we would make a few general comments relating 
to MCPs. The underlying theory of complementarity, and the closely related variational 
inequality was developed in the 1960s, e.g. see Cottle et al., 1992; Lemke and Howson, 
1964; Hartman and Stampacchia, 1966. For a thorough review, see Harker and Pang 
(1990). It was not until much later that commercially available algorithms capable of 
solving large scale complementarity problems became available, e.g. see Rutherford 
(1993) and Dirkse and Ferris (1993). The solver we use is called PATH (Dirkse and 
Ferris, 1993), which is seamlessly linked with the GAMS modeling software (Brooke et
al., 1998). 
As noted earlier, the equilibrium conditions that characterize an underlying optimization 
problem are an alternative way of expressing that problem. But there are some 
problems that can be formulated as an MCP for which there is no equivalent underlying
optimization problem. Such problems arise frequently in economics. Hence, the MCP 
offers the modeller greater choice and flexibility than traditional NLP formulations. A 
pertinent case in point is the explicit treatment of tariff-rate quotas, which requires a
modeling framework able to handle regime switching. For a description of the 
conditions that give rise to the lack of equivalence between NLPs and complementarity 
problems, and for some common examples, see Nicholson et al. (1994) and Nagurney 
et al. (1996a). For a similar discussion in the context of general equilibrium modeling, 
see Lofgren and Robinson (1999). 
Multi-Region Models8 
Having reviewed, albeit very briefly, the theory underlying optimization, we now turn to
some specific examples. Our purpose here is twofold: 
•	 To practically demonstrate what we’ve been talking about in the previous section; 
and 
•	 To develop a realistic but simple model that incorporates tariff-rate quotas. 
Whether a problem is formulated as a traditional NLP (of which linear problems are just 
a special case) or as an MCP, it is necessary to be able to then find a solution to the 
problem. Only in the most trivial of cases will the method of substitution and 
elimination, which we used earlier, be helpful. The most popular means of specifying 
and then solving the types of problems we are concerned with here is the GAMS 
modeling software. GAMS, which stands for General Algebraic Modeling System, 
8 We focus on multi-region models in this paper. It should be understood, however, that the same 
concepts apply to products (or sectors or markets) and time. In other words, the practical analyzis of 
space, form, and time amounts to much the same thing.
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employs a syntax that results in a model representation that is easily understood by 
humans, as well as computers. It also incorporates (is internally linked to) many well-
known commercial solvers, which enables almost any problem type to be solved. 
Hence, the models we now present will be depicted in GAMS format. 
A Simple Transportation Problem 
The transportation problem, formulated simultaneously and independently by 
Kantorovich (1939) and Hitchcock (1941), is the starting point for the partial equilibrium 
literature. The canonical problem of this genre, popularized by Dantzig (1963) and 
solved using linear programming (LP) algorithms, is depicted in Figure 3.1. 
Here we have a problem where the objective is to minimize the transportation cost of 
shipping a single homogeneous good from one set of regions or cities (points in space) 
to a second set of regions. To make the problem very simple, supply and demand is 
fixed, i.e. it does not respond to price. In other words, the problem is to satisfy the 
fixed demands (of 275, 300, and 375 at Topeka, Chicago, and New York, respectively) 
from the fixed supplies (of 350 and 600 at Seattle and San Diego, respectively), at the 
least cost. 
The transportation cost is specified to be a linear function of distance. Specifically, it is 
$90 per case per thousand miles. The values on the arcs in Figure 3.1 denote the 
distance in miles between each pair of cities, while the number in parentheses is the
transportation cost in thousands of dollars per case. Notice that in total there is excess 
supply; there are 950 cases available for supply, while the total fixed demand is only 
900 cases.
Figure 3.1  Dantzig’s Transportation Problem 
Seattle 
350 
San 
Diego 
600 
2500 (0.225) 
1700 (0.153) 
1800 (0.162) 
1400 (0.126) 
1800 (0.162) 
2500 (0.225) 
Topeka 
275 
New 
York 
325 
Chicago 
300 
Source: Dantzig (1963) 
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In keeping with the style of the previous section, we can state this problem 
algebraically as follows: 
Minimise ∑∑cij xij 
i j 
subject to ∑ xij ≤ si ∀ i 
j  (LP 3.1)
∑ xij ≥ d j ∀ j 
i 
x ≥ 0ij 
Alternatively, we can write the model using GAMS (see Figure 3.2). Except for the line 
numbers, which have been added for expositional convenience, the code in Figure 3.2
is literally a GAMS program. Not only does it include the algebraic description of the 
model, lines 36 through 40, it also contains the data used to parameterise the model. 
Specifically, lines 1-3 specify the sets, or indices, on which the problem’s parameters, 
variables, and equations are defined, i.e. set i denotes the supply points (Seattle and 
San Diego), while set j denotes the three demand points. Lines 5 through 13 declare 
the two parameters, si and dj, and also assigns values to these parameters. It ought to
be apparent that si denotes the supply quantities of 350 and 600 available at Seattle 
and San Diego, respectively. Likewise dj denotes the demand quantities. Lines 15-18 
produce a table of distances that is subsequently used in line 23 to calculate the 
shipping cost associated with each of the six arcs or routes. Lines 25-29 declare the 
variables. Note that z is just the objective function value. Also note the command in line 
29; it is the GAMS-equivalent of specifying the non-negativity condition on the variable 
xij. 
Lines 31 through 34 declare the equations contained in the model, while lines 36-40 
specify the algebra of each equation. In GAMS, =e= means strictly equal to, =l= means 
less than or equal to, and =g= means greater than or equal to (the ≤, =, and ≥ signs 
are reserved for use in assignment statements). The command in line 42 simply says
take all of the equations that have been specified and use them to create a model 
called transport. Line 44 tells GAMS to solve the model called transport using the LP 
solver. In other words, the user is telling GAMS that this model is an LP problem. 
To recap, what we have specified here is a linear programming problem. An LP is a
special case of the NLP class of problems where both the objective function and all of 
the constraints are linear. Incidentally, if the objective function was quadratic and the
constraints were linear, then we would have a problem known as a quadratic
programming (QP) problem. LP and QP problems are significant from an algorithmic 
point of view because specialized solvers are able to solve these problems much more 
quickly than general NLP solvers can. An NLP may have an objective function that 
contains nonlinearities of a higher order than quadratic. It may also have linear or 
nonlinear constraints, or a mixture of both. 
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Chapter 3: Modeling TRQs as a MCP
Figure 3.2 GAMS Code for Dantzig’s Transportation Problem 
1  Sets 
2 i canning plants  / seattle,  san-diego / 
3 j markets  / new-york, chicago, topeka /; 
4 
5  Parameters 
6   s(i) capacity of plant i in cases 
7  /seattle   350 
8 san-diego   600 / 
9 
10 d(j)  demand at market j in cases 
11 /new-york 325 
12  chicago 300 
13  topeka 275 /; 
14 
15  Table dist(i,j)  distance in thousands of miles 
16   new-york   chicago topeka 
17 seattle 2.5  1.7 1.8 
18 san-diego 2.5  1.8 1.4 ; 
19 
20  Scalar f  freight in dollars per case per thousand miles  /90/; 
21 
22  Parameter c(i,j)  transport cost in thousands of dollars per case; 
23  c(i,j) = f * dist(i,j)/1000; 
24 
25  Variables 
26 x(i,j)  shipment quantities in cases 
27 z  total transportation costs in thousands of dollars ; 
28 
29  Positive Variable x; 
30 
31  Equations 
32 cost define objective function 
33  supply(i)   observe supply limit at plant i 
34  demand(j)   satisfy demand at market j ; 
35 
36  cost.. z =e= sum((i,j), c(i,j)*x(i,j)); 
37 
38  supply(i).. sum(j, x(i,j)) =l= s(i); 
39 
40  demand(j).. sum(i, x(i,j)) =g= d(j); 
41 
42  Model transport /all/; 
43 
44  Solve transport using lp minimizing z; 
Source: GAMS model library (trnsport.gms), www.gams.com. 
Finally, for the sake of completeness, we should point out that a pure transportation 
problem such as (LP 3.1) need not be formulated as an LP problem in order to find a
solution; there is another whole class of problems called network problems, for which 
very fast solution algorithms have been designed. 
A solution to this problem will generate the quantities shipped (defined by city of origin 
and destination). The objective, as already noted, is to minimize the total transportation 
cost. The only constraints to this simple problem are that shipments must be non-
negative (they may be zero along a particular route); the supply cities cannot ship more 
than they have available to ship; and the total quantity of shipments into a demand city 
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Chapter 3: Modeling TRQs as a MCP
must be at least as great as the fixed amount demanded at that city. Given that each 
case of the good shipped incurs a positive cost, we would expect that this last 
constraint will be satisfied with a strict equality, i.e. the quantity shipped into a city will 
exactly equal the quantity demanded at that city. 
The solution is as follows: 
• Ship 300 cases from Seattle to Chicago; 
• Ship 325 cases from San Diego to New York; and 
• Ship 275 cases from San Diego to Topeka. 
The total transportation cost, z, will be $153,675. This represents an optimal solution, 
which means that given the fixed supplies, it is not possible to satisfy the fixed 
demands at a lower total cost. Note that the excess supply of 50 cases remains at 
Seattle. This problem actually has more than one optimal solution. The per unit
shipping cost is identical along both the Seattle-New York and the San Diego-New York 
routes. Hence, an equally optimal solution would have been the same as above except 
Seattle could have shipped 50 cases to New York while San Diego could have shipped 
275 cases to New York, instead of 325. In this alternative optimal solution, the total 
transportation cost would still be $153,675 but the excess 50 cases would be located at 
San Diego. 
Finally, formulating and solving this problem as an LP yields two other pieces of 
valuable information; the shadow price associated with each of the constraints and the 
marginal cost associated with each variable. While the solution technique enables this 
information to be generated, it is important to understand that these values, i.e. the 
shadow prices and the marginal costs, are not explicit variables in the problem being 
solved. 
The shadow prices associated with the two supply constraints are zero. This should not 
be a surprise as there is excess supply in this problem. The shadow prices represent the 
value of relaxing the constraint. In other words, how much would the objective function 
value, z, change if we had one more case at either Seattle or San Diego? The answer is 
zero because demands are fixed and another case available for supply therefore has no 
value – anywhere. Recall that the shadow prices are akin to the Lagrange multipliers. 
The shadow prices associated with the three demand constraints are 0.225, 0.153, and 
0.126 at New York, Chicago, and Topeka, respectively. What does this mean? Consider 
the New York demand constraint. If New York required 326 cases, i.e. one more than is 
currently specified, then the objective function value would increase by 0.225 (or, 
equivalently, the total transportation cost would go up by $225). This, it can be seen, is
nothing more than the cost of getting another case from Seattle, the point at which
there exists excess supply. 
The marginal costs associated with the six variables are zero, except for along the 
Seattle-Topeka arc where it is 0.036, and along the San Diego-Chicago arc where the 
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Chapter 3: Modeling TRQs as a MCP
marginal cost is 0.009.9 What does this mean? It means that it is optimal to send 
nothing from Seattle to Topeka and from San Diego to Chicago. But if you insisted on
sending just one case along these arcs, it would add $36 and $9, respectively, to the 
optimal (minimum) total transportation cost. 
The Transportation Problem as a Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP)10 
There is no compelling reason why the transportation problem shown above should be
formulated and solved as a complementarity problem. Nevertheless, we will do it so as 
to explicitly relate the complementarity problem back to a simple LP. We will then move 
on to a model that includes price responsive supply and demand functions.
Consider the simple transportation problem as specified in (LP 3.1). As we’ve just seen, 
this problem can be solved as a linear program. But let’s go back to the theory we 
discussed earlier. The derivation of the optimality conditions for this problem begins by 
associating with each constraint a multiplier, alternatively termed a shadow price or 
dual variable. These multipliers represent the marginal price on changes to the 
corresponding constraint. Instead of the λs we used earlier, let’s label the prices on the 
supply constraint ps and those on the demand constraint pd. 
Intuitively, for each supply node i we have: 
s0 ≤ pi and si ≥∑ xij (3.8) 
j 
In other words, supply prices cannot be negative and the quantity available for supply 
at a particular location must be greater than or equal to the sum of all shipments out of 
that location. 
Consider what happens when si > Σjxij, i.e. supply is strictly greater than the sum of the 
shipments. In a competitive setting, no rational person would be willing to pay for more 
supply at location i; it is already oversupplied. Therefore ps at that location would be 
zero. Alternatively, when si = Σjxij, that is the market clears, one might be willing to pay
for some additional supply of the good. Therefore ps ≥ 0. We can write these two 
conditions succinctly as: 
s0 ≤ pi ⊥ si ≥∑ xij ∀i (3.9) 
j 
where the “⊥” symbol is understood to mean that at least one of the adjacent 
inequalities must be satisfied as a strict equality, i.e. either ps = 0 or si = Σjxij. This is
nothing more than a formal statement of the complementary slackness result that we 
saw earlier when presenting the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
9  Not counting the objective function variable, z, whose marginal cost is zero, there are six variables in 
this model, i.e. i = 2 times j = 3 equals 6, and x is defined on i and j. 
10 This section draws heavily on Ferris and Munson, 2000.
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Chapter 3: Modeling TRQs as a MCP
We can go through a similar logic with respect to the demand markets and derive the 
complementarity relationship: 
0 ≤ pdj ⊥∑ xij ≥ d j ∀j (3.10) 
i 
In other words, if shipments into a demand location were to exceed the quantity 
demanded, then we’d expect the demand price to be driven down to zero. 
Also, from basic intuition, we know that the supply price at i plus the transportation cost 
cij from i to j must exceed the market price at j: 
pi
s + cij ≥ pdj (3.11) 
This, as we’ll see later in the chapter, is just a statement of a simple spatial price 
equilibrium (SPE) condition. If this condition was not true, then in a competitive market 
place, another producer could replicate supplier i and thereby increase the supply of the 
good, which in turn would drive down the market price. This process would continue
until the inequality condition (3.11) was restored. Furthermore, if (3.11) held with a 
strict inequality, i.e. the cost of delivery (supply price plus the transportation cost) 
exceeded the market price, then nothing would be shipped from i to j because doing so 
would incur a loss. In such a circumstance, it is clear that xij = 0. Therefore, 
0 ≤ xij ⊥ pis + cij ≥ pdj ∀i, j (3.12) 
We can combine (9), (10), and (12) into a single problem:
s0 ≤ pi ⊥ si ≥∑ xij ∀i 
j 
0 ≤ pdj ⊥∑ xij ≥ d j ∀j  (LCP 3.1)
i 
0 ≤ xij ⊥ pis + cij ≥ pdj ∀i, j 
(LCP 3.1) defines a linear complementarity problem that should, by now, be easily 
recognised as the complementary slackness conditions associated with (LP 3.1). For 
linear programs, the complementary slackness conditions are both necessary and 
sufficient for x (a 6 by 1 vector) to be an optimal solution to (LP 3.1).11 
Looking a little more carefully at (LCP 3.1) we can gain further insight into 
complementarity problems. A solution to (LCP 3.1) not only tells us how much to send
along each route, it also specifies the routes to be used. This property represents the
11  If the reader is confused at this point, we suggest returning to the section presenting the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions and the complementarity problem contain essentially the same
information. 
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Chapter 3: Modeling TRQs as a MCP
key contribution of a complementarity problem over a system of equations.12 If we 
knew a priori which routes to use, we could solve a simple system of equations to find 
the quantity to ship along each route. However, the key to the modeling power of 
complementarity is that it chooses which inequalities to satisfy as equalities. 
We can therefore exploit this property and generate models with different regimes and 
let the solution determine which ones are to be active. A frequently used example of 
this can be found in the economics literature relating to climate change and the 
atmospheric accumulation of greenhouse gas. It is common in that literature to see 
modeled a “backstop” technology such as windmills that becomes active once the price 
of traditional energy sources have reached a certain threshold level, following the 
introduction of carbon taxes.
In Figure 3.3 we present the GAMS code to specify and solve (LCP 1). Up until line 25, 
it is identical to the LP specification shown in Figure 3.2. The key differences between 
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3  are as follows. The LCP has no objective function so there is 
no need for an objective function variable, i.e. the variable z in the LP specification. But
the shadow prices seen in the solution to the LP model are explicitly included as 
variables in the LCP. Hence, the variables that we earlier called ps and pd are included in 
the LCP GAMS code as p_supply(i) and p_demand(j), respectively. The spatial price 
equilibrium condition, equation (3.11) above, is included in the LCP model as the 
equation called zprofit(i,j). As described earlier, this is the condition that, in a
competitive setting, will cause profits over and above a firm’s normal profit to be driven 
to zero. Hence the name “zero profit condition”. One can think of this condition as an 
arbitrage condition, i.e. the potential for an agent to profitably exploit non-equilibrium 
situations is sufficient to drive the market back to an equilibrium. 
Notice the “Model” statement in line 41. Whereas the LP model simply assigned “all”
equations to the model called “Transport”, the LCP model requires a different approach. 
Specifically, the “.” takes the place of the “⊥” symbol, which we used earlier in (LCP 
3.1). So, line 41 specifies that the variable x is complementary to the equation called 
zprofit. Likewise, the variable called p_supply is complementary to the equation called 
supply and the variable called p_demand is specified to be complementary to the 
equation called demand. It is important to note that the modeler must explicitly specify 
the complementarity pairings in order for the solver to exploit this information. Simply 
formulating a model that contains arbitrage conditions, such as (3.11), in an NLP 
setting is not the same as exploiting complementarity. 
12 As noted earlier, (LP 1), when solved as a linear programming problem, also tells us which routes to 
use. There is thus no compelling reason to use a complementarity formulation for such a simple 
problem. But there are many instances when economic problems can’t be solved using traditional LP or 
NLP techniques. In such cases, the available options are to solve a system of equations representing 
the equilibrium conditions for the underlying optimisation problem, or to formulate and solve the 
problem as a complementarity problem.
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Chapter 3: Modeling TRQs as a MCP
Figure 3.3 GAMS Code for a Linear Complementarity Problem 
1 Sets 
2 i canning plants  / seattle,  san-diego / 
3 j markets         / new-york, chicago, topeka /; 
4 
5 Parameters 
6 s(i) capacity of plant i in cases 
7        /seattle  350 
8         san-diego  600 / 
9 
10 d(j) demand at market j in cases 
11         /new-york    325 
12          chicago     300 
13          topeka      275 /;
14 
15 Table dist(i,j)  distance in thousands of miles 
16      new-york  chicago    topeka
17 seattle 2.5  1.7 1.8 
18 san-diego  2.5  1.8 1.4 ;
19 
20 Scalar f  freight in dollars per case per thousand miles  /90/;
21 
22 Parameter c(i,j)  transport cost in thousands of dollars per case; 
23 c(i,j) = f * dist(i,j)/1000; 
24 
25 Positive Variables 
26 x(i,j)    shipment quantities in cases 
27 p_supply(i) shadow price at market i 
28 p_demand(j) shadow price at market j ; 
29 
30 Equations 
31 supply(i)     observe supply limit at plant i 
32 demand(j)     satisfy demand at market j 
33  zprofit(i,j)  zero profit condition ; 
34 
35 supply(i)..     s(i) =g= sum(j, x(i,j)); 
36 
37 demand(j)..     sum(i, x(i,j)) =g= d(j); 
38
39 zprofit(i,j)..  p_supply(i) + c(i,j) =g= p_demand(j); 
40
41 Model transport /zprofit.x, supply.p_supply, demand.p_demand/; 
42 
43 Solve transport using mcp; 
Source: GAMS model library (transmcp.gms), www.gams.com. 
Finally, the “Solve” statement in line 43 is differs in two ways from that in the LP model. 
First, we need to tell GAMS that this is an MCP class of model, and not an LP. And as a
consequence of this, there is no need to specify an objective function value to be 
minimized (or maximized). 
A solution to this problem will generate the quantities shipped (defined by location of 
origin and destination), and supply and demand prices, i.e. both prices and quantities 
are variables, unlike in (LP 3.1). Both price and quantity variables may be zero, i.e. the
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Chapter 3: Modeling TRQs as a MCP
model endogenously selects the appropriate regime that satisfies the model and its 
constraints.
The economic question contained herein is what quantity should be shipped between 
each supply and demand point so as to minimize the overall transportation cost? The 
answer to this question describes the regime determined by the model’s solution. For
markets, i.e. combinations of supply and demand points, the regime is either one of full
utilization with a positive market clearing price, or excess supply with a zero price. For 
the arcs, i.e. the transportation flows, the regime is either one of active links associated 
with a positive shipment, or inactive links and a zero flow. The solution may be viewed 
as a market equilibrium, albeit subject to the restrictive assumption of fixed, i.e. non-
price responsive, supply and demand quantities. 
Not surprisingly, the solution to the LCP is identical to the solution of the LP problem. 
To reiterate though, the prices are explicit variables in the LCP formulation, whereas the 
LP model yields prices only implicitly. This points to some of the flexibility available from 
the LCP formulation compared to the LP model. For instance, in the LCP (or the MCP) 
setting, it is a straightforward matter to directly simulate policies that operate on prices, 
e.g. agricultural support prices. 
Adding Price Responsive Behavior 
The spatial price equilibrium (SPE) model is something of a workhorse in trade and 
interregional analysis. A simple formulation of an SPE model is just the transportation 
problem with its fixed supplies and demands replaced with price responsive supply and 
demand functions. In this section, we describe a little of the background to the SPE 
model, and then amend (LCP 1) so that it incorporates price responsive behavior. To 
keep things uncluttered we will assume that quantity is a simple function of own price, 
i.e. all conceivable cross-price terms are zero. Once we have explored the specification 
of the SPE model formulated as a complementarity problem, we will be in a position to
then add tariff-rate quotas to the model. 
Enke (1951) and Samuelson (1952) were the first to extend the transportation model 
by introducing price responsive regional supply and demand functions. Samuelson’s 
formulation shows that the problem of maximizing “net social payoff” (the sum of 
consumers’ and producers’ surpluses in each region less transportation costs) subject to 
regional commodity balance equations generates a set of optimality conditions that 
define an equilibrium in each regional market.13 Given the significance of Samuelson’s 
contribution, it is worth dwelling on this for a moment. 
Imagine a three region model where each region both supplies and demands a single 
good. Further imagine that the cost structures and consumer preferences are 
sufficiently different in each region that they engage in trade in order to maximize 
13 We hasten to point out that Samuelson warned of the problems associated with using his result to 
make inferences about welfare. Hence his term “net social payoff”, which explicitly excludes a reference 
to welfare. The literature would seem to suggest, however, that Samuelson’s cautionary note was 
almost immediately ignored. See his 1952 paper for further details.
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welfare. In a graphical sense, it is easy enough to picture the area denoting producer 
and consumer surplus in each region. The transportation cost is simply the quantity 
traded between each pair of regions multiplied by the appropriate transportation cost. 
Samuelson’s innovation was that if we simply set out to maximize the sum, over all 
regions, of the producers’ and consumers’ surplus, less the total transportation cost, 
and observed the supply and demand constraints, then the resulting solution to such an 
optimization problem would, in fact, be the equilibrium market solution. That is, the 
solution would yield the quantity that each region would supply and demand, the 
quantity that would be traded between regions, and the supply and demand prices in 
each region could be gleaned from the solution as the shadow prices associated with 
the supply and demand constraints. 
Takayama and Judge (1964) made Samuelson’s approach operational by showing that 
if the supply and demand functions were linear, then the resulting optimization problem 
was a quadratic programming problem (i.e. quadratic objective function with linear 
constraints), which could be solved quite readily with available QP solvers.14 Takayama 
and Judge also extended the model to multiple products incorporating cross-price terms 
in the supply and demand functions. The work of Samuelson, and subsequently 
Takayama and Judge, spawned a great deal of empirical modeling, especially in the 
area of trade. Even today, many trade models are constructed in the tradition of the 
Samuelson-Takayama-Judge (STJ) genre. A very accessible and graphical exposition of 
the STJ model can be found in Martin (1981). 
Most spatial equilibrium models of the STJ type are formulated in the quantity domain. 
This means that the supply and demand curves are inverted, the primal variables in the 
model are quantities, and prices are read from the solution as shadow prices, i.e. as we
saw earlier. Alternatively, but less commonly in the case of trade models, the “dual” 
problem could be formulated and solved, whereby the problem is solved in the price 
domain. In other words, the variables in the model are prices and the shadow values 
are the quantities. Either way, LP, QP, and more general NLP solution techniques 
require that the demand functions be symmetric (see Nicholson et al., 1994). This 
shortcoming was overcome with linear complementarity techniques (see the primal-dual 
formulations in Takayama and Judge, 1971). However, up until the 1990s, when 
complementarity solvers became commercially available, such primal-dual problems  
14  In fact, the objective function in the Takayama and Judge QP formulation embodies the integral 
functions of the inverse linear demand and supply functions. It calculates the area under the demand 
curve between the origin and the optimal demand quantity (a decision variable in the model), less the 
area under the supply curve between the origin and the optimal supply quantity, less the transportation 
costs. The result is the sum over all regions of producers’ and consumer’ surplus. 
62
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
 
Chapter 3: Modeling TRQs as a MCP
were usually configured such that they could be “forced” into conventional NLP solvers. 
Hence, the objective function, even if it was vacuous, still had to observe the symmetry 
condition.15 
Finally, it should be noted that a number of policy instruments can be quite readily 
modeled in a simple SPE model. Indeed, the trade literature is full of examples. For 
example, the transportation cost component can be modified to include per unit tariffs, 
taxes, and subsidies; import quotas can be introduced as upper bounds on shipment 
variables; and even ad valorem tariffs can be modeled, so long as they are non-
discriminatory, by modifying the slope parameters of the demand functions. But there 
are many policy instruments that the conventional SPE model is unable to
accommodate; discriminatory ad valorem tariffs, for instance. 
The SPE Model as an MCP 
We now turn to the task of amending (LCP 3.1) to create a nonlinear complementarity 
problem. We will refer to the resulting model as an MCP, even though it does not
contain a mixture of equalities and inequalities (see Figure 3.4; the model contains only 
inequalities). Nevertheless, unlike the linear complementarity problem in Figure 3.3 , 
our SPE model is now a nonlinear problem due to the functional form we have chosen 
for the supply and demand functions, i.e. they are constant elasticity functions. 
The GAMS code seen in Figure 3.4 should by now seem quite familiar. The first 30 lines 
are identical to the LCP model in Figure 3.3 , except that we have introduced two new 
parameters; eta and sigma, the elasticities of supply and demand, respectively. 
We assume for simplicity that supply prices are unitary (i.e. equal to 1). In order to 
specify the isoelastic functions, we need to compute share parameters based on the 
base case, or reference data. Hence, lines 33 through 38 declare the parameters to do 
this. Careful inspection will reveal that the reference demand prices are just the supply 
prices plus the lowest transport cost to each demand city. Because supply prices are 1, 
line 42 simply sets the supply function share parameter to be equal to the supply 
quantity. Similarly, line 44 computes the demand share parameters using the reference 
demand prices, pbar. 
Note that two asterisks is the GAMS way of denoting exponentiation (e.g. line 44). 
Before we take a look at the variables and the equations, we should reiterate that the 
reference data we have specified here is purely fictional. Nevertheless, the GAMS code 
in Figure 3.4 can be used as a template for specifying a realistic model where supply 
and demand prices and quantities, and transportation costs are all observed, and the 
15 Technically speaking, NLP solution techniques require that the Jacobian matrix, the matrix of first 
partial derivatives, be symmetric. The model is then said to be integrable. We should also point out that 
complementarity techniques are not the only way out of this “requirement for integrability” dilemma. 
Fixed-point algorithms, for example, received a lot of attention in the1960s and 1970s. But while 
theoretically elegant, they have turned out to be rather slow and cumbersome in applied modeling 
situations. Variational inequalities, closely related to the complementarity problem, may also be used 
(see Nagurney et al., 1996b).
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Chapter 3: Modeling TRQs as a MCP
elasticities are econometrically estimated. The set-based structure of GAMS also means 
that the model is highly scalable to any number of regions (and commodities, for that 
matter). 
Figure 3.4 GAMS Code for a Nonlinear Complementarity Problem 
* Lines 1 through 13 the same as in Figure 3. 
14 
15   eta(i)  price elasticity of supply 
16 /seattle 1.0 
17  san-diego 1.0 / 
18 
19   sigma(j) price elasticity of demand 
20  /new-york  1.5 
21  chicago 1.2 
22  topeka 2.0 /; 
23 
24 Table dist(i,j)  distance in thousands of miles 
25  new-york  chicago    topeka 
26   seattle  2.5    1.7  1.8 
27   san-diego  2.5    1.8  1.4  ;
28 
29 Scalar f   freight in dollars per case per thousand miles  /90/; 
30 
31 Parameters 
32   c(i,j)  transport cost in thousands of dollars per case 
33   alpha(i) supply function share coefficient 
34   beta(j)  demand function share coefficient 
35 pbar(j)  reference price at demand city j (suppy price = 1) 
36  /new-york  1.225 
37  chicago  1.153 
38  topeka  1.126 /; 
39 
40 c(i,j) = f * dist(i,j)/1000 ; 
41 
42 alpha(i) = s(i); 
43 
44  beta(j) = d(j)*pbar(j)**sigma(j); 
45 
46 Positive variables 
47   x(i,j) shipment quantities in cases 
48   p_supply(i) shadow price at supply market i 
49 p_demand(j)  shadow price at demand market j ; 
50 
51 Equations 
52   supply(i)  supply limit at plant i 
53   demand(j)  demand constraint at market j 
54 zprofit(i,j) zero profit conditions  ;
55 
56 supply(i)..  alpha(i)*p_supply(i)**eta(i) =g= sum(j, x(i,j)); 
57 
58 demand(j)..  sum(i, x(i,j)) =g= beta(j)*p_demand(j)**(-sigma(j)); 
59 
60  zprofit(i,j).. p_supply(i) + c(i,j) =g= p_demand(j); 
61 
62 Model transport /zprofit.x, supply.p_supply, demand.p_demand/; 
63 
64 p_demand.l(j) = pbar(j); 
65 
66 Solve transport using mcp; 
Source: Rutherford (1995). 
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The variables and the equations declared in this model, i.e. lines 46 through 54, are the 
same as we had before in (LCP 3.1). The difference now is in the specification of those 
equations. Consider the left-hand side of the supply equation, i.e. line 56. Whereas 
before we had si on the left, i.e. the fixed supply, we now have a function of own-price,
p_supply, that will evaluate to yield the supply quantity. Similarly, the right-hand side of
the demand equation is the demand function. Notice the negative sign on the elasticity 
term to give a downward sloping function. The zero profit condition and the 
complementarity pairings in the model statement remain unchanged from what they 
were earlier. 
Finally, line 64 assigns an initial (strictly positive) value to the demand price variables. If 
we didn’t do this, then the exponentiation in line 58 would yield a numerical error at the 
start of the solution process. That is, at this point, prior to the model being solved, the 
level of the variable p_demand is zero, and zero raised to a negative exponent is 
undefined.
As we noted earlier, there is really no need to formulate this model as a 
complementarity problem as it is perfectly able to be solved using conventional NLP 
techniques. But consider the case of discriminatory ad valorem tariffs or taxes. That is, 
imagine that each of the three demand cities was to charge each of the two supply 
cities a different ad valorem tariff. Such a problem provides an example of where the 
formulation of a market equilibrium is not straightforward.16 No single optimization 
problem characterizes the equilibrium because integrability has been destroyed, i.e. the
supply price is a non-unitary multiple of the marginal cost of supply. But there does 
exist a unique MCP which precisely characterizes the equilibrium. 
Consider line 60, the zero profit condition. If we had a parameter called tij, denoting our
asymmetric ad valorem tariff or tax rate, then it would be a simple matter to 
incorporate it into the model by modifying the zero profit condition as follows: 
zprofit(i,j).. (p_supply(i,j) + c(i,j))*(1 + t(i,j)) =g= p_demand(j); (3.13)
There are many other examples in economics where this modeling difficulty arises. 
Asymmetric demand specifications, regime switching, threshold effects, switching sides 
of the market (i.e. from being an exporter, say, to being an importer),17 and tariff-rate
quotas are just a few. Exploiting complementarity is a convenient means of resolving 
the difficulty. Specific taxes (or tariffs or subsidies) do not cause this problem as they 
can easily be added to the per unit transport cost coefficients. 
16  An equilibrium to such a problem could be computed by iteratively solving a sequence of NLPs, but 
this is clumsy and inefficient. 
17  See Anania and McCalla (1991) and Bishop et al. (1994). 
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Modeling Tariff-Rate Quotas 
We now return to the topic implied by the title of this chapter. Thus far we have
developed the intuition underlying the complementarity problem. Moreover, we have 
shown how the popular spatial price equilibrium model can be formulated as a mixed 
complementarity problem, and we have even presented the GAMS code, which can be 
used as a template for building a realistic model.18 In this section of the chapter we 
discuss some aspects of tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) that make them difficult to 
incorporate into models using conventional optimization techniques. In the following 
and final section, we bring everything together and present an SPE model complete 
with TRQs.
The Basic Tariff-Rate Quota 
As the name suggests, a TRQ embodies both a quantitative restriction in the form of a 
quota, and a price instrument in the form of a tariff (which may be ad valorem or 
specific).19  Figure 3.5 shows a very simplified depiction of a TRQ. One can think of this 
as being a small country supplying a single good to a country that imposes the TRQ. 
The supply curve is the bold line that begins horizontal at Pw, the world price. It then 
turns vertical at Q*, the import quota quantity, and becomes horizontal again at Pw + to, 
where to denotes the over-quota tariff rate. For the moment, imagine the importing 
country’s demand curve is that given by D1. Whilst the diagram is clearly not to scale, 
imagine, for the sake of simplicity, that the supply curve belongs to a single supplier 
while the demand curve represents the sum of all demand from imported and 
domestically produced sources. 
In this simple case, there are two tariff rates associated with this TRQ. The within-quota
tariff, tw, applies to all imports up to the quota quantity, Q*. Above the quota, the over-
quota (sometimes called the out-of-quota) tariff applies. But significantly, the TRQ 
places no quantitative restriction on the import volume that might occur above Q*. 
However, in practice, the over-quota tariff rates in agriculture are typically so high, they 
prohibit any trade from taking place above the quota.
But it is not just the tariff rates and quota levels that determine the quantity of trade. 
The nature of demand in the importing country also plays a role. Consider, the demand 
curve depicted by D1. In this case, imports are exactly equal to Q* and a quota rent has 
been created (the shaded rectangle). The domestic price, Pd, is determined in the 
normal fashion by observing where demand intersects with supply. The government in 
the importing country collects revenue equal to tw times Q*. 
18 As we noted at the outset of this paper, we are unable to claim credit for much of what has been 
presented here. The GAMS templates are no exception as they are taken, almost as originally 
presented, from other sources.
19 Throughout this paper we have focused on ad valorem tariffs. We will continue that focus but would 
point out that the MCP formulation also handles specific tariffs, as well as TRQs that might contain both 
specific and ad valorem tariffs.
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Figure 3.5 A Simple TRQ 
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But what if D2 was the relevant demand curve? Clearly in this case the quota would not 
be binding and no rent is created. If this situation prevailed, then there is nothing to be 
gained from trade liberalization that saw either the quota quantity increased and/or the 
over-quota tariff reduced. A small increase in trade would be observed if, when D2 was 
relevant, the within-quota tariff was reduced. 
The more interesting situation is when the demand schedule lies somewhere near D1 or
D3. When D1 is the relevant demand curve, there is an interesting trade-off to be made, 
by the supplying country, between the benefits of greater market access, i.e. an 
increased quota quantity, versus a diminished quota rent. Consider the situation where 
Q* is increased up until the point where the world price line intersects with D1.20 Under 
this scenario, the quota rent would diminish entirely but this would be offset to some 
extent by increased exports. Which scenario should the exporting country prefer? The 
answer is it depends. One needs a model with endogenous regime switching and an
endogenously determined quota rental variable in order to be able to ascertain which 
20 Actually, the relevant line to consider is the line denoted by Pw + tw. 
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situation is preferred. It may turn out that the exporting country’s favored position is a
decline in Q*, which would see the quota rental value increase. 
Now consider the case when D3 is relevant. In this situation a judicious increase in Q* is 
likely to be beneficial to the exporting country, i.e. both the quota rent and the volume 
of trade increase. On the other hand, the merits of a decrease in to may be 
indeterminate, i.e. the trade volume would increase, but the tariff rental value may 
decline. 
To muddy the waters even further, it is usually the case that in reality, TRQs are more 
complex than that depicted in Figure 3.5 .  For example, there may exist several tiers to 
the schedule. The tariffs and the quotas may be assigned on a bilateral basis as well as 
on a multilateral basis. For reasons that have to do with historical trade patterns, the 
EU and New Zealand have a disproportionate share of preferential access arrangements 
for dairy product exports to the US. These take the form of favorable tariff rates 
and(or) exclusive quota rights. Tariffs may be defined either on a specific (unit) basis or 
on an ad valorem basis.
All of these factors give rise to an interesting problem when deciding upon a negotiating 
stance to adopt. When the TRQ concerns a product exported by the US to other 
countries, which regime the US might favor is likely to be different from one case to the 
next, depending on the demand conditions above.  It is therefore imperative that US 
negotiators understand what the outcomes of policy proposals are, as they are 
proposed and before they are negotiated. In the next section we discuss a modeling
framework that is able to shed some light on these questions. 
Bringing It All Together 
We now present a 3-region SPE model formulated as an MCP, and which incorporates 
tariff-rate quotas (see Figure 3.6). The core model specification is changed slightly from
the SPE model we saw in Figure 3.4, with all unnecessary detail stripped away. In fact, 
we don’t even assign data values to the parameter symbols. Rather, we conduct the
entire discussion in terms of the symbol names. To keep things uncomplicated we show 
only bilateral tariff-rate quotas. It is a straightforward modification, however, to
integrate multilateral TRQs into the same model. For an example of a trade model 
formulated as a complementarity problem that embodies a wide range of price- and 
quantity-based policy instruments, as well as multiple products, see Chapter 4. 
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Figure 3.6 GAMS Code for an MCP with TRQs 
1 SETS
 
2 i   regions     /r1,  r2,  r3 /
 
3 ql  quota levels (break points)  /ql1, ql2, ql3 /;
 
4 
5 
6 
  ALIAS (i,j); 
7   PARAMETERS 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
    s0(i)   
    d0(j)   
    x0(i,j) 
    eta(i)  
    sigma(j)
    qlvl(i,j,ql) 
    t(i,j,ql)    
  reference supply quantity in region i 
  reference demand quantity in region j 
  reference biltaeral trade quantity 
  price elasticity of supply 
  price elasticity of demand 
  bilateral quota levels 
  bilateral tariff rates ; 
16   ... Read in data here ... 
17 
18   POSITIVE VARIABLES 
19 
20 
21 
22 
    X(i,j,ql)    
    P(i)    
    QR(i,j,ql)   
   shipment of product from region i to region j 
   regional price 
   quota rent (price per unit)  ; 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
  EQUATIONS 
    ZPROFIT(i,j,ql)  zero profit conditions 
    MARKET(i)        domestic market clearing constraint 
    QUOTA(i,j,ql)    limits on shipments by tariff class ; 
28 
29 
30 
31 
  market(i).. 
    s0(i)*P(i)**eta(i) + sum((j,ql), X(j,i,ql)) =e= 
    d0(i)*P(i)**(-sigma(i)) + sum((j,ql), X(i,j,ql)); 
32 
33 
34 
  zprofit(i,j,ql)$(NOT sameas(i,j)).. 
    P(i)*(1 + QR(i,j,ql) + t(i,j,ql)) =g= P(j); 
35 
36 
  quota(i,j,ql)$(NOT sameas(i,j)).. qlvl(i,j,ql) =g= X(i,j,ql); 
37 
38 
MODEL trq /market.p, zprofit.x, quota.qr /; 
39 
40 
  p.l(i) = 1; 
41   SOLVE trq using mcp; 
Immediately noticeable is that the declaration of the sets, lines 1 through 3, is slightly 
different than before. We have dropped the U.S. cities and gone with three generic 
regions, denoted r1, r2, and r3. As we’ll see in moment, each region is both a supplier 
and a demander of the single good. Hence, this model has three domestic markets that 
are linked through their ability to trade with one another. Notice the “alias” statement in 
line 5. It assigns the elements of set i to a set called j (i.e., i and j each have the same 
elements). 
The second set we define, ql, specifies that there are three steps or break points in the 
quota schedule. This in turn implies that there are three levels in the tariff schedule. To
avoid confusion, we will be quite explicit about how this specification is to be
interpreted. We could imagine that ql1, the first element of set ql has a quota quantity
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of, say, 1000 tons associated with it. All imports up to that point might attract a tariff of 
10%. The second element, ql2, might relate to a quota quantity of 3000 tons, which 
attracts a tariff of 50%. Finally, the third element, ql3, might be infinity, and shipments 
occurring in this band might attract a tariff rate of 250%. (We would point out that the 
TRQ instrument normally has an infinite quantity associated with the upper tier, 
although from a modeling point of view, this is not required.) To recap, our imaginary 
tariff-rate quota schedule with three tiers operates as follows. Imports up to 1000 tons 
attract a 10% tariff. Imports between 1000 and 4000 tons, i.e. a 3000 tonne quota at 
the second tier, attract a 50% tariff. And all imports over 4000 tons get charged a tariff 
of 250%. 
In lines 7 through 14 we declare some parameters. All but the last two should be
familiar from the models seen earlier. The reference or benchmark quantity of bilateral 
trade, x0, is not necessary to specify the model, per se, although such data may be
used to validate the model’s ability to replicate the benchmark set of data. In any 
event, it is at line 16 that one would ordinarily assign values to all of these parameters. 
Alternatively, GAMS could be instructed at this point to read the necessary data from an 
external file, such as a spreadsheet. 
The parameters qlvl and t (lines 13 and 14) are new to this model, and their purpose 
should be self-evident. These two parameters define the quota levels and tariff rates in 
the manner we have just explained above. Notice that each of these parameters are 
defined on sets i and j (i.e. on an origin-destination basis) as well as on ql. This should
reiterate the point that these parameters are defined bilaterally. 
If one were to also include a multilateral TRQ, it would be accomplished by creating an 
additional parameter for the multilateral quota levels, say, qlvlm(j,ql), i.e. it would not 
be defined on i as it would apply to all i. A multilateral tariff schedule can be 
accommodated by assigning the appropriate values to the bilateral tariff parameter. 
Alternatively, one could create a specific multilateral tariff parameter, even though it is 
unnecessary. Obviously, care needs to be exercised in defining a model with both 
multilateral and bilateral TRQs. It would make no sense, for example, for a multilateral 
quota quantity in region j to exceed the sum of all bilateral TRQs emanating from j and 
applying to all other regions. Finally, the addition of a multilateral TRQ would require an
additional variable and complementary constraint; i.e. a multilateral quota rent variable 
and a multilateral quota constraint. 
There are only three variables in this model. The shipment variable, x, we have seen 
before. But notice that it is now defined on ql as well as i and j. One can think of each 
origin-destination route as being a road divided into 3 lanes, one for each level of the 
TRQ schedule. However, the price variable, p, is a significant change from earlier. We 
now have just one price per region, whereas previously we had a supply price and a 
demand price. This comes about because we have removed all of the intra-regional 
price wedges, i.e. there are no transportation costs in this model and the quotas and 
tariffs don’t apply on intra-regional shipments. Hence, the equilibrium supply price is 
identical to the demand price in each region. 
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The final variable (line 21) is the quota rent variable, qr. It can be interpreted as the 
price of a unit of quota rent. Notice that it is defined on both i and j because it applies 
to quota rents on a bilateral basis. Note too that it is defined on set ql. It should already 
be apparent that there are potentially three “quota rent” rectangles of the kind seen in 
Figure 3.5 . The value of each quota rental is just the relevant qr variable multiplied by 
the relevant quota quantity, qlvl. The key point to note about the quota rent variable is
that it is endogenous – a solution to the model will yield the level of qr. It is not the
case that the modeller must assign a value to the quota rent before using the model to
undertake experiments. Clearly, as was discussed in the previous section, the level of 
the quota rent variable will be determined by the interplay of a number of factors. 
Moreover, it will be consistent with the equilibrium outcome. 
There are three sets of equations in this simple model. The first, called market, 
specifies the condition that ensures each market clears and that trade flows balance.21 
It says that the quantity supplied plus the sum of all shipments from a region (including 
intra-regional flows) must be equal to the sum of all shipments into a region (including 
intra-regional flows) plus the quantity demanded. Careful inspection of the summation 
of the x variable will reveal that the order of the indexes, i and j, is reversed on the 
right-hand side of the equation from what it is on the left. The supply and demand 
functions are specified such that prices are equal to 1 in the base case. Hence, there is 
no need to compute and use the share coefficient terms, alpha and beta, as was the 
case in Figure 3.4.  But we would stress that this is just for convenience; the functions 
could be calibrated to any consistent price and quantity levels. As before, the supply 
and demand relationships are isoelastic functions of own price. 
The zero profit condition for this model is quite straightforward. In essence, it says the 
price in region i multiplied by one plus the quota rent variable plus the tariff rate, is 
greater than or equal to the price in region j. There are two points to note about this 
condition. First, it is not defined when i equals j (see the statement that says “not 
sames as (i,j)”. Second, a zero profit condition is defined for each level of the quota
schedule, i.e. set ql, as well as each (i-j)th route, so long as i is not the same as j. 
Because the benchmark prices are normalized to one in this model, the quota rent 
variable appears to enter the zero profit condition as a rate, just like the tariff rate. 
Once again, this would not be the case if prices were modeled at their observed levels. 
The final equation is the quota constraint. It simply says that for each i-j-ql arc, where i 
is not equal to j, the quota level must be greater than or equal to the shipment 
quantity. 
As before, the model statement specifies the complementarity pairing of variables with 
equations. Also, we set the initial price level to be one in order to avoid undefined 
exponentiation. The final statement tells GAMS to solve the model called trq, while 
making sure to treat it as an MCP formulation. 
21 The term “trade flows” is used rather loosely here. It includes intra- as well as interregional flows.
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Concluding Remarks 
We have now presented a comprehensive template of an SPE trade model, formulated 
as an MCP, that can easily be scaled up to realistic dimensions. We finish this chapter 
with a few comments on how to use the model to conduct experiments. A typical 
experiment would entail decreasing tariff rates and observing what happens to
production, demand, trade volumes, prices, and quota rents. For example, an across 
the board tariff cut of 30% could be modelled by adding the statement t(i,j,ql) = 
0.7*t(i,j,ql); immediately after the solve statement in line 41, followed by a second 
solve statement. The results of the simulation (the second solve) can then be compared 
with the benchmark case (the first solve). One could get more specific, however, and 
conduct experiments where only the tariffs on certain routes and/or certain levels of the 
tariff schedule are modified. Similarly, one could simulate market access scenarios by 
increasing quota levels. Finally, a likely policy scenario would involve increased quota 
levels in conjunction with decreasing tariff rates. 
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Chapter 4: Modeling World Dairy Product Trade with a Mixed 

Complementarity Problem Formulation 

Introduction 
Dairy has long been a highly regulated industry in the United States and in other 
developed countries.  However, in the early 1990s the US dairy industry entered a 
period of domestic and trade policy reform (see Chapter 2). Three major policy 
events—the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 1995 Uruguay 
Round Agreement (URA), and the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform 
Act (FAIR)—represented a significant modification of previous policies by opening up 
markets and limiting government price support.  Although the extent to which these 
efforts will be carried forward in future policies (e.g., the next round of WTO 
negotiations) is uncertain in the current political environment, these changes retain 
significant potential to influence world dairy trade.   
In addition to trade and domestic policy reform, technological developments in the dairy 
and food processing industries will take on a greater importance in coming years.  
Current microfiltration technologies permit the fractionation of milk into its basic 
nutritive components:  proteins, fats, lactose and minerals (Rizvi, 1987; Rizvi and 
Bhasker, 1995). These basic building blocks of milk are already being used to build 
customized products for industries as diverse as medicine and pharmaceuticals, health 
foods, and specialized food preparations and ingredients.  Component separation is 
ubiquitous in the world dairy industry, and already the basic milk fractions are being 
further separated into various specialty products.  Separation allows dairy processing 
companies to formulate products that can be transported more cheaply, stored for 
longer periods, and reformulated into a variety of customized food ingredients and 
value-added products.  These developments will place tremendous pressure on policies 
aimed at pricing milk and protecting domestic producers.  Technological change in dairy 
processing thus has the potential to markedly alter dairy trade patterns over the next
two decades. To a certain extent, they are at the heart of dairy producer concerns 
surrounding US imports of milk protein concentrates (MPCs; see Chapter 2). The 
implications of future component separation technologies and product formulations for
world and US dairy markets has not previously been subject to formal study, so the 
potential impacts are largely unknown. 
Many of the analytical models developed to date fail to account for important facets 
that determine prices, trade patterns, and competitiveness in the dairy industry today, 
at least for analyses of product-specific trade policies such as those likely to be
negotiated under the next WTO round. The limitations of previous models are 
discussed in detail in Bishop et al. (1994). The characteristics of the world dairy 
industry that should be addressed in a model of dairy trade are summarized in Table 
4.1. First, the characteristics of milk and dairy products make product-specific trade 
modeling a challenge. One characteristic is jointness in production.  That is, milk is 
viewed by dairy processors as a combination of components (e.g., fat, proteins, and  
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Table 4.1. Model Characteristics Required for Modeling Dairy Trade
Characteristic Example of representation in a dairy trade model
Jointness in production, 
component disaggregation 
Dairy products characterized as two or more components (e.g., 
fat, protein and other solids), not as milk equivalents. 
Intermediate products Allow dairy products traded among processing firms (e.g., milk 
powders, butteroil, whey powders) to be manufactured and 
traded in addition to products for final demand. 
Explicit processing sector For each region, specify a processing plant or plants.  Plants 
serve to mediate supplies of raw milk and intermediate products
to meet final demands. Model constraints ensure that milk 
component inflows and outflows are balanced, and that 
currently feasible technical relationships in dairy processing are 
maintained. 
Trade policy specificity Tariffs (ad valorem and unit, discriminatory and non-
discriminatory), quotas, TRQs and export subsidies modeled
explicitly for specific dairy products, rather than aggregated 
measures.  Trade policies modeled with constraints on the price 
and quantity relationships in model formulation. 
Domestic policy specificity Key price supports, production quotas, and price controls in the 
dairy sector modeled with constraints on prices and quantities in 
the model formulation. 
Bilateral trade flows Use of price-responsive domestic supply and demand functions, 
rather than excess supply and demand functions, allows regions 
to switch from net importer (exporter) to net exporter
(importer) 
Alternative market 
structure assumptions 
Market imperfections of the types described in Hashimoto 
(1984) and Kolstad and Burris (1986) with relevance to 
examination of STEs modeled as constraints in the model 
formulation. 
Product disaggregation Examine intermediate and final dairy product types, rather than 
the small number in many previous models. 
Regional disaggregation Specify at least 10 production, processing, and consumption 
regions, based on the importance of countries in current world 
production, consumption, or trade. 
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lactose) that can be (and are) separated and recombined in numerous product forms.
This implies that economic models of dairy product trade must include sufficient 
disaggregation of dairy components, and explicit balancing constraints for each 
component. 
Related to the need to account for component separation is the observation that much 
dairy trade is in “intermediate products.”  That is, dairy products processed from milk 
received at one location frequently are transported to another location and are used to 
make a different dairy product.  An example is the use of nonfat dry milk in cheese 
manufacturing.  Trade in intermediate products is a significant portion of total world 
trade, although an exact accounting is difficult to determine.  In the mid-1990s, 
however, more than half of dairy product trade consisted of milk powders, butter and 
related products, and casein-type products, all of which have potential uses in 
manufacturing other dairy products.  The importance of intermediate product trade 
nearly always implies that an explicit “processing” sector needs to be specified in dairy
trade models.  The political importance of the dairy sector in most countries also has 
resulted in a plethora of government interventions in dairy production, marketing and 
trade. Thus, any product-specific model of dairy trade must be able to account for a
full range of domestic and trade policy instruments regulating both prices (e.g., support 
prices) and quantities (e.g., tariff-rate quotas and quantitative export subsidy limits).  
In particular, it is highly useful (if not essential) for product-specific models to address 
discriminatory ad valorem tariffs (tariffs that vary by country of origin), the principal 
mechanism for trade liberalization through “tariffication” under the last round of WTO 
negotiations.   
A few recently constructed models (e.g., Cox and Zhu, 1997) have incorporated a 
higher degree of component and product disaggregation than the dairy trade models 
commonly in use a decade ago (e.g., OECD, 1991; Baker, 1991).  However, even 
recently developed dairy trade models do not include explicit representation of flows of 
intermediate dairy products (i.e., those used in subsequent dairy processing) among 
countries.  Modeling of ad valorem tariffs by Cox and Zhu (1997) relies upon iterative 
solution of the model with unit tariffs.  The use of a mixed complementarity framework 
has great potential to incorporate characteristics of dairy trade not yet adequately 
addressed by existing empirical models.  These characteristics include direct modeling 
of ad valorem tariffs, imperfectly competitive international markets (including state 
trading enterprises such as the former New Zealand Dairy Board, now largely a part of 
Fonterra), nonlinearities in component balance equations due to variations in raw milk
component content by region, and development of new intermediate products that 
circumvent existing trade barriers. 
The objectives of this chapter are to describe a model of world dairy trade using the
mixed complementarity approach, and to discuss its advantages over existing model 
formulations.  We focus on the development of the model structure that accounts for 
relevant factors influencing dairy trade, and contrast our structure with that of previous
modeling efforts. Empirical implementation of the model structure will be the focus of 
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Chapter 4: World Dairy Trade Model 
subsequent research, so no numerical results are presented herein1 . Our model is a
joint-input (i.e., multiple-component), multiple-product spatial trade model.  
Conceptually, the model derives an equilibrium across spatially dispersed markets for
raw milk and the range of products derived from milk.  In equilibrium, prices are related 
across regions and market levels subject to transfer costs, policy, and institutional 
impediments.  The model includes an explicit representation of the dairy processing 
sector in each supply region.  As a result, the equilibrium conditions ensure that milk 
component quantities are balanced, and that currently feasible technical relationships in 
dairy processing are maintained.   
The model explicitly incorporates key trade policies such as product-specific tariffs, 
tariff-rate quotas (see Chapter 3), and export subsidy limitations.  Domestic economic
policies that can be specified as restrictions on prices or quantities, such as price 
supports or production quotas, are included where these have a material impact and 
are quantifiable. The structure incorporates multilateral and bilateral agreements.  The
complementarity framework readily allows the computational innovations related to 
imperfect competition of Hashimoto (1984) and Kolstad and Burris (1986) to be 
implemented in a full scale applied model (Ferris and Pang, 1995; Maeda et al., 2001). 
The outcomes of various strategies that might be employed by state trading enterprises 
focusing on exports (e.g., in New Zealand) and imports (e.g., in Mexico and China) can 
be analyzed within this framework.  Although our structure is specific to dairy products, 
the MCP approach has great potential for a broad range of product-specific trade 
analyses (Harrison et al., 1997). 
The Mixed Complementarity Problem Restated
Chapter 3 introduced the mixed complementarity problem in the context of a spatial 
price equilibrium model, and showed its application to modeling TRQs.  This chapter 
expands upon that model, defining the MCP more formally and specifying a full-fledged 
model of dairy trade.   
The complementarity problem is essentially a way to find a solution to a square system 
of nonlinear equations. As Ferris and Munson (2000) note, the complementarity 
problem adds a “combinatorial twist” to the classic square system of nonlinear 
equations.  Of 2n equalities in a system, a subset n will be chosen that will hold as
equalities.  More formally, the nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP) can be 
specified as: 
n n nGiven a nonlinear function F : ℜ →ℜ , find z ∈ℜ such that 
0 ≤ z or F (z) ≥ 0. 
Thus, only one of the inequalities is satisfied as an equality, or equivalently for 
individual components, zi Fi(z)=0. This property is typically referred to as zi being 
1 An empirical application using this model structure is presented in van Schagen (2000).  This application 
used now-dated information from 1998, so the results are not reported herein.
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Chapter 4: World Dairy Trade Model 
“complementary” to Fi(z).  As an extension to this NCP, we may sometimes wish to 
specify certain “intermediate” variables, for example, yi, where 
yi = f (z) for i = 1,..., I 
Then the NCP then becomes 
n n nGiven a nonlinear function F : ℜ →ℜ , find z ∈ℜ such that
 
0 ≤ z or F (z) ≥ 0
 
and
 
yi = f (z).
 
The problem now involves a mixture of equations (for the yi) and complementarity 
contstraints. The “mixed” nature of this problem results in the name mixed 
complementarity problem. More formally, following Ferris and Munson (2000) the 
mixed complementarity problem can be defined as: 
Given lower bounds l ∈ {ℜ ∩ {−∞}}n, upper bounds u ∈ {ℜ ∩ {∞}}n, and a function
F:ℜn →ℜn, find z ∈ :ℜn such that precisely one of the following holds for each i ∈
{1,…n}: 
Fi(z) = 0  and li ≤ zi ≤ ui 
Fi(z) > 0  and  zi = li 
Fi(z) < 0  and  zi = ui . 
Often in trade modeling, non-negativity constraints will be appropriate, implying that li 
= 0. Note also that if li = zi = ui, then the function Fi(z) is unrestricted and can be
omitted from the model. 
In the typical simple spatial price equilibrium (Samuelson, 1952; Takayama and Judge, 
1964) model with unit transportation costs and no other trade barriers, a nonlinear 
objective function is maximized subject to a set of constraints to calculate a market 
equilibrium. When the objective function is formulated in terms of inverse demand and 
supply functions, the model variables are the quantity produced in each region, the 
quantity demanded in each region, and the quantity shipped from each supply region to
each demand region. The “dual” values in this formulation are the supply and demand 
prices in each region. In contrast, the MCP framework permits the construction of 
models with explicit representation of both prices and quantities as variables.  For
example, the basic spatial price equilibrium (SPE) model would be expressed as: 
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Chapter 4: World Dairy Trade Model 
s s∑ xij ≤ Qi or Pi ≥ 0 
j 
d dQ j ≤∑ xij or Pj ≥ 0 
i 
d d d dg j (Q j ) ≤ Pj or Q j ≥ 0 
s s s sgi (Qi ) ≤ Pi or Qi ≥ 0 
d sPj ≤ Pi + cij or xij ≥ 0 
where 
Qdj = quantity demanded in region j
 
s
Qi = quantity supplied in region i 
xij = quantity shipped from supply region i to demand region j 
Pj
d = demand price in region j
 
s
Pi = supply price in region i
cij = constant unit transport costs from supply region i to demand region j 
s sgi (Qi ) = inverse supply function in supply region i 
gdj (Q
d
j ) = inverse demand function in demand region j 
The MCP framework exploits the Kuhn-Tucker complementary slackness conditions to 
provide an explicit representation of both ‘primal’ and ‘dual’ variables in the model 
structure. Although primal-dual methods also exploit this complementarity, the MCP 
approach can be extended to create new problems for which no equivalent optimization
problem exists (see Chapter 3 also).  For example, Nicholson et al. (1994) have shown 
that the SPE model with discriminatory ad valorem tariffs (i.e., tariffs on imports that 
differ by exporting region) cannot be directly solved using an optimization model,
because the value of the tariff depends on the endogenously-determined supply price2. 
In the MCP framework, this is easily handled by modifying the condition relating supply 
and demand prices as follows: 
d sPj ≤ (Pi + cij )(1+τ ij ) or xij ≥ 0 
2 As noted in Chapter 3, however, it is possible to iteratively solve the SPE as an optimization problem to 
obtain unit tariff values equivalent to the applicable ad valorem tariffs.
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Chapter 4: World Dairy Trade Model 
where the τ represent ad valorem tariffs imposed by demand region j on imports from
supply region i. The essential points are that both price and quantity values can be 
simultaneously and directly constrained, and that relationships among these variables 
need not conform to the first-order conditions of an optimization problem.   
Because both prices and quantities can be simultaneously constrained, policy
instruments that target prices or quantities (e.g., price supports, ad valorem tariffs, 
tariff rate quotas) can be modeled simultaneously and directly.  Complementarity also 
makes mute the issue of integrability (e.g., the need for symmetry of cross-price terms 
in demand equations) which is a major restriction required by many of the algorithms 
for solving conventional optimization problems.  For the world dairy industry, the 
relevant set of spatial price equilibrium conditions can be formulated and solved as a
mixed complementarity problem (MCP) to yield supply and demand prices and 
quantities, milk component values, and interregional dairy product trade flows.   
The World Dairy Trade Model Formulation 
In this section, we provide a detailed mathematical description of the MCP model 
equations and variables.  To help place the mathematics into perspective, a conceptual
representation is provided for a simplified two-region, three product version of the 
model (Figure 4.1). Milk produced (circle) in region 1 can flow to processing plants in
regions 1 or 2. In countries that have a raw milk supply quota, milk production can not
exceed the quota quantity. The arrows connecting the raw milk supply and processing 
plants (triangles) represent raw milk assembly flows.  In the processing sector, milk 
components are balanced. As a result, milk components, in the form of intermediate 
products, move between the plants.  All intermediate and final products can potentially 
be traded between regions. Government policies and support programs (e.g., tariffs, 
quotas, tariff-rate quotas, export subsidies and price supports) are primarily
administered through the processing sector.  The label “final product trade” applies to 
the arrows connecting processing to demand both within a region and across regions.
Products are demanded at wholesale level by “consumers” and the non-dairy industry
(squares). 
For the mathematical representation of the model, the sets, or indices, upon which the 
model is specified are as follows: 
Regions: R = {i,j | i,j = (1, 2, ..., J)}. 
Products: P = (k,k′,k′′ | k,k′,k′′ = (1, 2, ..., K)}. IP∈P denotes the set of intermediate 
products and FP∈P denotes the set of final products. This specification 
enables, but does not require, a product to be both an intermediate and a 
final product. k = FP∈P also denotes processing plant types, i.e. plant 
types correspond to final product types. Conversely, intermediate products 
must be produced at a final product plant type.  The intermediate product 
shipments allowable in the model are summarized in Table 4.2.
Components: C = {m | m = (1, 2, ..., M)}. 
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Chapter 4: World Dairy Trade Model 
Quota levels: L = {l | l = (1, 2, ..., L)}. 

The parameters in the model are defined as: 

αi = slope coefficient in raw milk supply function in region i ; 

εi = own price elasticity of raw milk supply in region i ;
 
βik = slope coefficient in demand function in region i for product k∈FP ; 

ηik = own price elasticity in demand function in region i for product k∈FP ; 

ψim = proportion of milk component m contained in raw milk in region i ; 

δkm = proportion of milk component m contained in intermediate product k∈IP ; 

γikm = proportion of milk component m contained in final product k∈FP in region
 
i ; 
tcijk = 	 per unit transportation cost to ship product k from region i to region j ; 
tcrij = 	 per unit transportation cost to ship raw milk from region i to region j ; 
pcik = 	 constant per unit processing cost for product k in region i ; 
tijkl = 	 per unit import tariff imposed on the lth level of the quota schedule by 
region j on imports of product k from region i ; 
τijkl = 	 ad valorem import tariff imposed on the lth level of the quota schedule by 
region j on imports of product k from region i ; 
sijk = 	 per unit export subsidy imposed by region i on exports of product k to 
region j ; 
rqi = 	 raw milk supply quota in region i ; 
bqijkl = 	 bilateral import quota imposed by region j on the lth level of the quota 
schedule on imports of product k from region i ; 
mqjkl = multilateral import quota imposed by region j on the lth level of the quota 
schedule on imports of product k from all regions; and 
svik = 	 maximum export volume of product k that region i may subsidize. 
The variables in the model are defined as: 
QRMi = 	 quantity of raw milk produced in region i ; 
QCRikm= 	 quantity of milk component m received at plant type k∈FP in region i, and 
which arrives at the plant in the form of raw milk, i.e. it is also possible for 
components to arrive at plants in the form of intermediate products ; 
QCPikm= 	 quantity of milk component m processed at plant type k∈FP in region i. If 
components are processed, it implies they are used in the production of
final products; 
QPPik = 	 quantity of product type k produced in region i. Unlike components that 
are processed at plants, the quantity of product produced at a plant is
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Chapter 4: World Dairy Trade Model 
defined on all k, i.e. k∈IP and k∈FP. This distinction between processing 
and producing is somewhat artificial and can be confusing. It is really only
necessary to allow processing costs to be applied per unit of product; 
QFPik = 	 quantity of final product k∈FP demanded in region i ; 
XRMijk = 	 quantity of raw milk shipped from region i to plant type k∈FP in region j ; 
XIPik′jk′′kl  = 	 quantity of intermediate product k∈IP shipped from plant type k′∈FP in 
region i to plant type k′′∈FP in region j, on the lth level of the quota 
schedule. There is only a single non-binding level to the quota schedule 
for all intra-regional shipments, i.e. when i = j ; (See Table 4.2) 
XFPijkl = 	 quantity of final product k∈FP (shipped from plant type k∈FP) in region i
to region j, on the lth level of the quota schedule. There is only a single 
non-binding level to the quota schedule for all intra-regional shipments, 
i.e. when i = j ; 
PRMi = market price of raw milk in region i ; 
PCRikm = market price of milk component m received at plant k∈FP in region i ;
PCIikm = market price of milk component m in interplant transfers of intermediate 
products at plant type k∈FP in region i ; 
PCPikm = market price of milk component m processed at plant type k∈FP in region
i ; 
PRQi = 	 market price of raw milk production quota in region i ; 
PQPik = 	 market price of processing product type k in region i ; 
PXSik = 	 market price of quantitative restriction on subsidized exports of product
type k from region i ; 
PMQikl = market price of the multilateral import quota imposed by region i on 
imports of product k on the lth level of the quota schedule; 
PBQijkl = market price of the bilateral import quota imposed by region j on imports 
of product k from region i on the lth level of the quota schedule; and 
PFPik = market price of final product k demanded in region i. 
Employing the notation set out above, the model is defined as follows: 
QRM i ≥ ∑ ∑  XRM ijk ∀i ∈ R	 (4.1) 
j k∈FP  
∑(ψ jm * XRM jik ) ≥ QCRikm ∀i ∈ R,k ∈ FP,m ∈ C	 (4.2) 
j 
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Chapter 4: World Dairy Trade Model 
QCRik ′m +∑ ∑ ∑∑(δ km * XIPjk ′′ik ′kl ) ≥ 
j k ′′∈FP k∈IP l 
(4.3)∑ ∑ ∑∑(δkm*XIPjk ′ik ′′kl )+QCPik ′m ∀i ∈ R,k ∈ FP,m ∈C 
j k ′′∈FP k∈IP l 
QCPikm ≥ ∑∑(γ jkm * XFPijkl ) ∀i ∈ R,k ∈FP,m ∈C (4.4) 
j l 
QPPik ≥ ∑ ∑  ∑ ∑ XIPik ′jk ′′kl +∑∑ XFPijkl ∀i ∈R,k ∈P (4.5) 
j k ′∈FP k ′′∈FP l j l 
∑∑ XFPijkl ≥ QFPjk ∀j ∈R,k ∈FP (4.6) 
i l 
rqi ≥ QRM i ∀i ∈R (4.7) 
svik ≥ ∑ ∑  ∑ ∑ XIPik jk kl + ∑∑ XFPijkl ∀i ∈R,∀k ∈P (4.8)′ ′′
 
i≠ j k′∈FP k ′′∈FP l i≠ j l
 
mq jkl ≥ ∑ ∑  ∑ XIPik jk kl +∑ XFPijkl ∀i ≠ j ∈ R,∀k ∈P,l ∈ L (4.9)′ ′′
 
i k ′∈FP k ′′∈FP i
 
bqijkl ≥ ∑ ∑ XIPik ′jk ′′kl + XFPijkl ∀i ≠ j ∈R,∀k ∈P,l ∈ L (4.10) 
k ′∈FP k ′′∈FP 
( )  * QRM1 εi 1εi + PRQ ≥ PRM ∀i ∈R (4.11)α i i ii 
PRM i + tcrij ≥ ∑(ψ im * PCRjkm ) ∀i, j ∈R,k ∈FP (4.12) 
m 
PCR ≥ PCI ∀i ∈ R,k ∈ FP,m ∈C (4.13)ikm ikm 
 ∑(δ km * PCIik ′m ) + PQPik + tcijk * (1 +τ ijkl )− sijk + tijkl + PXSi ≠ jk +  m  (4.14) 
PMQi ≠ jkl + PBQijkl ≥ ∑(δ km * PCI jk ′′m ) ∀i, j ∈R,k ∈FP,l ∈L 
m 
PCI ≥ PCP ∀i ∈ R,k ∈FP,m ∈C (4.15)ikm ikm 
pc ≥ PQP ∀i ∈ R,k ∈ P (4.16)ik ik 
 ∑(γ jkm * PCPikm )+ PQPik + tcijk * (1 +τ ijkl )− sijk + tijkl + PXSi≠ jk +  m  (4.17) 
PMQi≠ jkl + PBQijkl ≥ PFPjk ∀i, j ∈R,k ∈FP,l ∈ L 
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PFP ≥ ( ) * QFP1 ηik 1ηik ∀i ∈ R,k ∈ FP (4.18)ik β ikik 
In order to exploit complementary slackness when solving the model, it is necessary to 
associate each equation with its complementary variable. The complementarity pairings 
are defined as in Table 4.3. 
Figure 4.1. Simplified Conceptual Representation of  
the World Dairy Trade Model 
Supply sector Processing sector Demand sector 
Component balance 
Consumers 
Non-dairy 
industry 
Butter 
Cheese 
wmp 
Price supports 
Raw milk 
Component balance 
Consumers 
Non-dairy 
industry 
Butter 
Cheese 
wmp 
Price supports 
Raw milk 
Region 1 
Region 2 
Intermediate 
Product Trade 
Tariffs 
Quotas (TROs) 
Exports subsidies 
Supply 
quotas 
Supply 
quotas 
Final product trade 
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Table 4.2: Interplant (Intermediate Product) Shipments 
Allowed in the World Dairy Trade Model 
Intermediate product type From plant type To plant type
Skim Milk Powder (SMP)1 SMP Cheese 
SMP Fluid 
SMP Soft products 
Whole Milk Powder (WMP) WMP Cheese 
WMP Fluid 
WMP Soft products 
Anhydrous Milk Fat (AMF) Butter Fluid 
Butter Soft products
Cream Fluid Butter 
Fluid WMP 
SMP Butter 
SMP WMP 
WMP Butter 
Skim milk Casein Cheese 
Casein Fluid 
Casein Soft products 
Casein SMP 
Butter Casein 
Butter Cheese 
Butter Fluid 
Butter Soft products
 Butter SMP 
WMP Casein 
WMP Cheese 
WMP Fluid 
WMP Soft products 
WMP SMP 
Butter milk Butter Soft products
 Butter WMP 
1 The intermediate product skim milk powder, for example, can flow from a skim milk powder 
plant to a cheese plant, a fluid plant and a soft product plant. Intermediate product 
anhydrous milk fat is processed in a butter plant. It can flow from a butter plant to a plant
for fluids and to a soft product plant.
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Chapter 4: World Dairy Trade Model 
Table 4.3. Complementary (Equation-Variable) Pairings 
 in the World Dairy Trade Model 
Equation Variable Equation Variable
(1) PRM (11) QRM 
(2) PCR (12) XRM 
(3) PCI (13) QCR 
(4) PCP (14) XIP 
(5) PQP (15) QCP 
(6) PFP (16) QPP 
(7) PRQ (17) XFP 
(8) PXS (18) QFP 
(9) PMQ 
(10) PBQ 
Equations (4.1) through (4.6) are essentially the underlying “primal” constraints. 
Together with an appropriate objective function, they would constitute an NLP
formulation of the classic Samuelson-Takayama-Judge SPE type of model. Equations 
(4.7) through (4.10) are policy conditions, again, operating on the quantity or primal
variables. Equations (4.10) through (4.18) are the “dual” conditions in the MCP 
formulation of the model. Alternatively, they can be thought of as zero profit, or 
arbitrage, conditions. 
The raw milk supply and final product demand functions, equations (4.11) and (4.18) 
respectively, are inverted for convenience. In other words, the first term in (4.11) yields 
the supply price, while the right-hand side of (4.18) yields demand prices. 
We now briefly describe each equation in turn. Equation (4.1) simply says that the 
quantity of raw milk produced in region i must exceed the quantity shipped to plants. 
While raw milk is theoretically able to cross regional boundaries, it is expensive to
transport large distances, and may encounter hygiene-related barriers to trade. 
Equation (4.2) translates the raw milk delivered to plants into a quantity of m milk 
components. Even when raw milk is shipped inter-regionally, it is the composition of 
milk at the point of supply, and the quantity of milk shipped, which determines the 
quantity of each milk component received at plants. Equation (4.3) appears quite 
complex; it is the component balancing constraint associated with interplant shipments 
of intermediate products. It says that for each of the m component types in milk, the 
quantity received at a plant in the form of raw milk, plus the quantity received in the 
form of interplant shipments, must be greater than or equal to the quantity shipped out 
as interplant shipments, plus the quantity processed into final products. Equation (4.4) 
is another balancing constraint. It ensures that the quantity of each milk component 
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shipped out of a plant in the form of final products does not exceed the quantity 
actually processed at that plant. Equation (4.5) is included in the model for
convenience; it allows us to compute the variable QPP so that we can assign processing 
costs on a per unit of product (final or intermediate) basis, rather than trying to 
estimate such costs on a component basis. Equation (4.6) simply says that the quantity 
of final product demanded in a region can be no more than the quantity shipped to that
region (including from itself).
Equation (4.7) imposes raw milk supply quotas where they exist; equation (4.8) 
imposes quantitative restrictions on subsidized exports; and equations (4.9) and (4.10)
impose, respectively, multilateral and bilateral import quotas. As already alluded to, the 
import quota schedule can have many levels or steps to it. The sum of all bilateral 
import quotas that any region may impose is, by definition, less than or equal to 
(usually less than) that region’s multilateral import quota. Incidentally, the tariffs 
associated with each step of the tariff-rate quota schedule must be monotonically 
increasing. 
Equation (4.11) states that for each region, the raw milk supply price plus the raw milk
supply quota value must be greater than or equal to the market price of raw milk. 
Equation (4.12) says that the market price of raw milk plus the cost of shipping milk to
a plant must be at least as great as the price of milk at the plant. The plant price of 
milk is computed from the sum of the component values each multiplied by their 
respective composition parameters. Equation (4.13) requires that the price of a milk
component, m, at the point of receipt at a plant is equal to or greater than its price 
when transferred elsewhere as an intermediate product shipment. Equations (4.14) and 
(4.17) are similar; (4.14) is the zero profit condition for intermediate products while 
(4.17) is the same condition for final products. Essentially, they specify the wedges that 
exist between prices at plants and/or plants and demand markets in terms of import 
tariffs (ad valorem and specific), export subsidies, transportation costs, and quota
rental values. It is these two constraints that enable discriminatory ad valorem tariffs to 
be modeled (τijkl is defined bilaterally). As noted earlier, this is not possible in an NLP 
formulation. 
Like equation (4.13), (4.15) is just an accounting identity that emerges from the 
underlying profit maximizing behavior assumed on the part of processing firms. 
Equation (4.16) says that the per unit cost of processing each product type must be
greater than or equal to the market price of that processing activity. Finally, equation 
(4.18) requires that, for each region, the market price of a final product is consistent 
with the quantity of that product demanded and the specified inverse demand function.  
Government purchase prices for specific products can be established by fixing lower 
bounds on the price variable PFP.  
The MCP can be solved in GAMS using the PATH solver (Dirske and Ferris, 1995; Ferris 
and Munson, 2000), and can be more computationally efficient than optimization 
formulations for some problems.   
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Data Considerations 
Although the focus of this paper is on the mathematical structure of the model, a brief
discussion of data is relevant.  The data requirements of our model present a significant 
challenge due to the high degree of disaggregation in product, spatial, and policy 
dimensions.  These data and potential sources are summarized in Table 4.4. The data 
required can be categorized as economic parameters, technical parameters, and policy
or institutional parameters.  Secondary sources can be used to obtain many of these 
parameters, although in some cases available data must be used to develop estimates 
of the necessary coefficients.  Key sources for the required information are appropriate 
country-level agencies and the relevant literature.  International agencies that collate 
data are also sources, e.g., WTO and APEC.  As a last resort, the popular sources such 
as FAO and OECD can be used.  Despite the challenges, Nicholson (1996) has shown 
the feasibility of collecting and assessing the detailed information on dairy production, 
processing, and consumption required for a model of the type proposed. 
Concluding Comments 
The world dairy industry currently faces major domestic and trade policy reform and 
technological changes that have the potential to markedly alter existing dairy trade 
patterns. To adequately analyze this potential, current dairy trade models must be 
modified to incorporate additional essential characteristics of the industry.  This chapter 
has described the mathematical structure of a mixed complementarity formulation that
includes many of these essential characteristics, demonstrating the potential of a MCP 
to extend product-specific dairy trade modeling in relevant directions.   
89
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
 
 
 
Chapter 4: World Dairy Trade Model 
Table 4.4. Data Requirements for the World Dairy Trade Model 
Type of data Examples Sources 
Economic parameters 
Supply elasticities Raw milk, inputs (grain) and 
complementary outputs (sheep, 
beef) 
Existing estimates (e.g., 
SWOPSIM, FAO), academic and 
government literature in each 
region 
Demand elasticities Final products, income Existing estimates (e.g., 
SWOPSIM, FAO), academic and 
government literature in each 
region 
Price-quantity pairs in base period Raw milk and final products FAO, national statistics, EU 
Commission, ABARE 
Transformation costs Processing costs for 
intermediate and final products 
Academic, government, and 
industry sources in each region, 
contacts with key dairy industry
leaders 
Transportation costs Milk hauling, ocean freight 
(refrigerated vs. non-
refrigerated; container vs. 
pallet), land-based 
transportation costs for
manufactured products 
Key industry contacts 
Technical parameters 
Product composition Component content of raw milk, 
intermediate products, and final 
products 
USDA, FAO and national
statistics data to construct 
component balances for key
regions; contacts with dairy 
industry leaders 
Transformation coefficients Yield relationships in dairy 
processing, possibilities for 
interplant shipments and joint 
production 
Same as above. 
Institutional and policy parameters 
Tariffs Traded dairy products by region 
(including discriminatory tariffs) 
US Department of Commerce, 
APEC, national agencies, fee-
based sources 
Quotas Traded dairy products Same as above 
Export subsidies Subsidized exports National and regional policy 
documents 
Levels of domestic price and 
quantity-related policy instruments 
Support prices and associated 
government purchases,
production quotas, retail price
controls 
National and regional policy 
documents 
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Chapter 5: Market Impacts of Milk Protein Concentrate Imports 
Background 
As noted in Chapter 2 (p. 38) imports of milk protein concentrates (MPC) grew rapidly 
between 1995 and 2000. The term MPC is applied to a variety of products, but it is 
appropriate to distinguish between products produced by ultra-filtration and “dry 
blends” of powdered milk products made without ultra-filtration. Ultra-filtration is used 
in processing typical MPCs, but there has been a high degree of concern about the use 
of dry blends to circumvent US tariffs on NDM.  In the Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
(HTS), the key US trade policy document, two types of MPCs are identified.  The first 
includes any complete milk protein that is more than 40% milk protein by weight.  
These lower-protein MPCs are listed in Chapter 4 of the HTS.  The second includes 
concentrates consisting of greater than 90% casein, and are specified in Chapter 35 of 
the HTS. The most rapid growth has occurred for MPCs with the lower protein content.   
MPC imports are important because they illustrate the dynamic consequences of US 
commitments to no new trade barriers under the URA.  The impact of MPC imports on 
US milk prices also has not been fully evaluated to date.  One objective of this chapter 
is to describe a quantitative model of the US dairy industry that includes trade linkages.  
This model includes sufficient product-level detail (including inter-plant shipments from
one dairy product plant to another) to allow reasonable assessment of alternative 
policies for the milk protein product complex.  Our working hypothesis is that MPC 
imports do not simply substitute for NDM in various product uses.  Hence, there may be 
market impacts from reallocation of other dairy components (fat, other non-protein 
solids) as a result of changes in trade policy for dairy proteins.  A second objective is to 
assess the impacts of the “Chapter 4” MPC imports on US dairy markets, including 
effects on farm milk prices, milk production, product prices, and government purchases 
of NDM. Subsequent research will assess a broader range of issues related to trade in 
milk protein products, including impacts of other milk protein products (e.g., casein), 
assessment of the market impacts of proposed legislation to limit milk protein imports, 
and evaluation of proposals to subsidize domestic production of casein and MPCs. 
A Mixed Complementarity Model of the US Dairy Industry with Trade 
Chapters 3 and 4 describe the basic nature of the Mixed Complementarity Problem 
(MCP) and its application to the analysis of dairy markets.  The model developed in this 
chapter is an empirical model, rather than conceptual or theoretical.  As Bishop et al. 
(1994) noted, the joint-input, multiple-product nature of dairy processing implies that 
component disaggregation is a necessary element of dairy-related SPE modeling.  
Previous model formulations (e.g., Pratt et al., 1997) and elsewhere in the literature 
have employed component balance constraints (mass-balance constraints on individual
components of milk such as fat, protein, other solids) and a fixed-proportions
production technology (e.g., 100 lbs of cheddar cheese requires a minimum of 33.14 lbs 
of fat). A related issue is the level of spatial aggregation at which component balance 
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is required:  at a “processing plant” level or a “regional” level.  Many dairy products 
(e.g., nonfat dry milk) are used primarily as intermediate products in other dairy 
processing activities. The use of nonfat dry milk and milk protein concentrates in 
cheese manufacturing is an example. Models that require component balancing only
within a region typically ignore the importance of intermediate products used in other 
dairy processing, and may overstate the flexibility of component uses because all of the 
milk components produced in a region can be allocated among dairy products without 
regard to the constraints on intermediate product form and movement that would exist 
in real-world processing settings.  However, the empirical importance of plant versus 
regional component balancing has not been fully explored. 
In contrast, the current model employs nonlinear yield functions to represent 
production rather than fixed proportion functions (as in Pratt et al., 1997), requires 
component balancing at the processing plant level in each region, and explicitly 
incorporates the use of intermediate products.  Raw milk with a known composition is 
shipped to plants. The milk is then separated into cream and skim, each of a known 
(pre-determined) fat content and an endogenously determined solids-not-fat (SNF) 
content. In other words, the SNF content of skim and cream is dependent on the 
composition of the raw milk, the fat content of the skim milk and cream, and the 
quantity of skim and cream produced. Because the quantity of skim and cream is 
determined by the model, i.e., it is endogenous, it is not possible to pre-determine the 
SNF composition. We assume a standard ratio of protein and other nonfat solids in the 
SNF portion of milk. Thus, the model uses three components to represent raw milk, 
intermediate products, and final products. 
The cream and skim is then used in one of three ways at each plant: 1) shipped as is 
between plants; 2) used to produce additional intermediate products which may be
shipped between plants, or 3) used by itself, recombined in varying proportions, or 
combined with other intermediate products to produce final products.  Like the cream 
and skim, other intermediate products and final products thus end up with an
endogenously determined composition. The endogenous determination of product
compositions that is made possible by the use of yield functions (i.e. product production 
functions) permits the balancing of all milk components supplied with all milk 
components used, whether the component supply is from raw milk or from imported 
products. In addition to raw milk, there are 20 dairy products included in the model.
Other key model characteristics include: 
•	 15 final products (including separate casein, caseinates, Chapter 4 MPC and Chapter 
35 MPC; Table 5.1) 
•	 7 intermediate (inter-plant) products (NDM, cream, skim, ice cream mix, fluid whey, 
buttermilk, MPC > 40%; Table 5.1) 
•	 Imports of 12 products (including separate casein, caseinates, Chapter 4 MPC and 
Chapter 35 MPC; Table 5.1) 
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•	 2 regions (California and rest of US—the latter assumed to be under FMMO 
regulation) 
•	 Model base year is 2001.  2001 was a relatively high milk price year.  Shifts of 
supply and demand curves by relevant amounts can be used to examine impacts 
under alternative market conditions, like the low milk price year 2002. 
•	 Milk supply and dairy product demand elasticities are adapted from FAPRI as
reported in GAO (2001). 
•	 FMMO and California product-based pricing formulas are explicitly included, as are 
the purchase prices under the Dairy Price Support Program.  The payments under 
the MILC program are also included, but were not in effect during the 2001 base 
year, so are not included in the base scenario discussed subsequently. 
•	 Imports and import supply prices are endogenous, but are based on 2001 mean 
import values from Census Bureau import data. 
•	 Trade policies include specific and ad valorem tariffs, TRQ and US export subsidies. 
The model consists of a square system of 888 inequalities and equalities (i.e. there are 
888 equations and 888 variables).  The Appendix describes the model equations in 
detail. 
Model Data 
Data for the model include milk production and component composition, dairy product 
demand and minimum component composition, component retention factors, supply 
and demand elasticities, and US trade policy parameters (TRQ levels, ad valorem tariffs, 
unit tariffs, unit export subsidies, and limits on export subsidies).  Value-based data 
include estimated costs of dairy product processing and distribution, milk prices, 
domestic dairy product prices, and imported dairy product prices.  These data come 
from government agencies (Federal Milk Marketing Orders, NASS, California Department 
of Food and Agriculture), previous research (for elasticity values and processing and 
distribution costs), and internal model calibration runs.  The data used in the base 
model scenario are summarized in Tables 5.2 through 5.13, with footnotes to explain 
data sources and calculations. 
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Table 5.1 Dairy Product Designations in the US Dairy Policy Model 
Product Description 
Product Type in Model: 
Inter-
mediate Final Import Export 
Fluid milk (Other US only) Y 
High solids fluid milk (California only) Y 
Ice cream Y Y Y 
Yogurt Y 
Cottage cheese  Y 
Cheddar cheese Y Y Y 
Other cheese Y Y Y 
Dry whey products Y Y Y 
Butter Y Y Y 
Nonfat dry milk Y Y Y Y 
Evaporated, condensed and dry products Y Y Y 
Casein (HS 3501.10.50) Y Y 
Caseinate (HS 3501.90.60) Y Y 
MPC > 90% protein (HTS 3501.10.10)1  Y Y 
MPC > 40% protein (HTS 0404.90.10)1 Y Y Y 
40% fat cream Y 
Skim milk Y 
Ice cream mix Y 
Fluid whey Y 
Buttermilk  Y 
1  HTS stands for Harmonized Tariff Schedule.  The numbers indicate the 8-digit
product code for milk protein concentrates with greater than 90% protein,
described in Chapter 35 of the HTS, and greater than 40% (but less than 90%), 
described in Chapter 4 of the HTS
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Table 5.2. Raw Milk Quantity Supplied and Composition, 2001 
Region 
Milk 
Supplied1 
(mil lbs) 
Composition2 
% Fat % SNF % Protein 
% Other 
Solids 
Other US3 132,085 3.67 8.72 3.02 5.69 
California 33,251 3.59 8.63 3.09 5.54 
Total 165,336 
1 Milk production from Milk Production, February 2002. 
2 Fat composition for both regions from unpublished FMMO and CDFA data.  SNF for 
FMMO region from relationship used in Pratt et al. (1997) based on data from four
marketing orders.  The protein percentage is estimated using standard milk composition 
(3.1/8.7) times actual SNF content.  The other solids content is determined by 
difference.  For California, SNF, protein and other solids are from unpublished CDFA 
data.   
3 Includes both areas regulated by FMMO and state-regulated or unregulated areas. 
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Table 5.3. Regional Final Product Demand Estimates, Exports and Imports, 2001 
Product 
Regional Final Demand1 , 
mil lbs Exports, 
mil lbs 
Imports, 
mil lbs 
Other US CAL 
Fluid milk 49,679.7 6,424.9 0.0 0.0 
Ice cream 5,572.8 773.9 93.5 14.5 
Yogurt 1,731.0 240.4 5.3 5.9 
Cottage cheese 1,222.0 169.7 0.0 0.0 
Cheddar cheese 3,294.0 554.8 69.3 70.0 
Other cheese 3,868.3 530.9 45.5 143.8 
Whey products2 4,190.2 749.6 656.3 57.1 
Butter 1,171.2 187.1 3.7 45.5 
Nonfat dry milk 340.4 37.3 212.0 7.4 
Evaporated, Condensed, or Dry 704.2 102.3 125.1 37.2 
Casein 119.2 16.6 0.0 135.8 
Caseinates 74.0 10.3 0.0 84.3 
MPC > 90% (Chapter 35 HTS) 13.4 1.9 0.0 15.3 
MPC > 40% (Chapter 4 HTS) 55.1 7.7 0.0 62.8 
1  Demand for fluid milk based on FMMO and CDFA data on fluid milk sales.  Demand estimates 
for ice cream, yogurt, and cottage cheese are based on production data from Dairy Products. 
For other domestically produced products, data on production, change in stocks, imports, 
exports and dairy industry (intermediate product) use were used to develop initial demand 
estimates.  In order to ensure component balance in the base model scenario, assumptions 
regarding the percentage of production covered in NASS Dairy Product surveys and 
intermediate product use were modified through iteration of the model structure.  Demand for
casein, caseinates and MPCs is based on import data.  Aggregate US data for products other 
than fluid milk was allocated to regions based on adjusted per capita consumption (for 
methods, see Pratt et al., 1997) and regional population. Intermediate demands are
endogenous to the model. They are not specified as explicit demand relationships, and 
therefore are not reported herein. 
2  Final demand for whey products assumes all fluid whey is processed into dry product, which 
is not in fact the case.  This assumption is necessary because the model does not explicitly 
model the costs of alternative whey disposal (other than drying).  Use of actual estimated 
whey final product demand would result in a dry whey price of zero. 
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Table 5.4. Composition of Intermediate Products from US Plants
Product 
Composition1 
% Fat % SNF % Protein 
% Other 
Solids 
Skim milk 
Other US 0.07 9.05 3.23 5.83 
California 0.07 8.95 3.19 5.76 
Cream 
Other US 40.00 5.36 1.91 3.45 
California 40.00 5.30 1.89 3.41 
NDM 
Other US 0.80 95.20 33.92 61.28 
California 0.79 95.21 33.93 61.29 
Ice cream mix 
Other US 9.17 9.74 3.47 6.27 
California 9.17 9.74 3.47 6.27 
Buttermilk 
Other US 0.77 8.99 3.20 5.79 
California 0.77 9.09 3.24 5.85 
MPC > 40% (Chapter 4) 
Other US 1.20 94.80 56.00 38.80 
California 1.20 94.80 56.00 38.80 
1 Fat and SNF values calculated based on raw milk composition and assumptions about the 
fat content of cream and skim.  Values of these intermediate products are exogenous.  
Protein values for products determined based on protein:SNF ratio in raw milk.  Other
solids composition equals SNF less protein.  The value of protein in MPC is based on the 
estimated value of protein in MPC imports (that is, product composition for domestic and 
imported MPC > 40% is assumed to be the same; see footnote for Table 5.5 for 
additional explanation.)
Table 5.5. Composition of Selected Imported Products 
Product 
Composition 
% Fat % SNF % Protein 
% Other 
Solids 
Casein 
Caseinates 
MPC > 90% (Chapter 35 HTS) 
MPC > 40% (Chapter 4 HTS) 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
93.0 
95.0 
95.0 
95.0 
92.0 
94.0 
90.0 
56.0 
1.0 
1.0 
5.0 
39.0 
Source:  Compositions based on information in Dairy Proteins, Wisconsin Center for Dairy 
Research (1999) and David Barbano, Department of Food Science, Cornell University 
(personal communication).  Protein content of MPC > 40% based on unit value of 
Chapter 4 HTS MPC imports in 2001 and the unit value of protein in NDM in US markets. 
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Table 5.6. Minimum Component Specifications for Final Products 
Product 
Composition 
% Fat % SNF % Protein 
% Other 
Solids 
Fluid milk 
Other US 2.65 
California 2.36 9.64 
Yogurt 
Other US 1.55 13.50 
California 1.55 13.50 
Cottage cheese
Other US 15.41 15.40 
California 15.41 15.40 
Cheddar cheese 
Other US 33.00 25.50 
California 33.00 25.50 
Other cheese
Other US 24.60 22.50 
California 24.60 22.50 
Source: Minimum fat content for fluid milk is actual average fat content of fluid milk
sales from FMMO and CDFA data. Minimum solids content for fluid milk in California 
is based on regulations specifying a minimum total solids content.  Other measures 
are based on USDA (1979).
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Table 5.7. Component Retention Factors Used to 
Determine the Yield of Selected Products at US Plants 
Product 
% Retention 
Fat Protein Other Solids 
Cheddar cheese 
Other US 93 75 5 
California 93 75 5 
Other cheese
Other US 85 75 5 
California 85 75 5 
Butter 
Other US 98 
California 98 
Casein 
Other US 75 3 
California 75 3 
MPC > 40% (Chapter 4) 
Other US 50 80 2 
California 50 80 2 
Source:  Papadatous et al., 2002. 
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Table 5.8. Elasticities of Raw Milk Supply, Final Product Demand, US Export and 
Import Supply 
Product 
Elasticity for:
Other US
Demand
CA 
Demand
US 
Exports3 
Import
Supply4 
Domestic Supply1 
Raw milk 0.312 0.433 
Domestic Aggregate Consumption2 
Fluid products -0.25 -0.25 
Soft products -0.5 -0.5 -1.5 2.5 
Cheddar cheese -0.5 -0.5 -1.5 2.5 
Other cheese -0.25 -0.25 -0.75 2.5 
Dry whey -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 2.5 
Butter -0.25 -0.25 -0.75 2.5 
NDM -0.5 -0.5 -1.5 2.5 
Evaporated, condensed or dried -0.3 -0.5 -0.9 2.5 
Casein -0.5 -0.5 2.5 
Caseinates -0.5 -0.5 2.5 
MPC > 90% (Chapter 35 HTS) -0.5 -0.5 2.5 
MPC > 40% (Chapter 4 HTS) -0.5 -0.5 2.5 
1 Raw milk elasticities adapted from FAPRI, as reported in US GAO (2001). 

2 Demand elasticities adapted from US GAO (2001). 

3 Equal to three times the domestic demand elasticity. 

4 An elastic value assumed for present analyses, but will be the subject of sensitivity 

analyses in subsequent work. 
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Table 5.9. US Quota Levels, Ad Valorem Tariffs, Unit Tariffs, Unit Export 
Subsidy and Export Subsidy Quantity Limitations 
Product TRQ Ad Valorem Tariff Unit Tariff Export Subsidy  
Product Within 
Mil lbs 
Within 
% 
Over 
% 
Within 
¢/lb 
Over 
¢/lb 
Unit 
Subsidy 
¢/lb 
Subsidy 
Quantity 
Mil lbs 
Fluid products No limit 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 
Ice cream 14.5 20.0 17.0 0.00 22.77 0.00 0.0 
Yogurt No limit 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 
Cheddar cheese 37.0 11.6 0.0 0.00 48.18 54.43 6.7 
Other cheese 251.7 9.6 0.0 0.00 98.39 0.00 0.0 
Dry whey No limit 7.7 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 
Butter 15.4 0.0 0.0 5.58 69.90 81.47 46.5 
NDM 11.6 0.0 0.0 1.50 39.24 54.85 212.0 
ECD 22.4 0.0 0.0 1.25 7.61 0.00 0.0 
Casein No limit 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 
Caseinates No limit 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 
MPC > 90%
(Chapter 35 HTS) No limit 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MPC > 40%
(Chapter 4 HTS) No limit 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source:  Values for TRQs and tariffs adapted from Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States (2001) (Rev. 1) as appropriate for model product categories.  Export subsidy information
from Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA. 
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Table 5.10.  Processing Costs for Final and Intermediate Products 
Product 
Processing Cost1 
($/cwt) 
Overhead, Storage, 
Profit, etc.2 ($/cwt) 
Other US CA Other US CA 
Final products 
Fluid products 2.8 2.8 0.0 0.0 
Soft products 5.3 5.3 0.0 0.0 
Cheddar cheese 11.0 9.5 2.4 3.2 
Other cheese 11.0 9.5 24.2 26.2 
Dry whey 0.5 0.5 5.6 8.1 
Butter 4.2 4.2 5.2 10.8 
NDM 8.2 8.2 2.5 0.0 
ECD 8.2 8.2 1.0 2.0 
Casein 13.0 13.0 0.0 0.0 
Caseinates 15.0 15.0 0.0 0.0 
MPC > 90% (Chapter 35 HTS)3 40.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 
MPC > 40% (Chapter 4 HTS)3 12.3 12.3 0.0 0.0 
Intermediate products 
Skim milk 2.8 2.8 0.0 0.0 
Cream 2.8 2.8 0.0 0.0 
Buttermilk 2.8 2.8 0.0 0.0 
Fluid whey 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NDM 8.2 8.2 0.0 0.0 
MPC > 40% (Chapter 4 HTS)3 12.3 12.3 0.0 0.0 
1 Estimated based on fixed and variable costs for medium sized processing operations
(large cheese operations for California) from Pratt et al. (1997), p. 74, and
(unpublished) mean predicted processing volumes from the US Dairy Sector Simulator 
(Pratt et al., 1997) using 2001 raw milk supplies and final product demands. 
2 Based on industry sources, professional judgment, and the model calibration process. 
This value also accounts for increases in unit processing costs since plant survey data 
were collected in the early 1990s. 
3 Based on MPC yields from ultra-filtered milk--and diafiltration processes for the high
protein MPCs—(David Barbano, personal communication) and costs estimated from a 
survey of current US ultra-filtered milk processors, assuming 0.5 million lbs milk 
processed per plant per day (Mark Stephenson, Cornell Program on Dairy Markets and 
Policy, Cornell University, personal communication).  Because UF processing costs 
decrease in a non-linear manner with increasing volumes, these reported costs will 
overstate unit processing costs for MPCs compared to plant volumes that could be 
observed as more US-based UF processing facilities were established. 
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Table 5.11.  Transportation Costs for Raw Milk Assembly and Final Products Distribution 
Transportation type, product (plant) Distance pairs, miles
1 Cost, $/ 100 lbs milk or product 2 
type US to
US 
US to
CA 
CA to 
US 
CA to 
CA US to US US to CA CA to US CA to CA 
Raw Milk Assembly To 
Fluid products 200 2,120 2,120 250 0.80 8.48 8.48 1.00 
Soft products 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.20 8.48 8.48 0.20 
Cheddar cheese 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.20 8.48 8.48 0.20 
Other cheese 25 2,120 2,120 25 0.10 8.48 8.48 0.10 
Dry whey3 NA 2,120 2,120 NA NA NA NA NA 
Butter 50 2,120 2,120 25 0.20 8.48 8.48 0.10 
NDM 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.20 8.48 8.48 0.20 
ECD 80 2,120 2,120 80 0.32 8.48 8.48 0.32 
Casein 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.20 8.48 8.48 0.20 
MPC > 40% (Chapter 4 HTS) 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.20 8.48 8.48 0.20 
Final Product Distribution From 
Fluid products4 25 2,120 2,120 25 13.02 NA NA 14.58 
Soft products5 75 2,120 2,120 75 87.3-114.7 94.9-122.0 93.3-120.6 88.9-116.0 
Cheddar cheese 300 2,120 2,120 200 1.58 6.57 6.57 1.17 
Other cheese 300 2,120 2,120 200 1.58 6.57 6.57 1.17 
Dry whey 300 2,120 2,120 200 1.41 5.90 5.90 1.05 
Butter 350 2,120 2,120 200 1.76 6.57 6.57 1.17 
NDM 350 2,120 2,120 200 1.58 5.90 5.90 1.05 
ECD 250 2,120 2,120 200 1.24 5.90 5.90 1.05 
Casein 350 2,120 2,120 200 1.58 5.90 5.90 1.05 
MPC > 40% (Chapter 4 HTS) 350 2,120 2,120 200 1.58 5.90 5.90 1.05 
1 Based on (unpublished) mean predicted distances from US Dairy Sector Simulator (Pratt et al., 1997) using 2001 raw milk supplies and final 
product demands for within-region shipments.  Distances for inter-regional shipments based on distance between Los Angeles and Chicago. 
2 Based on transportation cost relationships specified in Pratt et al. (1997).  
3 Assembly of raw milk at whey “plants” is prohibited by setting an arbitrarily large distance for the assembly flow. 
4 A retail margin of $1.10 and $1.38 per gallon is added in the Other US and California regions, respectively, to allow comparisons with retail 
prices. 
5 Varies by product. An estimated retail margin of between $0.87 cents and $1.15 per lb is included in the value to allow comparison with 
reported retail prices. 
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Table 5.12.  Transportation Costs for Permitted Intermediate Product Flows 
Intermediate Distance pairs, miles
1 Cost, $/100 lbs milk or product2 
product Origin 
plant 
Receiving 
plant US to US US to CA CA to US CA to CA 
US to 
US 
US to 
CA 
CA to 
US 
CA to 
CA 
Buttermilk Butter ECD 50 NA NA 50 0.20 NA NA 0.20 
Cream Casein Butter 50 NA NA 50 0.20 NA NA 0.20 
Casein Cottage 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.20 8.48 8.48 0.20 
Casein ECD 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.20 8.48 8.48 0.20 
Cottage Butter 50 NA NA 50 0.20 NA NA 0.20 
Fluid Butter 50 NA NA 50 0.20 NA NA 0.20 
Fluid Cottage 25 2,120 2,120 25 0.10 8.48 8.48 0.10 
Fluid ECD 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.20 8.48 8.48 0.20 
MPC40 Butter 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.20 8.48 8.48 0.20 
MPC40 Cottage 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.20 8.48 8.48 0.20 
MPC40 ECD 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.20 8.48 8.48 0.20 
NDM Cheese 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.20 8.48 8.48 0.20 
NDM Other 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.20 8.48 8.48 0.20 
NDM DCE 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.20 8.48 8.48 0.20 
Other Butter 50 NA NA 50 0.20 NA NA 0.20 
Yogurt Butter 10 NA NA 10 0.04 NA NA 0.04 
Fluid Whey Casein Whey 0 2,120 2,120 0 0.00 8.48 8.48 0.00 
Cheddar Whey 0 2,120 2,120 0 0.00 8.48 8.48 0.00 
MPC40 Whey 0 2,120 2,120 0 0.00 8.48 8.48 0.00 
Other Whey 0 2,120 2,120 0 0.00 8.48 8.48 0.00 
Ice cream mix NDM Mix 75 2,120 2,120 75 0.30 8.48 8.48 0.30 
MPC > 40% MPC40 Cheddar 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.38 5.90 5.90 0.38 
MPC40 Cottage 100 2,120 2,120 100 0.63 5.90 5.90 0.63 
MPC40 Other 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.38 5.90 5.90 0.38 
NDM NDM Cheese 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.38 5.90 5.90 0.38 
NDM Cottage 100 2,120 2,120 100 0.63 5.90 5.90 0.63 
NDM 
Fluid 3 2,120 3 100 NA 5.90 NA 0.63 
NDM Other 50 2,120 2,120 50 0.38 5.90 5.90 0.38 
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
Intermediate Distance pairs, miles
1 Cost, $/100 lbs milk or product2 
product Origin 
plant 
Receiving 
plant US to US US to CA CA to US CA to CA 
US to 
US 
US to 
CA 
CA to 
US 
CA to 
CA 
Skim Casein Cheese 75 2,120 2,120 75 0.30 8.48 8.48 0.30 
Casein Cottage 75 2,120 2,120 75 0.30 8.48 8.48 0.30 
Casein ECD 75 2,120 2,120 75 0.30 8.48 8.48 0.30 
Casein Other 75 2,120 2,120 75 0.30 8.48 8.48 0.30 
MPC40 Cheese 75 2,120 2,120 75 0.30 8.48 8.48 0.30 
MPC40 Cottage 75 2,120 2,120 75 0.30 8.48 8.48 0.30 
MPC40 ECD 75 2,120 2,120 75 0.30 8.48 8.48 0.30 
MPC40 Other 75 2,120 2,120 75 0.30 8.48 8.48 0.30 
NDM Cheese 75 2,120 2,120 75 0.30 8.48 8.48 0.30 
NDM Cottage 75 2,120 2,120 75 0.30 8.48 8.48 0.30 
NDM ECD 75 2,120 2,120 75 0.30 8.48 8.48 0.30 
NDM Other 75 2,120 2,120 75 0.30 8.48 8.48 0.30 
1 Based on (unpublished) mean predicted distances from U. S. Dairy Sector Simulator (Pratt et al., 1997) using 2001 raw milk 
supplies and final product demands for within-region shipments. Distances for inter-regional shipments based on distance 
between Los Angeles and Chicago. 
2 Based on transportation cost relationships specified in Pratt et al. (1997). 
3 Use of NDM in fluid milk is not allowed in the FMMO region.  It is allowed in California due to the higher solids requirement for fluid 
milk products. 
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
Table 5.13.  Milk Supply, Regional Demand, Import Supply and Export Demand Prices and Data Sources 
Product
Reference Price ($/cwt)
Definition and Sources (US Values)  Other US CA ImportSupply1 
Export 
Demand1 
Supply 
Raw milk 15.23 13.72 NA NA 
FMMO = [US mean annual all-milk price – (CA mean annual 
all-milk price)(Proportion US milk production in
California)]/Proportion US milk in FMMO region.  CA=mean
annual all-milk price.  Agricultural Prices, various issues 2001-
2002 
Final demand
Fluid products2 32.00 33.00 NA NA 
FMMO = US city annual average of whole and lowfat gallon
milk prices.  CA=annual average of west urban whole milk 
prices.  Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
Ice cream 148.00 148.00 148.00 35.00 US city annual average of ice cream price reported by BLS.
Yogurt 129.00 129.00 135.00 33.00 US city annual average of yogurt price reported by BLS. 
Soft products 135.00 135.00 135.00 US city annual average of ice cream and yogurt prices reported by BLS. 
Cheddar 
cheese 148.70 145.40 125.00 130.00 
Annual average of weekly national 500-lb barrel prices 
reported by NASS. 
Other cheese 148.70 145.40 125.00 130.00 Assumed equal to cheddar prices based on industry sources. 
Dry whey 28.5 25.50 88.00 25.00 Annual average of weekly national prices for dry whey reported by NASS. 
Butter 164.00 162.00 99.00 99.00 Annual average of weekly national prices for butter reported by NASS. 
NDM 94.50 92.20 55.00 55.00 Annual average of weekly national prices for NDM reported by NASS. 
ECD 40.00 40.00 30.00 30.00 
Adapted from annual average of monthly prices for 
evaporated milk, Class II condensed skim and Class III 
condensed skim reported in Dairy Market News. 
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Product
Reference Price ($/cwt)
Definition and Sources (US Values)  Other US CA ImportSupply1 
Export 
Demand1 
Casein 217.00 217.00 217.00 NA Based on unit value of imports from Customs data. 
Caseinates 233.00 233.00 233.00 NA Based on unit value of imports from Customs data. 
MPC > 90% 219.00 219.00 219.00 NA Based on unit value of imports from Customs data. 
MPC > 40% 163.00 163.00 163.00 NA Based on unit value of imports from Customs data. 
1  Based on unit value of imports from Customs data. 

2  Gallon prices are $2.75 and $2.84 in the FMMO region and California, respectively. 
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Results and Discussion 
Scenarios Simulated 
To assess the impacts of MPC imports, four scenarios are simulated and compared.  
The first is a base scenario, which replicates average annual market outcomes (e.g.,
milk production, milk and product prices) during 2001.  This scenario allows MPC 
imports to enter the US at prices estimated from trade data complied by the Customs 
Bureau. The predicted outcomes of this base scenario are compared to actual market 
outcomes to assess how well the model replicates the base year data.   
The substitutability of Chapter 4 MPCs with NDM and with other non-milk (e.g., soy 
proteins) is important to the market outcome of MPC imports, especially when the Dairy 
Price Support Program is purchasing NDM.  Harris (2003) and others have suggested 
that when the CCC is purchasing sufficiently large quantities of NDM, MPC imports have 
no impact on farm milk or classified prices.  Rather, MPC imports only increase
government NDM purchases and expenditures.  However, this outcome occurs only if 
there is perfect substitutability between NDM and MPCs in both intermediate and final 
demand, and there is no substitutability between MPCs and non-milk protein sources in 
final demand.  Because little or no information exists about the substitutability for MPCs 
with alternatives—which is crucially important to market outcomes of MPC imports—we 
simulate three alternative scenarios that will be compared to results of the base. 
A second scenario is similar to the base scenario, but prohibits the imports of MPCs 
entering under Chapter 4 of the HTS1 . We assume that substitutes for MPC (such as 
NDM) can be found for dairy industry uses, but that there is a demand for MPCs in 
other uses that must be met by domestic production of MPCs.  That is, the use of MPC 
as an “intermediate” product in the manufacture of other dairy products is endogenous
and is determined by the relative prices of the substitute protein-intensive intermediate 
products (NDM and skim milk) generated by the model.  The demand for MPCs for
other food industries is assumed to sensitive to the price of MPCs, but there are no 
immediately available (dairy or non-dairy) substitutes.  This means that there will 
continue to be demand for MPCs in these industries even if no imports of MPC are 
allowed. Thus, the price of MPCs will increase to support the level of domestic 
production required to service the needs of the non-dairy industry users.   
Because there was essentially no domestic production of MPCs in 2001, import data 
indicate the total amount of MPCs demanded by dairy industry and non-dairy industry
users. No data are currently available to estimate the amount of MPCs used in dairy 
and non-dairy industry uses, although a survey of the importers and users of MPC was 
conducted by the US International Trade Commission in 2003.  (Some of this
1 This is equivalent to setting the TRQ for imports of Chapter 4 MPCs (i.e., the parameter qlvl in 
equation 5.22) equal to zero.  
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information may be made public in May 2004.)  Thus, we must make an assumption 
about the division of MPC imports into “intermediate” (dairy industry) and “final” (non-
dairy industry) use.  For the purposes of this analysis, we assume that 30% of the 62.8 
million lbs of MPC imports that entered the US in 2001 were used by the dairy industry 
(e.g., in manufacture of cheese without a standard of identity) and 70% of MPC imports 
were used for non-dairy industry manufacturing.  
Under the third scenario, NDM is assumed to be perfectly substitutable with Chapter 4
MPC imports at the NDM purchase price, and no imports of Chapter 4 MPCs are 
allowed. The import ban results in an increase in the final commercial demand for NDM 
for use in final products equal to the amount of NDM required to supply the milk protein 
assumed to enter the US in MPC imports.  Thus, there is an increase in final demand for 
NDM of about 103 million lbs.   Demand for NDM as an intermediate product remains 
endogenous. In the fourth scenario, there is no substitutability between Chapter 4 MPCs 
and NDM, but perfect substitutability between MPCs and non-milk proteins at the 
current MPC price. Thus, when Chapter 4 MPC imports are banned, there is no 
additional demand for milk protein.  Instead, the final demand for Chapter 4 MPCs is 
assumed to be zero.  Although none of the three scenarios is completely plausible, they
illustrate the range of possible market impacts. 
The base scenario simulated by the model compares favorably to the observed market 
outcomes (Table 5.14).  The all-milk price is within $0.02/cwt of the actual for the 
Other US regions, and within $0.09/cwt in California.  The weighted average all-milk 
price for the US predicted by the model is the same as the actual.  With the exception 
of the Class 4b price in California, all minimum class prices are within $0.01/cwt of the 
actual values. All product prices in both regions are within $0.02/lb of the observed 
market prices.  Our predictions of NDM purchases by the CCC are somewhat high, 
about 7 million lbs, or just under 3%.  Model evaluation will be discussed in further 
detail in subsequent publications. 
Summary of Market Impacts 
The simulation of a ban on MPC imports under the second scenario indicates that farm-
milk price impacts are relatively modest (Table 5.14).  The weighted average US all-milk 
price increases by $0.06/cwt, and US milk production increases 200 million lbs or 0.1%.  
There is a reduction in the butter price of about $0.07/lb because additional butter (21 
million lbs) is manufactured as a by-product of the MPC manufacturing process2 . This
effect supports our initial hypothesis that there can be market impacts from reallocation 
of other dairy components (fat in this case) as a result of changes in trade policy for 
dairy protein products.  (It also illustrates the need to account for joint products in the 
2 Recall that the MPC manufacturing process yields cream (which can be used in the 
manufacture of butter as well as other products) and a lactose-rich by-product used in the “dry 
whey” product category. 
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modeling of dairy markets).  In essence, the demand for domestically produced MPCs 
increases the demand for domestically produced milk proteins.  In order to meet this 
demand, increased milk production occurs in response to price shifts.  Additional milk 
production results in additional butterfat, and the value of butterfat must fall to clear 
the fat market. 
Butter prices are used in the classified pricing formulas for all classes in both regions.
The largest impact of increased butter production is on the Class IV price in the FMMO 
region and the Class 4a price in California. The reduction in the butter price results in a 
$0.29/cwt fall in the Class IV price, and a $0.28/cwt decrease in the Class 4a price.  
Thus, there is a negative effect on milk prices that arises from adjustments in the 
butterfat market in response to the reduction in milk protein imports.  Cheese prices 
increase by 1 to 2 cents per lb as a result of both an increase in the demand for milk 
proteins required for MPC manufacture, and because the value of butterfat contributes 
negatively to the cheese price in the Class III and Class 4b pricing formulas (for a given 
cheese price). That is, as the butter price falls, the price of milk used in cheese will 
increase, ceteris paribus. However, the current pricing formulas imply that the increase 
in the Class III price due to a fall in the butterfat value will be less than the amount of 
decrease in the Class IV or 4a prices. Dried whey prices decrease about $0.01/lb, so
there is a second negative effect on milk prices through the “other solids” price in 
classified pricing formulas.  On net, however, there is an increase in the Class III and 
Class 4b prices of $0.16/cwt and $0.10/cwt, respectively. The all-milk price in the 
FMMO region increases despite the fall in the Class IV price because utilization is 
sufficiently larger in Class III than Class IV.   
In the FMMO region, the impacts on Class I and Class II mirror the impacts on the Class 
III and IV prices.  Differences in the Class II price will be equal to those in the Class IV
price, because these two prices differ by only the $0.70/cwt Class II differential.  The 
impact on Class I depends on whether Class III or Class IV is the “higher of” price used 
as the base price for milk used in fluid products.  In our 2001 base scenario, Class III 
was the “higher of”, and thus the Class I price increases by the same amount as the 
Class III price in response to the ban on Chapter 4 MPC imports.   
Production (consumption) of fluid milk decreases 113 million lbs due to increases in the 
Class I price resulting from the increase in the Class III price.  Production of ice cream 
increases due to the reduction in the fat price.  Total cheese production falls about 33 
million lbs (0.4%) as a result of increases in the Class III price.  NDM production 
declines 34 million lbs, or about 4.0%.  As a result, CCC purchases of NDM decrease by 
roughly the same amount, resulting in a reduction of $32 million in government 
expenditures under the Dairy Price Support Program.   
The farm-milk price effects differ in the two regions, in both magnitude and direction.
In California, the higher proportion of Class 4a utilization (28% versus 8% in the rest of 
the US) means that the reduction in the Class 4a price ends up having a larger effect on 
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the blend price than the increase in the Class 4b price.  Thus, the all-milk price in 
California decreases in response to the MPC import ban3, and production declines by 30 
million lbs.  In the rest of the US, the farm-milk price increases by about $0.08/cwt, and 
production increases by 230 million lbs.  Although our model currently does not 
disaggregate the “other US” region into additional regions (FMMO marketing areas 
being an obvious example), it is likely that there will be similar differences among the
various regions other than California.  Regions with relatively greater Class III utilization 
are likely to see relatively larger increases in the farm-milk price. 
Under the third and fourth scenarios, there are no market price or production impacts 
(and thus the scenario results are not shown in Table 5.14).  When NDM and Chapter 4 
MPCs are perfect substitutes, the only difference with the base scenario is a reduction 
in NDM purchases under the DPSP of 103 million lbs (essentially equal to the assumed 
increase in commercial NDM demand) and a reduction in government expenditures of
$96 million. When Chapter 4 MPCs are perfect substitutes with non-dairy proteins, the 
outcomes are identical to the base scenario except that MPC imports fall to zero.  That 
is, there is no reduction in NDM purchases by the government and no decrease in 
government expenditures. 
Conclusions and Implications
Our model of the US dairy industry suggests relatively modest farm-milk price impacts 
resulting from imports of lower-protein content MPCs.  When MPCs are not 
substitutable with NDM or non-dairy protein, a ban on imports would have a small 
positive impact on US all-milk prices, due primarily to an increase in the domestic 
demand for milk protein.  However, there will also be negative effects on milk prices 
that arise through reductions in the value of butterfat (reductions in the Class IV or 4a 
prices) as more milk is produced, and through reductions in the dry whey price (which 
offsets some of the increase in the Class III or 4b prices).  The presence of these 
offsetting effects implies that some regions may see larger-than-average gains in farm-
milk prices if MPC imports were prohibited, but that some regions (notably California 
with its larger Class 4a utilization) may see reductions in farm-milk prices.   
Importantly, our simulation results address only a small fraction of the total imports of 
milk protein products into the US.  Imports of Chapter 4 MPCs accounted for only one-
fifth of the volume of milk protein product imports in 2001, and probably substantially 
less than that on a protein-equivalent basis.  This implies that current efforts to 
markedly reduce all milk protein imports (as in the legislation currently under 
consideration by the US Congress) or to subsidize domestic production are likely to 
have larger impacts on US dairy markets.  The assumption of perfect substitutability 
between NDM or non-diary protein products and casein, caseinates and Chapter 35 
3 The reduction in the all-milk price in California arises because of reductions in both the blend 
price and a reduction in the over-order premium estimated by the model.  Each of these 
contributes equally to the overall reduction of $0.03/cwt.
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MPCs is much less plausible. Thus, it is highly likely that there will be impacts on US 
dairy market prices and production—as in our second scenario.  Although it remains to 
be confirmed by forthcoming research, it is likely that more dramatic restrictions of milk 
protein imports or domestic subsidy programs will result in substantially larger positive 
impacts on cheese prices (and substantial increases in Class III and 4b prices; and thus
Class I prices).  It is also likely that there will be much larger reductions in the butter 
price (and Class IV and 4a prices).  Unless the effects of increases in the Class III/4b 
price and decreases in the Class IV/4a are of similar magnitude, the potential exists for 
the positive and negative effects on farm milk prices to be larger if greater restrictions
on milk protein imports are put in place.  Further modeling of these alternative
scenarios will be undertaken in the near future.   
The impact on class prices and farm milk prices will also differ if market conditions 
dictate that Class IV is the “higher of” price used to set minimum regulated prices for 
milk used in fluid products.  The impact of restricting milk protein imports on Class I 
prices would be different if Class IV were the “higher of” in a base scenario.  In that 
case, the change in the Class I price would equal the change in the Class IV price (i.e., 
a decrease) if Class IV was still the “higher of” in the scenario prohibiting Chapter 4 
MPC imports.  If the Class IV price falls below the Class III in response to prohibiting 
Chapter 4 MPC imports, there would likely still be a fall in the Class I price, but it would 
be attenuated by the use of the (now higher) Class III price as the base price for Class 
I. When the Class IV price is the “higher of,” it is used as the base to price milk in 
Classes I, II, and IV. Under this circumstance, a fall in the Class IV price will have 
larger impacts on farm milk prices.  In general, if Class IV is the “higher of” there will 
be fewer positive impacts on farm milk prices (and a greater possibility of farm milk
price decreases) due to the fall in the price of butter resulting from restrictions on 
imports of milk protein products. 
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Table 5.14. Summary of Estimated US Dairy Market Impacts of Chapter 4 MPC Imports1 
Variable, Region or Product Reference Value 
Base Scenario with MPC Imports Scenario With No MPC2 Imports  
Value 
Difference
from 
Reference 
% 
Difference
from 
Reference 
Value Differencefrom Base 
% 
Difference
from Base 
Raw milk supply, billion lbs 
California 33.251 33.34 0.09 0.3% 33.32 -0.03 -0.1% 
Other US 132.085 132.04 -0.04 0.0% 132.27 0.23 0.2% 
All milk price, $/cwt 
California 13.72 13.81 0.09 0.6% 13.78 -0.03 -0.2% 
Other US 15.23 15.21 -0.02 -0.1% 15.30 0.08 0.6% 
Weighted Average 14.93 14.93 0.00 0.0% 14.99 0.06 0.4% 
Blend Price at Standard Test, $/cwt 
California 13.52 13.51 -0.01 -0.1% 
Other US 14.56 14.64 0.08 0.5% 
Minimum Class Prices at Standard Test, $/cwt3 
California 
Class 1 15.36 15.35 -0.01 0.0% 15.43 0.08 0.5% 
Class 2/3 13.84 13.84 0.00 0.0% 13.56 -0.28 -2.0% 
Class 4b 12.95 13.03 0.08 0.6% 13.12 0.10 0.7% 
Class 4a 13.09 13.09 0.00 0.0% 12.80 -0.28 -2.2% 
Other  US  
Class I 16.23 16.24 0.01 0.1% 16.41 0.16 1.0% 
Class II 13.93 13.93 0.00 0.0% 13.64 -0.29 -2.1% 
Class III 13.54 13.55 0.01 0.1% 13.72 0.16 1.2% 
Class IV 13.23 13.23 -0.01 0.0% 12.94 -0.29 -2.2% 
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Variable, Region or Product Reference Value 
Base Scenario with MPC Imports Scenario With No MPC2 Imports  
Value 
Difference
from 
Reference 
% 
Difference
from 
Reference 
Value Differencefrom Base 
% 
Difference
from Base 
Wholesale FOB Prices, $/lb 
California 
Cheddar cheese 1.45 1.44 -0.01 -0.8% 1.45 0.01 0.8% 
Other cheese 1.45 1.46 0.01 0.6% 1.48 0.02 1.1% 
Whey products 0.26 0.25 -0.01 -3.1% 0.24 -0.01 -2.0% 
Butter 1.62 1.60 -0.02 -1.4% 1.53 -0.07 -4.3% 
NDM 0.92 0.93 0.01 1.2% 0.93 0.00 0.0% 
Evaporated, condensed, and dried 0.40 0.39 -0.01 -2.8% 0.38 -0.01 -1.8% 
Other  US  
Cheddar cheese 1.49 1.49 0.01 0.4% 1.50 0.01 0.7% 
Other cheese 1.49 1.49 0.00 -0.1% 1.50 0.02 1.2% 
Whey products 0.29 0.26 -0.02 -7.4% 0.27 0.01 3.0% 
Butter 1.64 1.65 0.01 0.3% 1.58 -0.07 -4.1% 
NDM 0.95 0.93 -0.01 -1.3% 0.93 0.00 0.0% 
Evaporated, condensed, and dried 0.40 0.39 -0.01 -2.8% 0.38 -0.01 -1.8% 
Total US Production of Final Products, billion lbs 
Fluid (Other US only) 49.732 49.627 -0.105 -0.2% 
High-solids fluid milk (CA only) 6.423 6.415 -0.008 -0.1% 
Ice cream 6.443 6.463 0.020 0.3% 
Yogurt 1.979 1.979 0.000 0.0% 
Cottage cheese 1.390 1.396 0.006 0.4% 
Cheddar cheese 3.826 3.811 -0.015 -0.4% 
Other cheese 4.243 4.225 -0.018 -0.4% 
Whey products 5.501 5.478 -0.023 -0.4% 
Butter 1.317 1.338 0.021 1.6% 
NDM 0.844 0.810 -0.034 -4.0% 
Evaporated, condensed, and dried 0.859 0.867 0.008 0.9% 
MPC > 40% (Chapter 4 HTS) 0.000 0.044 0.044 
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Variable, Region or Product Reference Value 
Base Scenario with MPC Imports Scenario With No MPC2 Imports  
Value 
Difference
from 
Reference 
% 
Difference
from 
Reference 
Value Differencefrom Base 
% 
Difference
from Base 
CCC Product Purchases, million lbs 
NDM 259.9 267.1 7.2 2.8% 232.9 -34.3 -12.8% 
Value of CCC Product Purchases, $ million 
NDM 242.6 249.3 6.7 2.8% 217.3 -32.0 -12.8% 
1  Results are shown only for two of the scenarios because only government purchases of NDM and expenditures are different from 
the base under the third and fourth scenarios. 
2  Only MPCs under Chapter 4 of the HTS are prohibited in this scenario. 
3  Reference classified prices reported here are calculated using the average of weekly wholesale NASS product prices for 2001 in the 
product-pricing formulas specified under FMMOs.  This calculation ensures a consistency between reference product prices and 

reference classified prices, which is not present for the actual reported prices due to lags in the pricing formulas and use of a 

different wholesale price series. 
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APPENDIX:  Additional Discussion of Model Structure and Equations 
Like the models described in the previous chapters, this model has at its core the basic 
characteristics of a traditional Samuelson-Takayama-Judge (SJT) price equilibrium
model. That is, a solution to the model requires that prices in one market are explicitly 
linked to prices in another as a strict equality, provided a non-zero physical flow 
between the two markets exists. Conversely, the price linkage between the two markets 
can be expressed as a strict inequality if the physical flow is zero. In the canonical SJT 
model, the markets are separated by space, hence such models are known as spatial 
price equilibrium (SPE) models. But the separation need not be spatial; it might be the 
form of market levels along the value chain or product forms or time. 
If a typical SJT model contains a quadratic objective function and only linear 
constraints, then the model will be formulated and solved as a quadratic programming 
(QP) problem. A model with linear supply and demand functions could be formulated as 
a QP problem provided all the constraints were linear. A more general nonlinear 
programming (NLP) formulation would be necessary if: (a) any of the constraints were 
nonlinear, and/or (b) the objective function was nonlinear but not quadratic. An
example of an NLP formulation would be where the supply and demand functions were 
iso-elastic, i.e. they are curved. 
Formulation of the Model 
One of the key departures from the usual SJT formulation is that our model is 
formulated and solved as a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP). All NLPs can be 
recast as MCPs but not all MCPs can be formulated as an NLP. Hence, the MCP 
framework permits greater flexibility in terms of the economic structures that can be 
modelled. In our dairy policy model, there are three main reasons why we chose to 
formulate the model as an MCP: 
1) The ease with which ad valorem tariffs can be incorporated, i.e. there is no need to 
solve a sequence of NLPs containing specific (per unit) tariffs while iterating towards 
the desired solution, which contains specific approximations to the underlying ad 
valorem tariff rate. The mathematics underlying this issue have to do with the so-
called integrability problem. The integrability problem is made redundant with MCPs, 
and this also makes the MCP formulation well-suited to regime switching models, 
e.g. where a shock to the model causes the solution to switch from one regime, say, 
imports occurring within a quota, to another regime such as imports coming in over 
the quota.
2) Our dairy policy model is highly nonlinear. For example, many of the regulated 
pricing constraints contain nonlinearities. The presence of a high number of 
nonlinearities makes solving the model more difficult using NLP solvers.  This comes 
about because NLP solvers are unable to exploit second-order information, (i.e. 
GAMS provides first order derivatives only to the chosen solver).  An MCP is 
formulated in GAMS with explicit first order derivatives (that is more or less the 
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
definition of an MCP). Hence, GAMS then effectively provides second order 
derivatives to the solver. The ability to exploit this second order information greatly 
enhances the ability to solve the problem. In order to obtain similar outcomes from 
NLP solvers, it is often necessary to overly constrain the model and/or bound the 
variables to restrict the domain over which the model is able to locate a solution. 
3) A third, albeit less compelling reason, is that the MCP solution algorithm (i.e. PATH) 
is more efficient because it is able to exploit the complementary structure inherent 
in price equilibrium models. This is perhaps less of a concern with the availability of 
modern inexpensive computers.
“Primal” Constraints 
The MCP model can be expressed in terms of “primal” (quantity-based) constraints,
“dual” (value-based) constraints, minimum classified pricing formula definitions 
(applicable to Federal Milk Marketing Order areas) and California-specific pricing 
formulas.  The primal constraints are as follows:  
ASSEMBLY(i) 
Defined for all I supply regions. 
QSi ≥ ∑∑∑ XRM i, j, fp,cl (5.1 ) 
j fp  cl  
The quantity of raw milk supplied at region I, QS, is greater than sum of milk shipped to
processing plants of type FPεP in region J. 
VOLMFSEP(j,fp,ip) 
Defined for IP=cream, skim at FP=plants that can receive raw milk (fluid, yogurt, 
cottage cheese, cheddar cheese, other cheese, NDM and evaporated, condensed, and 
dried products). 
ρ j,ip ⋅∑∑ XRM i, j, fp,cl ≥QMFSEPj, fp,ip (5.2 )
i cl  
The volume of cream and skim separated at a plant receiving fluid milk, QMFSEP, is less 
than or equal to the amount of raw milk received at the plant times an allocation factor, 
ρ. The allocation factor is calculated using an independent system of simultaneous 
equations, solving for the volume and composition of the cream and skim fractions 
assuming separated cream is 40% butterfat. 
VOLMFUSE(j,fp,ip) 
Defined for IP=cream and skim at FP=plants that can receive raw milk (fluid, yogurt, 
cottage cheese, cheddar cheese, other cheese, NDM and evaporated, condensed, and 
dried products). 
QMFSEPj, fp,ip ≥ QMFUSE j, fp,ip +QUSEMIX j, fp∈NDM ,ip∈MIX +QIPj, fp,ip (5.3 )
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
where QMFUSE is the amount of cream or skim used in final products, QUSEMIX is the 
amount of cream or skim used in ice cream mix (at FP=NDM only) and QIP is cream or 
skim used in intermediate products. QIP is defined for inter-plant flows of cream from
fluid, yogurt, cottage cheese, other cheese, NDM plants and inter-plant flows of skim 
from NDM plants.  The quantity of cream and skim separated at a plant is greater than 
or equal to the quantity used in final products at that plant, the quantity used in ice 
cream mix at NDM plants, and the allowable inter-plants of cream and skim. 
YLDMIX(j,fp,ip) 
Defined for FP=NDM and IP=ice cream mix only. 
H 2O ConcSkimQUSEMIX j, fp∈NDM ,ip∈Cream + QUSEMIX j, fp∈NDM ,ip∈Skim ⋅ (1− θ j,ip∈Skim) / θ j 
≥ QIPj,ip∈MIX , fp∈NDM 
(5.4 )
The volume of ice cream mix produced at FP=NDM is less than or equal to the volume 
of cream used in ice cream mix at FP=NDM and the volume of concentrated skim used 
in ice cream mix at FP=NDM.  The volume of concentrated skim is calculated as the 
volume of skim used in ice cream mix times one minus the water content of skim 
divided by the total solids content of the concentrated skim. 
MIXSPEC(j,fp,ip) 
Defined for FP=NDM and IP=cream and skim only. 
QUSEMIX j, fp∈NDM ,ip∈Cream,Skim ≥ δ j,ip∈Cream,Skim ⋅QIPj,ip∈MIX , fp∈NDM (5.5 )
The volume of cream and skim used in ice cream mix at FP=NDM equals a proportion δ
of the volume of ice cream mix processed.  The value of δ is calculated using an 
independent system of simultaneous equations based on the desired fat content of the 
ice cream mix (volume basis). 
YIELDV(j,fp) 
Defined for FP=Fluid milk, yogurt, ice cream and yogurt. 
∑ QMFUSE j, fp,ip +∑∑∑ XIPjj, j,ip, ff , fp 
ip∈Cream,Skim jj ip ff 
(5.6 )+∑∑∑ XIPM jj, j,ip, fp,ql ≥ QFPj, fp 
jj ip ql 
The volume of final product produced at a plant, QFP, is less than or equal to the cream 
and skim used in final products plus the volume of interplant shipments of IP, XIP, to 
the plant allowed from plant type FF in region JJ, plus the volume of imported IP, XIPM, 
to the plant under all quota levels (ql). 
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YLDCOT(j,fp) 
Defined for FP=Cottage cheese only. 
∑∑θ j,c,ip ⋅QMFUSE j, fp,ip +∑∑∑∑θ jj,c,ip ⋅ XIPjj, j,ip, ff , fp 
ip c jj ip ff c 
H 2O(1− )θ j, fp 
(5.7 )∑∑∑∑θ jj,c,ip ⋅ XIPM jj, j,ip, fp,ql 
jj ip ql c+ ≥ QFPj fpH 2O(1− ) ,θ j, fp 
The volume of cottage cheese produced at a plant is less than or equal to the 
components in the cream and skim used in final products plus the components in the 
interplant shipments of IP and imported IP to the plant allowed from plant type FF in
region JJ divided by one minus the water content of cottage cheese.  The θ are the
composition parameters for QMFUSE and XIP. 
YLDCHS(j,fp) 
Defined for FP=Cheddar cheese or other cheese only. 
∑∑ψ j,c, fp ⋅θ j,c,ip ⋅QMFUSE j, fp,ip +∑∑∑∑ψ j,c, fp ⋅θ jj,c,ip ⋅ XIPjj, j,ip, ff , fp 
ip c jj ip ff c 
H 2O(1− )θ j, fp 
(5.8 )∑∑∑∑ ψ j,c, fp ⋅θ jj,c,ip ⋅ XIPM jj, j,ip, fp,ql 
jj c ip ql+ ≥ QFPj fpH 2O(1− ) ,θ j, fp 
The volume of cheese produced at a plant is less than or equal to the components 
retained from the cream and skim used in cheese plus the components retained from 
the interplant shipments of IP to the plant from plant type FF in region JJ and imported
IP divided by one minus the water content of the cheese.  The ψ indicate the 
proportion of each component used in the cheese vat retained in the cheese. 
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YLDDWH(j,fp) 
Defined for FP=Dry whey only. 
∑∑∑(1−ψ j,c, pp ∈Cheese) ⋅θ j,c,ip ⋅QMFUSE j, pp ∈Cheese,ip 
pp ip c 
H 2O(1− )θ j, fp 
∑∑∑∑∑ (1−ψ j,c, pp ∈Cheese) ⋅θ jj,c,ip ⋅ XIPjj, j,ip, ff , pp ∈Cheese 
jj ip ff pp c + H 2O(1− )θ j, fp 
∑∑∑∑∑ (1−ψ j,c, pp ∈Cheese) ⋅θ jj,c,ip ⋅ XIPM jj, j,ip, pp ∈Cheese,ql 
jj ip pp ql c+ H 2O(1− )θ j, fp 
∑∑∑(1−ψ j,c, pp ∈CAS ) ⋅θ j,c,ip ⋅QMFUSE j, pp ∈CAS ,ip 
pp ip c 
H 2O(1− )θ j, fp 
∑∑∑(1−ψ j,c, pp ∈ MP4) ⋅θ j,c,ip ⋅QMFUSE j, pp ∈ MP4,ip 
pp ip c+ ≥ QFPj fpH 2O , (5.9 )(1− )θ j, fp 
The volume of dry whey produced at a plant is less than or equal to one minus the
components retained from the cream and skim used in the cheese vat, casein 
production, or MPC production plus one minus the components retained from the 
interplant shipments of IP to the plant from plant type FF in region JJ divided by one 
minus the water content of the dry whey. 
YLDBUT(j,fp) 
Defined for FP=Butter only.
∑∑ ∑  ∑  ψ j c fp ⋅θ jj c ip ⋅XIPjj j ip ff, , , , , , , , fpjj ip ff c∈Fat 
H 20 Salt H 20 H 20(1− − )⋅(1− ⋅ ) /θ j, fp∈Butter θ fp∈Butter θ j, fp∈Butter θ j,c∈SNF ,ip∈Cream θ j,ip∈Cream 
(5.10 )
≥ QFPj fp, 
The volume of butter produced at a plant is less than or equal to one minus the fat 
retained from the interplant shipments of cream used in butter from plant type FF in 
region JJ divided by one minus the water and salt content of the butter times an
adjustment factor for the nonfat solids retained in the water fraction of butter.
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
YLDBMK(j,ip,fp) 
Defined for IP=Buttermilk and FP=Butter only. 
Salt∑ ∑  ∑  XIPjj, j,ipp, ff , fp ≥ QFPj, fp ⋅ (1 − θ fp ) + QIPj,ip, fp (5.11 )jj ipp ff 
The volume of buttermilk produced at a plant is less than or equal to the volume of 
interplant shipments of cream used in butter from plant type FF in region JJ minus the 
amount of butter produced adjusted for the salt content. 
YLDNDM(j,fp) 
Defined for FP=NDM only. 
∑∑θ j,c,ip∈Skim ⋅QMFUSE j, fp,ip∈Skim 
ip c ≥ QFPj, fp +QIPj,ip∈NDM , fp (5.12 )H 20(1− )θ j, fp∈NDM 
The volume of NDM as an FP or an IP produced at a plant is less than or equal to the 
components in skim used at the plant divided by the water content of the NDM.  
YLDECD(j,fp) 
Defined for FP=Evaporated, condensed or dried products only. 
∑∑θ j,c,ip ⋅QMFUSE j, fp,ip +∑∑∑∑θ jj,c,ip ⋅ XIPjj, j,ip, ff , fp 
ip c jj ip ff c ≥ QFPj fp (5.13 )H 2O(1− ) ,θ j, fp 
The volume of evaporated, condensed or dried products processed at a plant is less 
than or equal to the components in the cream and skim used in final products plus the 
components in the interplant shipments of IP to the plant allowed from plant type FF in
region JJ divided by one minus the water content of ECD products. 
YLDCAS(j,fp) 
Defined for FP=Casein under scenarios allowing US production. 
∑ ∑ψ j c fp ⋅θ j c ip ⋅QMFUSE j fp ip, , , , , , 
ip∈Skim c ≥ QFPj, fp (5.14 )H 2O(1− )θ j, fp 
The volume of casein processed at a plant is less than or equal to the components in 
the skim used divided by one minus the water content of casein. 
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
YLDDMPC(j,fp) 
Defined for FP=MP4 under scenarios allowing US production. 
∑ ∑ψ j,c, fp ⋅θ j,c,ip ⋅QMFUSE j, fp,ip 
ip∈Skim c ≥ QFPj, fp +QIPj,ip∈MP4, fp (5.15 )H 2O(1− )θ j, fp 
The volume of dried MPC processed at a plant as an intermediate or final product is less 
than or equal to the components in the skim used divided by one minus the water 
content of dried MPC. 
REQSPEC(j,fp,c) 
Defined for those products and with a required minimum content of component c. 
∑∑ψ j c fp ⋅θ j c ip ⋅QMFUSE j fp ip + ∑∑  ∑  ψ j c fp ⋅θ jj c ip ⋅XIPjj j ip ff, , , , , , , , , , , , , , fpip c jj ip ff 
(5.16 )+ ∑∑∑  ψ j c fp ⋅θ jj c ip ⋅XIPM jj j ip fp ql ≥ γ j, fp,c ⋅QFPj, fp, , , , , , , ,jj ipql 
The amount of component c retained from cream and skim used at the plant and 
retained from interplant shipments from plant type FF in region JJ must be greater than 
or equal to a minimum proportion of component c in the final product.
IPSHIP(j,ip,fp) 
Defined for allowed shipments of interplants only. 
QIPj,ip, fp ≥ ∑∑ XIPj, jj,ip, fp, ff (5.17 ) 
jj ff 
The amount of an IP produced at plant type FP in region J must be greater than or 
equal to the total amount of shipments of that IP to plant type FF in region JJ.
FPSHIP(j,fp) 
Defined for all FP. 
QFPj, fp ≥ ∑ XFPj,k, fp +XFPG j, fp +∑∑ XFPX j,k, fp,xl (5.18 )
k k xl 
The amount of an FP produced at plant type FP in region J must be greater than or 
equal to the total amount of shipments of that FP to final demand in region K or to the
government.   
IMPSHIP(j,p) 
Defined for allowable imports of IP and FP (i.e., P includes both IP and FP).
QSM j, p ≥ ∑∑∑ XIPM j, jj, p, ff ,ql +∑∑∑∑ XFPM j,k , p,ql (5.19 )
jj ff ql j k  p ql  
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
The sum of the quantities of imported IP and FP under all quota levels (ql; within-quota
and over-quota) must be less than or equal to the amount of these products supplied 
by the rest of the world (ROW).
SUBEXP(fp,xl) 
Defined for FP for which US export subsidies are designated. 
xvol fp, xl ≥ ∑∑ XFPX j,k, fp,xl (5.20 )
j k  
The sum of the quantities of subsidized US exports of FP must be less than or equal to 
the quantity restrictions imposed by WTO commitments.  The subscript xl indicates 
whether an export is subsidized or not.  The restrictions on unsubsidized exports are set 
to an arbitrarily large quantity. 
FPDEMAND(k,fp) 
Defined for all demand regions K and products FP. 
∑ XFPj,k , fp +∑∑∑ XFPM j,k, fp,ql +∑∑ XFPX j,k∈ROW , fp,xl ≥ QDk, fp (5.21 )
j j fp ql  j xl  
The amount of FP shipped from all processing regions J to demand region K must be
greater than or equal to the amount demanded. 
QUOTA(p,ql) 
Defined for all imported products P (includes both IP and FP). 
qlvlp,ql ≥ ∑∑∑ XIPM j, jj, p, ff ,ql +∑∑ XFPM j,k, p,ql (5.22 )
j jj ff  j k  
The sum of the quantities of imported intermediate and final products under import
quota level ql (within- and over-quota) must be less than or equal to the quantity 
restriction imposed under WTO commitments.  
“Dual” Constraints 
The dual constraints are as follows: 
QSFOC(i) 
Defined for all supply regions I. 
∑∑∑ (BLACT j + DPj ) ⋅ XRMi, j, fp,cl
 
εi j fp cl 
  αi ⋅QSi ≥ (5.23 )∑∑∑ XRMi, j, fp,cl 
j p cl  
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
Inverse supply relationship, where QS is the quantity of milk supplied and ε is the 
supply elasticity. The blend price at average test plus over-order premiums plus direct 
payments (under MILC) in region J weighted by all milk shipments from the region 
determine the quantity of raw milk supplied in region I.
QSMFOC(j,p) 
Defined for all regions which export to the US. 
IM ε j , pα j, p ⋅ QSM j, p ≥ PSM j, p (5.24 ) 
Inverse supply function for products imported by the US.  The FOB price of the 
imported supply in the ROW must be less than or equal to the value of the inverse 
supply function for the quantity of imports supplied in ROW, QSM. 
XRMFOC(i,j,fp,cl) 
Defined for FP that can receive raw milk. 
PCLASSA j,cl + TCAS i, j, p ≥ ∑ρ j,ip ⋅ PMFS j, fp,ip (5.25 )
ip 
The delivered milk cost (minimum classified price at average test plus over-order 
premiums for class CL plus raw milk assembly costs) from supply region I to plant type 
P in processing region J greater than the (internal) value of cream and skim separated 
from the raw milk received. 
MFSEPFOC(j,fp,ip)
Defined for IP=cream and skim and FP=plants that can receive raw milk. 
PMFS j, fp,ip ≥ PMFU j, fp,ip (5.26 )
The internal value of cream and skim separated at plant type FP is greater than or
equal to the internal value of cream and skim used at that plant. 
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MFUSEFOC(j,fp,ip)
Defined for IP=cream and skim and FP=plants that can receive raw milk. 
PMFU j, fp,ip ≥ PFPLT j, fp∈Fluid ,Yogurt 
PFPLT j, fp∈COT ⋅∑θ j,c,ip
 
c
+ H 2O(1− )θ j, fp∈Cottage 
PFPLT j, fp∈Cheese ⋅∑ψ j,c, fp ⋅ θ j,c,ip
 
c
+ H 2O(1− )θ j, fp∈Cheese 
PFPLT j, fp∈DryWhey ⋅∑(1− ψ j,c, fp∈Cheese) ⋅ θ j,c,ip
 
c
+ H 2O(1− )θ j, fp∈DryWhey 
PFPLT j, fp∈DryWhey ⋅∑(1− ψ j,c, fp∈CAS ) ⋅ θ j,c,ip
 
c
+ H 2O(1− )θ j, fp∈DryWhey 
PFPLT j, fp∈DryWhey ⋅∑(1− ψ j,c, fp∈MP4) ⋅ θ j,c,ip
 
c
+ H 2O(1− )θ j, fp∈DryWhey 
PFPLT j, fp∈NDM ⋅∑θ j,c,ip
 
c
+ H 2O(1− )θ j, fp∈NDM 
PFPLT j, fp∈ECD ⋅∑θ j,c,ip
 
c
+ H 2O(1− )θ j, fp∈ECD 
PFPLT j, fp∈CAS ⋅∑ψ j,c, fp∈CAS ⋅ θ j,c,ip
 
c
+ H 2O(1− )θ j, fp∈CAS 
PFPLT j, fp∈MP4 ⋅∑ψ j,c, fp∈MP4 ⋅ θ j,c,ip
 
c
+ H 2O(1− θ j, fp∈MP4) (5.27 )
+∑PMINREQ j,c, fp ⋅ ψ j,c, fp ⋅ θ j,c,ip 
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The internal value of cream and skim used at plant type FP is greater than or equal to 
the internal unit value of the product at that plant times the amount produced (Note 
that the yield function varies by product.) 
MIXUSEFOC(j,fp,ip)
Defined for IP=Cream and Skim and FP=NDM. 
CreamPMFU j fp ip ≥ PMIXSPEC j fp ip + PMIXUSE j ip, , , , , ∈MIX , fp 
(5.28 )
Skim H 2O ConcSkim+ PMIXUSE j ip ⋅ (1− ) /, ∈MIX , fp θ j,ip∈Skim θ j 
The internal value of cream and skim used in ice cream mix at FP=NDM is greater than 
or equal to the value of the minimum component content constraint for ice cream mix 
plus the value of cream used in ice cream milk plus the value of concentrated skim used 
in ice cream mix. 
QIPFOC(j,ip,fp) 
Defined for allowed IP and FP combinations. 
PMFU j, fp,ip + δ j,ipp∈Cream,Skim ⋅ PMIXSPEC j, fp∈NDM ,ipp∈Cream,Skim 
+ PMIXUSE j,ip∈MIX , fp∈NDM 
(5.29 )+ PFPLT j, fp∈NDM + PBMKBUT j,ip∈Buttermilk, fp∈Butter 
+ PFPLT j, fp∈MP4 + PCIP j,ip − psub j,ip ≥ PIPFOB j,ip, fp 
The internal value of product IP used at plant type FP plus the processing costs is 
greater than or equal to the IP product value at the plant. 
QFPFOC(j,fp) 
Defined for all FP. 
PFPLT j, fp + ∑ PBMKBUT j,ip, fp∈Butter ⋅ (1− Salt )θ j, fp∈Butter 
ip∈Buttermilk (5.30 )
+∑ γ j, fp,c ⋅ PMINREQ j, fp,c + PCFP j, fp − psub j, fp ≥ PFPFOB j, fp 
c 
The internal value of the product at plant type FP plus the value attributed to minimum 
component composition requirements plus the unit cost of processing is greater than or
equal to the FOB price of FP at that plant type. 
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XIPFOC(j,jj,ip,pf,ff) 
Defined for allowed J, JJ, IP and FP combinations. 
PIPFOB j ip fp + TCIPj jj ip fp ff ≥, , , , , , 
PFPLT jj, ff ∈Fluid ,IceCream,Yogurt 
PFPLT jj, ff ∈Cottage ⋅∑θ j,c,ip 
c+ 
H 20(1− )θ jj, ff ∈Cottage 
PFPLT jj, ff ∈Cheese ⋅∑ψ jj,c, ff ∈Cheese ⋅ θ j,c,ip
 
c
+ 
H 20(1− )θ jj, ff ∈Cheese 
PFPLT jj, ff ∈DryWhey ⋅∑ (1− ψ jj,c, ff ∈Cheese ) ⋅ θ j,c,ip
 
c
+ 
H 20(1− )θ jj, ff ∈DryWhey 
PFPLT jj, ff ∈Butter ⋅∑ (ψ jj,c, ff ∈Butter ) ⋅ θ j,c,ip 
c+ 
H 20 Salt H 20 H 2O(1− − )(1− ⋅ ) /θ jj, ff ∈Butter θ jj, ff ∈Butter θ jj, ff ∈Butter θ jj,c∈SNF ,ip∈Cream θ jj,ip∈Cream 
PFPLT jj, ff ∈ECD ⋅∑θ j,c,ip
 
c
+ 
H 20(1− )θ jj, ff ∈ECD 
+∑ PMINREQ jj, ff ,c ⋅ψ jj,c, ff ⋅ θ j,c,ip 
c 
(5.31 )
The value of an IP at its plant of origin plus transportation costs must be greater than 
or equal to the internal unit value of the product processed with the IP at the receiving 
plant times the yield of the product, plus the value of constraint on the composition of 
the product. The yield is based on the retention of components for cheese, whey and 
butter. 
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XIPMFOC(j,jj,p,ff,ql) 
Defined for allowable IP import combinations. 
PSM j, p ⋅ (1+ τ p,ql ) + PQRp,ql +TAR p,ql ≥ 
PFPLT jj, ff ∈Fluid ,IceCream,Yogurt 
PFPLT jj, ff ∈Cottage ⋅∑θ j,c,ip
 
c
+ 
H 20(1−	 )θ jj, ff ∈Cottage 
PFPLT jj, ff ∈Cheese ⋅∑ψ jj,c, ff ∈Cheese ⋅θ j,c,ip 
+	 c  (5.32 ) 
H 20(1−	 )θ jj, ff ∈Cheese 
PFPLT jj, ff ∈DryWhey ⋅∑ (1−ψ jj,c, ff ∈Cheese ) ⋅θ j,c,ip
 
c
+ 
H 20(1−	 )θ jj, ff ∈DryWhey 
+ ∑∑PMINREQ jj, ff ,c ⋅ψ jj,c, ff ⋅θ j,c,ip 
c ip  
The price of an imported IP at its location of origin plus transportation costs times the 
ad valorem tariff rate plus the value of quota rents plus any unit tariffs must be greater 
than or equal to the internal unit value of the product processed with the IP at the 
receiving plant times the yield of the product, plus the value of constraint on the 
composition of the composition of the product.  The yield is based on the retention of 
components for cheese and whey. 
XFPFOC(j,k,fp) 
Defined for all FP demand locations K 
PFPFOB j, fp +TCFP j k, fp ≥ PFPCIFk fp	 (5.33 ),	 , 
The FOB price of product FP in region J plus distribution costs to demand region K is 
greater than or equal to the CIF price of FP at demand region K.
XFPMFOC(j,k,fp,ql)
Defined for all imported FP to demand regions K.
PSM j, fp ⋅ (1 + τ fp,ql ) + PQR fp,ql + TAR fp,ql ≥ PFPCIFk, fp	 (5.34 )
The price of an imported FP at its location of origin plus transportation costs times the 
ad valorem tariff rate plus the value of quota rents plus any unit tariffs must be greater 
than or equal to the CIF price of FP at demand region K. 
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
XFPXFOC(j,k,fp,xl)  
Defined for all subsidized FP to from supply region J=US to demand region K=ROW. 
PFPFOB j∈US , fp − xsub fp, xl + PEXS fp, xl ≥ PFPCIFk∈ROW , fp (5.35 )
The FOB price of an US-exported FP including transportation less a unit export subsidy 
plus the value of a quantity constraint on subsidized exports must be greater than or 
equal to the CIF price of FP in the ROW. 
QDFOC(k,fp) 
Defined for all FP demand locations K.
k , fpPFPCIFk , fp ≥ βk , fp ⋅QDη (5.36 )k , fp 
The CIF price of FP in region K is greater than or equal to the inverse demand 
relationship, where QD is the quantity demanded of product FP in region K and η is the 
demand elasticity for product FP in region K. 
MINPP(j,fp) 
Defined for all FP. 
PFPFOB j fp ≥ PPMIN fp (5.37 ), 
The FOB wholesale price for product P in processing region J greater than or equal to 
fixed minimum government purchase prices for product P. 
Minimum Classified Pricing Formula Definitions 
FATPR 
 ∑ ∑ (PFPFOB , ⋅QFP j  p  , )   1  j US p  ∈ =BUT  j p   PRFAT = −11.5 (5.38 )  0.82 QFPj p   ∑ ∑  ,  j US p  =BUT   ∈ 
The butterfat price is equal to the weighted average FOB wholesale price of butter less 
a make allowance divided by a yield factor. 
SNFPR 
 (PFPFOBj p  ⋅QFP j p, )  ∑ ∑  ,1  j US p  =NDM   PRSNF = ∈ −14.0  (5.39 )   1.02 QFP , ∑ ∑ j p    j US p  ∈ =NDM    
The solids-not-fat (SNF) price is equal to the weighted average FOB wholesale price of 
nonfat dry milk (NDM) less a make allowance divided by a yield factor. 
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
PROTPR 
 (PFPFOBj p  ⋅QFPj p, )  ∑ ∑  , j US  p  CHE  ∈ =  PRPROT = 1.405 −16.5 +  ∑ ∑ QFP ,j p   j US  p  CHE   ∈ = 
(5.40 )  (PFPFOBj p  ⋅QFPj p, )   ∑ ∑  ,    j US  p  CHE  1.28 1.582 ∈ = −16.5 − PRFAT       ∑ ∑ QFPj p,    j US  p  CHE  ∈ =     
The protein price is a function of the weighted average FOB wholesale price of cheddar 
cheese adjusted by the value of butterfat. 
OSPR 
 ∑ ∑ (PFPFOB , ⋅QFP , )  j p  j p 
1  j US p  ∈ =DWH   
PROS = −14.0  (5.41 )   0.968 QFP , ∑ ∑ j p    j US p  ∈ =DWH    
The other solids (i.e. nonfat and non-protein) price is equal to the weighted average 
FOB wholesale price of dry whey less a make allowance and divided by a yield factor. 
CLFATPR(j,cl) 
Define for US regions J. 
PRFATCL j,cl = PRFAT + cldiff j,cl; if j =RST (i.e., FMMO) 
 ∑ ∑(PFPFOB j, p ⋅QFPj, p )   j=CAL p=BUTPRFATCL j cl = 1.2  − 0.1; if j = CAL and cl = 1,  ∑ ∑QFPj, p    j=CAL p=BUT   
PRFATCL j,cl = PRFATCL j,cl =4 + 0.03815; if j = CAL and cl = 2 / 3 
PRFATCL j,cl = PRFATCL j,cl =4; if j = CAL and cl = 4B  (5.42 )
  ∑ ∑(PFPFOB j, p ⋅QFPj, p )   j =CAL p=BUT PRFATCL j cl =1.2 − 0.045 − 0.097; if j =CAL and cl = 4A,  ∑ ∑QFPj, p     j =CAL p=BUT   
This equation specifies how the price of fat for each class is determined, for both FMMO 
and California pricing mechanisms. 
CLSNFPR(j,cl) 
Defined for all US regions J. 
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
PRSNFCL j cl = 0.01⋅ PRSKMCL j cl / 9; if j = RST and cl = 2, , 
PRSNFCL j,cl = 0.76 ⋅ (CRPj + 0.464 − 3.5 ⋅ PRFATCL j,cl =1) / 8.7; if j = CAL and cl = 1 
PRSNFCL j,cl = PRSNFCL j,cl =4 + 0.071; if j = CAL and cl = 2 / 3  (5.43 ) 
PRSNFCL j,cl = (PVCL4B j − 3.65 ⋅ PRFATCL j,cl =3) / 8.78; if j = CAL and cl = 4B 
 (0.01⋅ PFPFOB j p ⋅ QFPj p ) ∑ ∑ , ,   j'=CAL p= NDM PRSNFCL j cl = 0.99 ⋅ − 0.14; if j = CAL and cl = 4A,  QFPj p   ∑ ∑ ,   j'=CAL p= NDM  
This equation specifies how the price of SNF for each class is determined, for both
FMMO (class II only) and California pricing mechanisms. 
CLSKMPR(j,cl) 
Defined for FMMO regions J. 
MAX PRSKMCL , PRSKMCL ,  + cldiff , ;  if cl = 1j cl  , =3 j cl  =4  j cl  
 
 
PRSKMCL + cldiff ;  if cl = 2 , =4 j  cl  j cl  ,
PRSKMCL = , =   (5.44 ) j RST  cl   0.01⋅ (3.1⋅ PRPROT + 5.9 ⋅ PROS ); if cl = 3
 
 

9 ⋅ PRSNF 100;  if cl = 4
This equation specifies the price of skim milk by class for use in the FMMO pricing 
formulas. 
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
CLASSPRA(j,cl) 
Defined for all US regions J. 
  θ RM ⋅ XRM ∑ ∑ ( , =F , , , )i c  i j p cl 
  
 ,  i US p∈ ∈FP
 	 PRFATCL	 +j cl  
   ∑ ∑ XRMi j  p cl, ,  ,  
 i US p∈ ∈FP 

  RM
	 1−θ ⋅ XRM( , =F ) , , )∑ ∑ (	 i j p cl,  i US p∈FP i c 	   
,  ∈	 ;  if = RSTPRSKMCLj cl   j
  XRM , ,  ,  
∑ ∑  i j  p cl  
i US p∈FP ∈  
PRCLAj cl, = 
 (5.45 )  
RM	 RM RM100(θ ⋅ PRFATCL + (θ +θ )PRSNFCL ) +j cl i c, i c= j cli c, =F , =P , S ,
  RM RM RM
( − − −θ )PCL CAR1 ;	  if i j = CAL and1 θ θ	 , cl =1 , =F , =P i c=S ji c  i c  ,
 
 
 
RM	 RM RM100 θ , ⋅ PRFATCLj cl + θ , + i c PRSNFCL , ;  if i j = CAL and( i c=F , ( i c=P θ , =S ) j cl ) , cl ≠ 1 
 

This equation determines the minimum class prices at actual test, according to both 
FMMO and California pricing rules.
CLASSPRS(j,cl) 
Defined for all US regions J. 
0.035(PRFATCLj cl, ) + 0.965(PRSKMCLj cl, );  if j = RST
 
 
 
 3.5(PRFATCL , ) + 8.7(PRSNFCL , ) +j cl 	  j cl
PRCLS j cl  =	 (5.46 ),	  87.8(PCL CAR1 j );  if j = CAL and cl =1
 
 
 
3.5(PRFATCLj cl, ) + 8.7(PRSNFCL , ); if j = CAL and cl ≠1	 j cl
This equation determines the minimum class prices at standard test, according to both 
FMMO and California pricing rules.
ACTCLPRA(j,cl) 
Defined for all US regions J. 
j cl, = PRCLAj cl, +OOPD ∀ ∈j US clPCLASSA j ; ∈CL	 (5.47 ) 
The actual price of milk by class, including deducts and premiums, at actual test. 
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
ACTCLPRS(j,cl) 
Defined for all US regions J. 
PCLASSS , = PRCLS , +OOPDj j ;∀ ∈  US cl ∈CL  (5.48 ) j cl  j cl  
The actual price of milk by class, including deducts and premiums, at standard test. 
ACTBLEND(j) 
Defined for all US regions J. 
BLACT j = PBLENDA j +OOPD j j∀ ∈US  (5.49 ) 
The actual blend price in region j, including deducts and premiums under the PPD 
formula. 
BLENDA(j) 
Defined for all US regions J. 
PBLENDAj = ∑ PRCLAj,cl ⋅CLASSUTIL j,cl  (5.50 ) 
cl 
The blend price in region j at actual test, excluding deducts and premiums. 
BLENDS(j) 
Defined for all US regions J. 
PBLENDS j = ∑ PRCLS j,cl ⋅CLASSUTIL j,cl  (5.51 ) 
cl 
The blend price in region j at standard test, excluding deducts and premiums. 
TUTIL(j) 
Defined for all US regions J. 
TOTUTIL j = ∑∑QMFUSE j, fp,ip +∑∑∑∑ XIPjj, j,ip, ff , fp  (5.52 ) 
ip fp jj ip ff fp 
CU(j) 
Defined for all US regions J. ∑∑QMFUSE j, fp,ip +∑∑∑∑ XIPjj, j,ip, ff , fp 
ip fp jj ip ff fpCLASSUTIL j,cl =  (5.53 ) TOTUTIL j 
DIRECT(j) 
Defined for all US regions J. 
DP = j 
(5.54 )
PEM ⋅MAX 0, 0.45 16.94 − PCLASSS −OOPD ′ − (3.25 − 2.69)  j∀ ∈  USj { ( j ′=RST cl , =1 j =RST )}
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The direct payments in dollars per hundredweight in processing region j are equal to 
45% of the difference between $16.94 per hundredweight and the FMMO Class I price 
at Boston times the proportion of milk eligible for direct payments, if this difference is 
positive. The term (3.25 – 2.69) adjusts the Boston Class I differential to the FMMO 
average Class I differential to ensure the model’s Class I price is comparable to the 
Boston Class I price. 
PREM(j) 
Defined for all US regions J. 
PEM j = propem j 
= 
QSi j  
qs0i j   ∀ ∈  j US  (5.55 ) = 
The proportion of milk in processing region j that is eligible for direct payments equals 
an estimated proportion of eligible milk adjusted by the ratio of the reference quantity 
of raw milk supplied to the simulated quantity of raw milk supplied. 
OOPDEF(j)
Defined for all US regions J. 
∑ ∑ ∑  (PSi + tcas , ,  − PRCLA j  cl  , )XRM , ,i j p  ,i  j p cl 
  
i US p  =CHE  cl  =3
OOPD j = ∈ j US  (5.56 ) 
, ,  ,∑ ∑ ∑ XRMi j  p cl  ∀ ∈  
i US p  =CHE  cl  =3∈ 
The over-order premium (or deduct) equals the weighted average marginal milk value 
at supply region i plus the cost of assembling raw milk at cheese plants less the cheese 
milk price at average test. 
California-specific Pricing Formulas 
CHCRP(j)
Defined for California region only. 
 (0.01⋅ PFPFOB ′, ⋅QFP j p′, ) ∑ ∑  j p  
j US p  =CHE   ′∈ CRPCH = 9.8 +j CAL  =  QFP ′, ∑ ∑  j p   j US p  =CHE  ′∈ (5.57 ) ∑ ∑ (0.01⋅ PFPFOB ′, ⋅QFP ′, ) j p  j p 
 j US p  ′∈ =BUT  
0.27 − 0.1 QFP ′, ∑ ∑ j p   j US p  ′∈ =BUT   
The California Class 1 cheese commodity reference price is a function of the national
weighted average FOB wholesale cheese and butter prices adjusted by make 
allowances and yield factors. 
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BPCRP(j) 
Defined for California region only. 
 (0.01⋅ PFPFOBj p, ⋅QFP j ′, p ) ∑ ∑  ′  j US p  ′∈ =BUT  CRPBPj CAL  = ( )( )  3.5   += 1.2 QFP ′ , ∑ ∑  j p   j US p  ′∈ =BUT   
 (0.01⋅ PFPFOB ′ , ⋅QFP j p′ , ) ∑ ∑  j p j US p  =NDM  (0.99)(  )  8.7  ′∈ ∑ ∑ QFP ,′j p  j US p  ′∈ =NDM   
The California Class 1 butter-powder commodity reference price is a function of the 
national weighted average FOB wholesale butter and NDM prices adjusted by make
allowances and yield factors. 
CRPDEF(j) 
Defined for California region only. 
CRPj CAL  = = MAX CRPCH j ,CRPBP j 
The California Class 1 commodity reference price is the maximum of the cheese 
commodity reference price and the butter-powder commodity reference price. 
CL4BPV(j) 
Defined for California region only. 
 ∑ ∑ (0.01⋅ PFPFOB ′ ⋅QFP ′ ) j p, , j US p  ′∈ =CHE  j p  4 10 − 0.01 − 0.169 +PVCL B = j CAL  =  QFP ′, ∑ ∑  j p   j US p  =CHE  ′∈ 
 (0.01⋅ PFPFOBj p  ⋅QFP , )   ∑ ∑  ′ , j p′ j US p  =BUT  0.27 ′∈ − 0.10 − 0.097 ∑ ∑ QFP ,  ′j p  j US p  ′∈ =BUT   
The Class 4b product value in California is a function of the weighted average FOB 
wholesale cheese and butter prices across regions j less make allowances times yield 
factors. 
CL1CAR(j) 
Defined for California region only. 
PCL CAR 0.24 CRP + 0.464 − 3.5(PRFATCL )1 = 1 ( ( ))j CAL  j  cl  = j , =187.8 
The California Class 1 fluid carrier price is a function of the commodity reference price 
and the Class 1 butterfat price. 
(5.58 ) 
(5.59 ) 
(5.60 ) 
(5.61 ) 
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
Variables and Parameters 
The variables and parameters used in the above equations are: 
QSi = Quantity of milk supplied in supply region I
XRMi,j,fp,cl = Quantity of raw milk shipped from supply region I to plant type P (in class 
CL) in processing region J
ρj,ip = Proportion of IP=cream and skim separated from milk received at plants in  
region J.
QMFSEPj,fp,ip = Volume of IP=cream and skim separated from raw milk received at plant 
type FP in region J.
QMFUSEj,fp,ip = Volume of IP=cream and skim used in FP at plant type FP in region J.
QUSEMIXj,fp,ip = Volume of IP=cream and skim used in IP=ice cream mix at FP=NDM in
region J. 
QIP j,ip,p = Quantity of intermediate product IP processed at plant type P in region J.
H 2O = Proportion of water in intermediate product IP at region J.θ j ,ip 
ConcSkimθ j = Proportion of total solids in concentrated skim at region J 
δ j ,ip∈Cream ,Skim = Proportion of cream and skim used in ice cream mix 
XIPj,jj,ip,p,pp = Quantity of intermediate product IP shipped from plant type P in region J 
to plant type PP in region JJ
XIPMjj,j,ip,fp,ql = Quantity of imported intermediate product IP shipped from region 
JJεROW to plant type FP in region J under quota level QL
QFPj,p = Quantity of final product P processed at plant type P in region J
θ j ,c ,ip = Proportion of component C in intermediate product IP processed in region J 
H 2O = Proportion of water in final product FP processed in region Jθ j ,fp 
ψ j ,c ,fp = Retention of component C in final product FP processed in region J
Salt = Proportion of salt in final product FPθfp 
γ j ,fp ,c =Minimum proportion of component C in final product FP processed in region J
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
XFPj,k,fp = Quantity of final product FP shipped from region J to demand region K
XFPGj,p = Quantity of final product FP shipped from region J to government purchase 
programs
QSMjεROW,p = Quantity of imports of final product P supplied by region J=ROW
XFPMjεROW,k,p,ql = Quantity of imports of final product P shipped from region J=ROW to
US demand region K under quota level QL
xvolfp,xl = Limit of exports for final product FP under export subsidy level XL
XFPXj,kεROW,fp,xl = Quantity of final product FP exports shipped from US region J to
demand region K=ROW under export subsidy level XL
QDk,p = Quantity of final product P demanded in demand region K 
qlvl p,ql = Limit of imports for intermediate and final product P under import  
quota level QL
αi = Inverse raw milk supply parameter in supply region I
εi = Raw milk supply flexibility in supply region I
BLACTj = Blend price plus over-order premiums in region J (All-milk price in region J) at 
actual test 
DPj = Direct payments under MILC per hundredweight of milk in region J
= Inverse imported product supply parameterαIj
M
,p 
PSMj,p = Price of imported intermediate or final product.
PCLASSAj,cl = Class price of milk at actual test plus over-order premiums (actual milk
cost to processors)
TCAS i , j ,p = Cost of raw milk assembly from supply region I to plant type P 
in processing region J 
PMFSj,fp,ip = Marginal value of IP=cream and skim at separation at plant type FP in
region J 
PMFUj,fp,ip = Marginal value of IP=cream and skim at use in final products at plant type 
FP in region J 
PFPLTj,fp = Marginal (internal) value a unit of final product at plant type FP in region J
PMINREQj,c,fp = Marginal value of minimum required composition of component C in 
product FP in region J
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Chapter 5: Impacts of MPC Imports 
PMIXSPECj, fp, ip = Marginal value of minimum required composition of ice cream mix in 
region J 
PMIXUSEj,ipεMIX,fp = Marginal value of cream and skim used in ice cream mix in region J 
PBMKBUTj, ipεButtermilk, fpεButter = Value of buttermilk at butter plant in region J 
PCIP j ,fp = Unit processing cost of product IP in processing region J 
PIPFOBj,ip,fp = FOB wholesale price for intermediate product IP produced at plant type 
FP in processing region J
PFPFOBj,fp = FOB wholesale price for final product FP in processing region J
PCFP j ,fp = Unit processing cost of product FP in processing region J 
PFPFOBj,p = FOB wholesale price for product P in processing region J 
TCIP j , jj ,ip ,p ,pp = Cost of transporting intermediate product IP from plant type P in 
processing region J to plant type PP in processing region JJ
τ p ,ql = Ad valorem tariff on imports of product P under quota level QL 
PQRp ql = Marginal value of quota restriction on imports of product P under quota level QL, 
TARp ,ql = Unit tariff on imports of product P under quota level QL 
TCFP j ,k ,fp = Cost of wholesale distribution of final product FP from processing region 
J to demand region K 
PFPCIFkf,p = CIF wholesale price for final product FP in demand region K
xsubfp,xl = Unit export subsidy for final product FP under export subsidy level XL
PEXSfp,xl = Marginal value of constraint of quantity of FP exported under export subsidy 
level XL 
βk,fp = Inverse wholesale demand parameter for final product FP in demand region K
ηk,fp = Final product FP demand flexibility in region K
PPMIN p = Fixed minimum government purchase price for product P 
PRFAT = Butterfat price from FMMO pricing formulas
PRSNF = SNF price from FMMO pricing formulas
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PROS = Other solids price from FMMO pricing formulas
PRPROT = Protein price from FMMO pricing formulas
PRFATCLj, cl = Price of butterfat for class CL in region J 
PRSNFCLj, cl = Price of SNF for class CL in region J 
PRSKMCLjεRST, cl = Price of skim for class CL in region J
PRCLAj, cl = Minimum class price for class CL in region J at actual test
PRCLSj, cl = Minimum class price for class CL in region J at standard test
PCLASSAj, cl = Actual cost of milk used class CL in region J at actual test, including 
premiums or deducts
PCLASSSj, cl = Actual cost of milk used class CL in region J at standard test, including 
premiums or deducts
OOPDj = Over-order premium in processing region J
PBLENDAj = Blend price of milk used in region J at actual test
PBLENDSj = Blend price of milk used in region J at standard test
TOTUTILj = Total utilization of cream and skim and interplant shipments in region J
CLASSUTILj,cl = Total utilization of cream and skim and interplant shipments in class CL 
in region J
PEMj = Proportion of milk in processing region J eligible for direct payments
PROPEM j = Initial proportion of milk in processing region J eligible for direct payments
PSi = Marginal value of raw milk at supply point I
CRPCHjεCAL= Commodity reference price for cheese from California pricing formulas
CRPBPjεCAL = Commodity reference price for butter-powder from California pricing 
formulas
CRPjεCAL = Commodity reference price for Class 1 from California pricing formulas
PVCL4bjεCAL = Class 4b product value price from California pricing formulas
PCL1CARjεCAL = Class 1 fluid carrier price from California pricing formulas 
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